Pakenham Walsh, J.
1. In this case there was a reference to arbitration on February 27, 1932. The award dated March 23, 1932, was filed on March 31, 1932, and on the same day a decree was passed in terms of the award. It would appear that the plaintiff reported that he had no objections but at the outset the defendant raised various objections. The Court found it necessary to consider objection No. 4 only where it is stated that the arbitrator has given his award in favour of the plaintiff without examining the plaintiff's witnesses or his account books. From the fact that it is called objection No. 4 it may be inferred that the defendant put in written objections. The objection was dismissed. This petition is on two grounds: (1) that the learned District Munsif did not give time to the defendant to substantiate his objections nor did he deal with them judicially; and (2) that in any case the decree passed within ten days after the award was filed-- which is the period under Article 158 of the Limitation Act for putting in objections--is invalid. On the first contention I think it is clear that the petitioner must succeed. There is nothing in the record to suggest that he was given a chance of proving his objection by evidence. The District Munsif proceeds to dispose of it in the following words:
This is a wide and sweeping objection and is unsupported by facts The arbitrator has stated in that award that his findings were arrived at 'after hearing both the parties and considering all evidence placed before me.' The arbitrator is a Pleader of fairly good standing and I do not see why his statement of what transpired before him should not be accepted. From his award, it is clear that he heard the parties and their evidence and gave his award. Such an award could not be said to have been vitiated by any misconduct.
2. There is not a word about the evidence nor does he say that the defendant has either failed to adduce evidence or that his evidence was found to be insufficient to establish his objection.
3. The view of the Court, as I take it, appears to be that the arbitrator's award is final not only as regards the award itself but also as regards any statement which he makes in it as to the conduct of the proceedings. From that point of view the petition must succeed.
4. As regards the second point I am unwilling to express any decided opinion. In the case of Gunga Narain Ghose v. Ram Chand Ghose 20 WR 311 the Court insisted upon the objections being put in in one day whereas the parties are entitled to ten days and all the remarks in that case have to be read in the light of that fact. In Ravjibhai v. Dayabhai 59 Ind. Cas. 811 : 45 B 832 : 22 Bom. LR 1454 a decree was passed in terms of the award when no objec-jections were filed and ten days had not elapsed. In Ruddaraju Sooraparaju v. Ruddaraju Narayananaraju 17 Ind. Cas. 431 : (1912) MWN 1232 : 12 MLT 608 it would appear that no objections were filed. In Sri Krishanin Rochumal v. Rulumal Pariomal, 34 Ind. Cas. 845 34 Ind. Cas. 845 the Court was definitely opposed to the view that a decree passed in terms of the award within ten days is valid even though the objections may have been heard and disposed of within that time. But this is only from the Judicial Commissioner of Sind and carries no authority in this Court.
5. It is possible that ten days is given as an absolute period before which the award shall not be decreed in order to give the parties time to substantiate their objections. It must be admitted that if Section 16 of the Second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the award cannot be pronounced before the expiry of the period, it is very unfortunately worded. It runs as follows:
Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for re-consideration in manner aforesid, and no application has been made to set aside the award, or the Court has refused such application, the Court shall after the time for making such application has expired, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award.
6. This section clearly contemplates a case of application having been made to set aside an award and the Court, having refused such application, proceeds with the case, and puts such a case in the same category as one where no application has been made to set aside the award and where, after the time for making such application has expired it proceeds to pronounce judgment according to the award. The period is the same in each case 10 days. The wording seems to me to be perfectly plain and if I had to express an opinion for the purpose of this case I should hold that the words must be taken in their plain meaning and that the judgment should not be pronounced within ten days after the award has been received.
7. However the first ground in this case is quite sufficient in my opinion to allow the petition. The decree must be set aside and a fresh decree made after granting petitioner an opportunity for substantiating his objection. Costs of this petition will follow the decree.