1. The first point argued is that the 11th plaintiff was incompetent to file the appeal in the lower appellate Court. Mr. Lakshmanna relied on P. Krishnan Unni Nambiar v. C.M. Nilakandan Bhattathiripad (1882) 4 Mad. 141. That case related to the position of a Karayamma Samudayam under Malabar Customary Law. Here the temple is governed by a scheme and the order of the District Court, Godavari, dated 7th November 1919, modifies and supplements the original scheme, and I do not see that the appointment of a manager for the purpose of suing is ultra vires.
2. The next point argued is that Ex. 1 is binding on the plaintiffs as it was in compromise of a bona fide dispute. The Subordinate Judge thinks that the dispute was 'merely a pretention' and he is entitled to find so on the evidence. Mr. Lakshmanna contends that the whole of the Subordinate Judge's reasoning in paragraphs 2 and 3 is vitiated by a mistake as to the pandal to which the litigation of 1905 related. It is true that the pandal referred to in the third issue of that suit was the pandal opposite to the trustees house vide Ramanathan Chrttiar v. Swaminatha Aiyar (1912) 12 M.L.T. 155. It is also true that the defendants' father was muktyar only for two or three years, and the defendants' father died in 1913. There is nothing to show that the pandal was erected with any previous express permission, prior to 1905 and it is possible to argue that its existence was adverse if it existed for 40 years. But it seems to me that Ex. 1 is conclusive and puts an end to any adverse possession. Exhibit 1 was accepted by the defendant, and be is bound by its recitals. It proceeds on the footing that the defendant applied for permission and the permission was given. The possession must be taken to be permissive on the footing of that of a licensee.
3. It is true that the license intended to be given by Ex. 1 was a permanent license but this the Dharmakartha has no right to issue; see Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 65. Though I do not agree with the Subordinate Judge in supposing that Ex. 1 should be registered and though a fresh finding might have to be called for on the question of adverse possession, if there had been no Ex. 1, I think Ex. 1 puts an end to these questions.
4. The second appeal Jails and is dismissed with costs.