K. Veeraswami, C.J.
1. The appellant, a private High School at Arumuganeri, complaints against the order of Mudaliyar, J., who on a writ petition by the first respondent,. directed the appellant to pay her salary and allowances for the period from 16th July, 1968, to 31st May, 1969. The first respondent served in the institution as a teacher. She attained the superannuation at the age of 58 on 15th July, 1968. This was brought to her notice by the appellant by a letter dated 15th April, 1968, which said that on that date she would retire; On 24th April, 1968, she preferred an appeal to the Chief Education Officer against the second respondent's correpondent's views. She took up the stand that her superannuation was to be at 60. Pending disposal of the appeal and on the advice of the Chief Education Officer, she was continued in service up to 5th August, 1968, when her appeal was dismissed. A further appeal she filed, but that was rejected on 19th March, 1969, by the Director of School Education. The first respondent filed the writ petition on 9th December, 1970 after a delay of nearly 18 months from the date of the order of the Director of School Education. In her writ petition her prayer was that the Court should give a direction to the School to modify its order dated 10th March, 1969 directing her to retire on 15th July, 1968, arid to direct the school to reinstate her in the school with retrospective effect from 16th July, 1968, so as to enable her to claim appropriate monetary remedies and pass such further orders. Mudaliyar J., did not give the relief that she asked for, but gave the relief which we mentioned on the basis of an order of the Government, G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Education, dated, 24th September, 1965. in that order, the Government directed that any teacher attaining superannuation during the course of the academic year be permitted to continue till the end of the school academic year subject to the usual conditions. The Government order further said that the Director of Secondary Education should issue necessary revised instructions to all concerned. The relief granted, as we said, by Mudliayar, J., was on the basis of this Government order.
2. It is pressed upon us for the appsl-lajnt, and quite rightly, that the ordei under appeal cannot be sustained. As already noticed, the appellant is a private institution. Employment in the institution is entirely governed by contractual basis. No Rule s having the force of law apply to the service conditions. It may be that the Government in giving effect to their policies on education may give directions from time to time which it is open to the private institutions to follow or not. The only control the Government may have on such institutions is through the aid which tfey extend to such institutions. The order of Government, which formed the basis of the order under appeal is certainly not a Rule having the force of law. It is merely an administrative order which the institution may choose to ignore whatever may be the consequences. We cannot say that the Government order by its own force brought about any change in the conditions of service governed by a contract between the appellant and the first respondent.
3. Counsel for the first respondent relied on Union of India v. K.P. Joseph : 2SCR752 . where it was observed by the Supreme Court that to say that the Government order could never confer any right would be too wide a proposition and that there were administrative orders which conferred rights and imposed duties. The Court further observed that it was because an administrative order could abridge or take away rights that Courts had imported the principle of natural justice of audi alterant pattern into this area. We are afraid that this citation is not apposite and does not in any way support the first respondent. That was a case of a Government servant, more particularly in the Indian Army, and the question there was whether a general office memorandum touching the conditions of service, as an administrative order, which conferred certain rights on a Government employee, could be enforced through Courts cf law. That is not the case before us. A private institution is not regulated by a Government order in the matter of conditions of service of its own employees which are left to contractual relationship. We are unable, therefore, to agree with the learned Judge that the first respondent is entitled to the relief which he has given on the strength of the Government order.
4. We may also mention that the very Director of School Education, who was directed by the Government order concerned to give effect to it, had himself dismissed the appeal of the first respondent.
5. The appeal is therefore, allowed. No costs.