Skip to content


Kongot Puthen Veetlil Ammu Vs. Kongot Puthen Veetlil Nagappan Nair Karmavan and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1936Mad653; 165Ind.Cas.764
AppellantKongot Puthen Veetlil Ammu
RespondentKongot Puthen Veetlil Nagappan Nair Karmavan and anr.
Excerpt:
malabar compensation for tenants improvements act (i of 1900), section 6(3) - decree for eviction embodying award for compensation for improvements--date on which amounts are valued not mentioned--inference--provision for re-valuation in act--whether gives judgment-debtor right to go behind decree. - .....the decree has been passed. it is of course open to a court in passing its decree to say that the value of improvements on such and such a date is so much and that any increment in value may be worked out in execution by a re-valuation. but in the absence of any such provision the amount awarded for the value of improvements in the decree must be taken to be the decision of the court as to their value on that date.3. there are other minor contentions in this appeal which have little substance in them. it is argued that the tenant is entitled to a refund from the landlord of the cist which she paid shortly before her eviction because the landlord has been given a decree for mesne profits against his tenant. the only basis on which such a refund could be claimed would be if mesne profits.....
Judgment:

Wadsworth, J.

1. This appeal arises out of order in execution of a decree passed for eviction of a tenant in possession in Malabar, entitled to compensation for improvements under Madras Act I of 1900. The main question in the appeal is one of revaluation with reference to Clause 3, Section 6 of that Act. The suit was apparently pending for a number of years and the decree, which was passed in 1929 in fixing the amount of compensation due to the tenant accepted a valuation made by a Commissioner in 1926. The tenant was evicted almost immediately after the decree so that there is no question of any accretion in value between the date of the decree and the date of the eviction.

2. The argument for the appellant is that because Section 6(3) of the Act refers to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree, when no such date is given in the decree, the executing Court is at liberty to go behind the decree and ascertain from the evidence the date on which the valuation was actually made and allow a re-valuation with reference to any increment in value between the date of the valuation and the date of eviction. It is argued that this is the practice which is in vogue in certain Courts in Malabar and I am asked to give compensation to this practice, which, to my mind strikes at the root of the principles upon which the decrees of a Court ate executed. When a Court's decree for eviction embodies an award for compensation for improvements and say9 nothing about the date on which those amounts are valued, the natural inference is that the award concludes any claim between the parties on the date of the decree. The mere fact that Section 6 (3) of the Act provides for re-valuation does not give to the judgment-debtor a right to go behind the decree and by looking into the evidence to find out when the crop was last valued and re-open the whale matter by having a further valuation made immediately after the decree has been passed. It is of course open to a Court in passing its decree to say that the value of improvements on such and such a date is so much and that any increment in value may be worked out in execution by a re-valuation. But in the absence of any such provision the amount awarded for the value of improvements in the decree must be taken to be the decision of the Court as to their value on that date.

3. There are other minor contentions in this appeal which have little substance in them. It is argued that the tenant is entitled to a refund from the landlord of the cist which she paid shortly before her eviction because the landlord has been given a decree for mesne profits against his tenant. The only basis on which such a refund could be claimed would be if mesne profits were calculated without reference to the costs bf calculation or the costs incidental to raising the crop such as the payment of revenue. There seem to be no materials before the Court upon which one can hold that the payments made for the assessment were not taken taken into consideration in calculating the amount due for mesne profits, and in the absence of such materials there are no reasons for criticising the lower Appellate Court's order. Arguments have also been advanced before me on the question of the conversion rate for paddy and the valuation of the banana crop. There are matters with which in second appeal I have no concern. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal refused.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //