1. The plaintiff sues for rent due on a lease executed to him by the defendant. Sometime after the lease he assigned his reversion to a third party. The defendant had advanced kattahanom to the plaintiff. It has been found by the lower Courts that when an advance of this nature is made by a tenant, the interest due on the amount every year is deducted from the amount due for the year and the principal amount of the kattakanom is re-payable at the termination of the lease. Although the original lease was only for one year, it is not denied that the defendant, on the termination of the year, became a tenant from year to year. The tenancy has no been put an end to. Prima facie, therefore the defendant would not be entitled to claim his kattakanom, at present or set off the amount of it against the amount claimed by the plaintiff for tow years. The District Munsif did not permit him to make the set off, but the Subordinate Judge has allowed him to do so. It appears that the assignee has reason to anticipate difficulties with respect to the adjustment of this kattakanom reserved in his hands in the settlement of accounts between him and the assignor's family with respect to the consideration due for the assignment, and that, for that reason the tenant is disinclined to enforce his claim to the kattakanom against the assignee and would prefer to enforce it against the assignor himself. He, no doubt, has the option to decide whether he would proceed against the assignor or assignee, but this does not affect the question, when re-payment is due to the defendant of the kattakanom amount. It was not alleged by the defendant that there was any special agreement in the case making the kattakanom re-payable if the lessor made an assignment, of his reversionary right; and no authority has been cited in support of the argument that, if the tenant chooses to proceed against the assignor himself instead of against the assignee, the right to re-payment would accrue when the assignment is made. We must, therefore, set aside the Sub-Judge's decree. The plaintiff would be entitled to recover the rent without deducting the kattakanom, amount, but only the interest due on it for the two years in question. It is also argued by the appellant that the plaintiff is entitled to the commutation value of the paddy rent due to him as it stood at the date of the suit. The plaintiff, as we read the plaint, does not seem to have claimed payment of paddy in kind. His claim was for a sum of money as damages for nonpayment of rent. Whatever doubt there may be about the construction of the plaint, it is quite clear that when the Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree only for damages, he did not appeal against it claiming payment of paddy instead of money. On the footing that the plaintiff was entitled only to damages for the defendant's breach of contract, there can be no doubt that the damages must be computed as they stood at the time of breach of the contract. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the value of paddy only according to the rate prevalent at the end of the years 1080 and 1081 respectively. The amount found by the Subordinate Judge is accepted. It is contended by the respondent that the original defendant being dead and the lease having been taken by him for his own benefit, the decree against the present respondents, who have been placed on the record as his representatives, should be only against the assets of the deceased Gopala Menon. It does not appear from anything in the record, whether the lease was taken by him in his individual capacity and whether the suit was against him only as an individual and not as representing the tarwad. If the lease was taken by him on behalf of the tarwad, then the rent would be payable out of the tarwad property in the hands of the present respondents. The form of the decree may be that the defendants should pay rent out of the assets of Gopala Menon in their hands, such assets comprising the tarwad property in their hands, if the lease was taken by the deceased on behalf of the tarwad. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout. It is unnecessary to pass separate orders on the memorandum of objections.