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V. Ramaswamy Iyer Vs. K. Ramakrishnayya - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectTenancy
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1969)2MLJ272
AppellantV. Ramaswamy Iyer
RespondentK. Ramakrishnayya
Cases ReferredGhulam Ghouse v. Raia Rao
Excerpt:
- .....till 1966 when he filed e.p. no. 751 of 1966 for delivery of possession as per the order of the rent controller in the main petition obtained by him in august, 1957. this was opposed by the petitioner mainly on two grounds. the first contention of the petitioner was that there was a fresh tenancy created by acceptance of rents by the respondent between 1957 and 1966 and therefore the order cannot be executed. his second contention was that the rent controller not being a civil court, the decree which the landlord executed to secure delivery of possession of the property in question in the ordinary courts of law cannot be termed as a decree of a civil court so as to attract article 182 and the relevant sub-sections of the limitation act. the learned city civil judge did not agree with.....
Judgment:
ORDER

T. Ramaprasada Rao, J.

1. The petitioner in this case was the tenant against whom an order for eviction was obtained by the respondent landlord on 3rd August, 1957. The agreed rent payable by the petitioner to the landlord was Rs. 21 per month. After the respondent secured an order of eviction in 1957, he attempted to execute the same in the years 1958 and 1961. In fact, it appears that when the execution petition was filed in 1958, a warrant for possession was also issued. It is not, however, clear from the record as to the circumstances under which the execution petition was withdrawn by the landlord. After the withdrawal of the execution petition in 1958, the landlord again filed a petition for possession in the year 1961 which again appears to have been dismissed; the reasons for dismissal, however, are not clear. Thereafter, the Limitation Act of 1963 was enacted which gave apparently to the landlord the benefit to execute the decree within a period of 12 years from the date it was passed. No steps were taken by the landlord till 1966 when he filed E.P. No. 751 of 1966 for delivery of possession as per the order of the Rent Controller in the main petition obtained by him in August, 1957. This was opposed by the petitioner mainly on two grounds. The first contention of the petitioner was that there was a fresh tenancy created by acceptance of rents by the respondent between 1957 and 1966 and therefore the order cannot be executed. His second contention was that the Rent Controller not being a civil Court, the decree which the landlord executed to secure delivery of possession of the property in question in the ordinary Courts of law cannot be termed as a decree of a civil Court so as to attract Article 182 and the relevant sub-sections of the Limitation Act. The learned City Civil Judge did not agree with the contentions raised by the petitioner and held that the execution petition was not barred by limitation and no fresh tenancy had been created.

2. In this Court, learned Counsel for the petitioner, while repeating the very same contentions, urges that a fresh tenancy has been created as between the landlord and the tenant by acceptance of rents after the passing of the order for eviction. The case of the petitioner in the lower Court was that there was an agreement to pay increased rent and that was being paid by the tenant to the landlord, and by such payment there was indeed a fresh tenancy. This was disbelieved by the lower Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, pursues another line of argument by stating that even though the rent has not been increased, yet by the mere receipt of the original rent as agreed upon between the tenant and the landlord such receipt of rent by itself is a ready indicia to conclude that the intention of the landlord, was to create a fresh tenancy between himself and the tenant. I am unable to agree. If a landlord received the rents after an order for eviction it was not because he waived his right to secure possession of the property by virtue of the order of eviction already secured by him, but because he did not want to lose the legitimate amount to which he is entitled for the wrongful occupation of the premises by the tenant. In fact, the tenant obviously was in wrongful occupation of the premises. After the order for eviction was passed by the Rent Controller, any amount received by the landlord during such occupation of the tenant would not, in my view, tantamount to creation of a fresh relationship of landlord and tenant, different and distinct from the earlier relationship which is the foundation of the very action. Support is also gained for this view in a case reported in Ghulam Ghouse v. Raia Rao : AIR1947Mad436 , Happell, J., while repelling a similar contention which, of course, arose under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act observed that Section 116 was not applicable to the case, and that no new tenancy was created by the subsequent payment of rent to the landlord, as the tenant was not a person remaining in possession after the termination of the tenancy but was wrongfully remaining in possession beyond the date on which he had been directed by the House Rent Controller to give possession to his landlord. Apart from the ratio in the above case and my view of the matter, it appears that the landlord took the precaution of issuing receipts to the tenant without prejudice to his right to evict the tenant under the orders obtained by him from the Rent Controller. Exhibits A-1 and A-2 are a pointer in this behalf. I am, therefore, not satisfied that the tenant has let in any evidence to establish that the intention of the landlord in having accepted the old rent was indeed to create a new tenancy which would disentitle him from prosecuting his ordinary remedies in a civil Court under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.

3. This leads on to the question as to how and in what manner the order for eviction passed by the Rent Controller could be executed. In fact, this point involves a consideration of the second point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is conceded that the execution of the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was sought by the respondent under Section 18 of the Madras Act XVIII of 1960. While dealing with the execution of orders, this section provides that every order passed by the Rent Controller (it is not necessary to set out other details in this section for the purpose of this case) shall be executed by the City Civil Court in the City of Madras as if it were a decree passed by the said Court. By such a fiction the order passed by the Rent Controller is converted into a decree of a civil Court and this notional conversion by the operation of the fiction makes it a decree of a civil Court. If this were so, Article 182 of the Limitation Act as it then was, under the old Act, is naturally attracted. I do not agree with the extreme contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the expression 'as if it is a decree of a civil Court' appearing in Section 18 of the Madras Act XVIII of 1960 is not intended to give to an order of the Rent Controller placed in the hands of the City Civil Court, a status of a decree of a civil Court. In fact, the effect, content and real purpose of Section 18 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960 is to cloth the City Civil Court with the jurisdiction to execute the order of a tribunal constituted under Act XVIII of 1960 or a Rent Controller for the matter of that as if it were its own decree, meaning thereby a decree of a civil Court.

4. It, therefore; follows that it is a decree of a civil Court that was sought to be executed by the respondent ever since 1958. He attempted once in the year 1958, followed it up in 1961 and thereafter in 1966 taking advantage of the provisions of the new Indian Limitation Act of 1963. There can be no doubt at all that the respondent had at all material times the right to execute this decree. The order which has entered into the portals of the City Civil Court for the purpose of execution should be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court. In this view, the second contention that as the decree is not that of a civil Court, but that of the Rent Controller and hence inexecutable, cannot be countenanced at all.

5. Rightly, therefore, the learned City Civil Judge dismissed the objections raised for the execution of the order. I do not find any reasons to differ from the reasoning and the result arrived at by the lower Court. This Civil Revision Petition is therefore, dismissed with costs. The petitioner is granted four months' time to vacate.


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