M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.
1. In our view, the substantial point which is involved in the writ appeal can be disposed of on quite a short ground. It is a well-established principle of the judicial interpretation of statutes, that a Court may certainly look into the full-length title of an Act and its Preamble, in order to appreciate the intendment and tenor of the enacted statute. Certainly, this was enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in In re Kerala Education Bill) 1957 : 1SCR995 , and their Lordships further observed on this principle that, when any particular clause leaves any discretion to the Government to take any action, it must be understood that such discretion must be exercised for the purpose of advancing the policy enunciated in the Preamble. Their Lordships stated that the policy and purpose of a given measure could be deduced from the Long Title and Preamble thereto, and that this has been recognised in many decisions of that Court.
2. But, the extraordinary remedy sought for in the writ petition was the issue of a writ of prohibition inhibiting the Rent Controller from further proceeding with an action before him under Section 14 (1) (b) of Act XVIII of 1960, on the ground that Section 14 (1) (b) itself was violative of the purpose enunciated in the Preamble to the Act namely, 'the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants' inter alia. We are quite unable to accept this argument, and in fact, if it be accepted, it will cause considerable confusion with regard to the implementation of the respective rights of parties under any statute. It is well-settled that, where a statute is clear and explicit in its terms with reference to any particular section, the section cannot be interpreted in some other manner which is not consistent with the language employed, because of an argument that that would be contrary to the broad policy stated in the Preamble. Actually a Section 14 (1) (b) does not stand alone in this respect. Though, broadly speaking, the Act gives rights against eviction to tenants, and very valuable rights, it also gives certain rights to landlords to enable them to obtain possession of leased premises under stated contingencies, as those enacted in Section 10 (3) (c) etc. Section 14 (1) (b) is only another instance of the right of landlord to obtain possession, on proof of the bona fide requirement to which this section relates. Firstly, the Preamble does not control the statute in this sense. Secondly, even if the Preamble can be looked into for such a purpose, that does not imply that it would be ' unreasonable ' to evict a tenant within the scope of Section 14 (1) (b) of the Act. Obviously, the Legislature thought otherwise and it is the intention of the Legislature that should prevail.
3. Accordingly we dismiss the writ appeal.