1. This is an appeal against the order of the lower appellate Court declining to give effect to are valuation held under Section 6(3) of the Malabar Tenants Improvement Act. The decree of the first Court was passed on 18-2-18. For the purpose of the suit there had been a valuation of the 'improvements' by a Commissioner in 1916. The suit went up on appeal and second appeal and; the second appeal decree was passed on 16-11-20. On an application for revaluation under Section 6(3) of the Act a second Commissioner was sent in September 1921 and he reportel his valuation of the improvements. This valuation both the lower Courts have declined to accept and the appellant appeals.
2. The method followed by the second Commissioner apparently was not to value how much the property had improved since the first valuation in 1916, but how much it had improved since the date of the kanom, i.e., as if he was carrying out a first valuation and not are valuation. As his total figure is much larger than the figure of the first Commissioner, appellant claims compensation at that figure. Needless to say, if the second figure had been less than the first, appellant would have claimed the contrary. This indicates that this line of reasoning is wrong. The first figure is already embodied in the final decree and cannot be disturbed, and must be accepted so far as it goes. That is, the duty of the second Commissioner was to accept it as the compensation payable up to the date up to which the final decree said compensation had been fixed and decreed and consider whether, after that date, there had been further improvements which would entitle the kanomdar to further compensation. This principle is enunciated in a case reported at Kunhammad Kutti v. Punchara Aleewa : (1916)30MLJ203 and seems to me to follow clearly from the wording of Section 6(3) of the Act. As I understand the section, the Commissioner has to consider (1) if any and what compensation is to be given for new improvements subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree; and (2) whether any improvement, which has already been adjudged, has to be revalued in consequence of some change in its condition since the adjudication of it in the first case. It is not his business to make a valuation de novo. The starting point of the second valuation is the point where the first left off, and on the appellant rests the onus of putting before the commissioner evidence on which he has to make his decision.
3. The method of the Commissioner was therefore wrong. But I am not prepared to direct a fresh re-valuation, as it is clear that his error was due to the laches of appellant. His kariasthan P.W. 3, who accompanied the Commissioner, does not appear to have furnished him with any copy of the first valuation and to have taken any steps to see that it was furnished to him. The original valuation was not produced even at the hearing of this application before the Court of first instance. It was clearly the appellant's duty to see that the second Commissioner was provided with information as to each item for valuation, as to its condition at the time of the first valuation and its value as adjudicated by the final decree. Vague evidence, which is all that is now given, that some trees have increased in girth is of no use. Other trees have probably disappeared altogether, and some new ones may have grown up. Appellant has not even examined either of the Commissioners. Appellant: in this failed to supply the necessary information to enable the re-valuation to be properly conducted by the Commissioner and tested by the Courts. I do not subscribe to all the reasons given by the lower appellate Courts for rejecting the revaluation, such as e. g., that no compensation is permissible for trees of spontaneous growth. But even so, appellant has failed to adduce evidence to justify the award of any additional compensation. I decline to interfere and dismiss this appeal with costs.