Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.
1. The accused petitioners before me were convicted along with 20 others of the offences of rioting and hurt by the Magistrate who heard the ease. The Magistrate convicted the 20 accused, and on appeal the Appellate Magistrate acquitted 10 out of the 20. It is now argued before me that the learned Appellate Magistrate has not considered the ease of each of the petitioners separately and come to a conclusion with regard to his guilt or otherwise. On a careful consideration of the judgment of the Appellate Magistrate I an satisfied that he did not bring to bear, with regard to the case of each of these accused, a judicial mind for the purpose of considering whether he was guilty or not having regard to the charges against him and the special evidence directed to him and his particular defence if any. It has been held by Ayling, J., in the case of In re Bapu Naidu (1915) 2 L.W. 958 that though the Appellate Magistrate may give satisfactory reasons for accepting the conclusions of the Original Magistrate, his omission to consider the case against the individual accused separately would vitiate the judgment. To similar effect is the judgment of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in the ease of Thakshinamurthi Rajali v. Emperor (1918) M.W.N. 129. The Calcutta High Court seems even to have gone further and stated in the case of Arindara Rajbunshi v. Emperor 20 C.W.N. 1296 that the judgment of the Appellate Magistrate should be self sufficient, that is to say, should contain all the necessary materials to enable the High Court to form a conclusion as to the propriety of the conviction of each of the accused having regard to the various offences with which each of the accused was charged and to enable the High Court to come to a conclusion as to the correctness of the sentence upon each of the accused. The learned Public Prosecutor has drawn my attention to certain words in the judgment of the Appellate Magistrate which go to show that he found the conclusions arrived at by the Original Magistrate to be correct. But that would obviously be insufficient in view of the decisions just now referred to by me. After stating that the analysis of the evidence made by the lower Court was correct and that on that footing the ten petitioners before me were guilty the Appellate Magistrate proceeds to say thus : 'The defence evidence is untrustworthy as analysed by the lower Court and does not also help the appellants above mentioned referring only also 1, 3, 4, 6 and 11.'. This sentence is rather difficult to understand, but assuming that it means that the defence evidence bad relation only to five of these ten petitioners, still it would not go to show that he considered judicially the evidence adduced for the defence in respect of these five accused. On the whole, regarding the judgment in its entirety, I am not satisfied that the Appellate Magistrate brought his judicial mind to bear on the evidence in the case of each of these petitioners separately. His decision was therefore wrong : I set it aside and remand the case to the Joint Magistrate of Chingleput for entertaining the appeal of these ten petitioners and disposing of the same according to law. Such of the petitioners as have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment will continue to be on bail till the disposal of the appeal on the same security as has been furnished by them.
2. I might also point out that the Appellate Magistrate has nowhere referred to the common object of the unlawful assembly by reason whereof the petitioners have been convicted of the offence of rioting. It may be that this matter was not clearly argued before the Appellate Magistrate in the first instance. For the purpose of arriving at a proper decision with regard to the case of these petitioners it would be necessary to find whether these ten persons were really' guilty of the offence of rioting as having formed members of an unlawful assembly with a common unlawful object. The execution of the sentences of fine imposed on the petitioners should be suspended till the disposal of the appeal.