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Adivi Bapiraju and anr. Vs. Tummalapalli Sreeramulu and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in152Ind.Cas.459
AppellantAdivi Bapiraju and anr.
RespondentTummalapalli Sreeramulu and ors.
Cases ReferredDevaguptapu Kameswaramma v. Vadaddi Venkatasubba Rao
Excerpt:
hindu law - debts--decree against father--partition between father and sons--liability of son's share to be attached in execution. - .....is binding on them, and another thing to say that where they have not been so impleaded in the suit property which has fallen to them in partition can be proceeded against. the lower appellate court does not seem to have grasped this distinction. the learned counsel for the respondent did not deny the legal position contended for by the learned advocate for the appellants but suggested that the attachment in 1921 which was made before the partition remained in force. but the trial court has stated that the execution filed by the plaintiff in o.s. no. 31 of 1917 in 1920 was subsequently not proceeded with and it was also dismissed. it is clear therefore that there was no subsisting attachment at the time of the partition which took place some time about 1921. under these circumstances.....
Judgment:

Pakenham Walsh, J.

1. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the appellants in this second appeal which arises in the following way. A. decree was obtained in O.S. No. 34 of 1917, against the first defendant who is the father of the present appellants. An attempt was made in execution to sell the property in 1920 and an attachment petition was put in but it was dismissed for default of prosecution. In 1924 another application to attach these properties was made and the present appellants put in a claim petition Ex. VI on October 23, 1921, alleging that subsequent to the decree there had been a partition between them and their father and they had been in possession of the properties that fall to their snare and these properties could not be attached in execution proceedings for a decree obtained against their father. That claim was allowed the decree-holder's pleader reporting no instructions. The respondent who subsequently got an assignment of this decree put in an execution petition E. P. No. 1516 of 1925 to attach and bring to sale the same properties. The appellants put in second claim petition repeating their earlier plea and taking a further plea that as no suit had been instituted to set aside the order passed on their previous claim petition, the respondent was not entitled to make the attachment. This claim petition was allowed on March 9, 1926, and the present suit was filed to set aside the order on this latter claim petition. The trial Court upheld the contention that the order on the second claim petition was correct as no suit had been instituted against the order on the first claim within a year. So far as the appellants were concerned, the suit against them was dismissed in the trial Court. In the lower Appellate Court the learned Judge agreed with the view that the order on the first claim petition had become final and, therefore, the order on the second claim petition was correct except as regards Item No. 17 which he said had not been included in the previous claim petition. It may be noted that this point had not been raised either in the trial Court or in the memorandum of appeal preferred to the lower Appellate Court. He held that this item was liable to be attached in satisfaction of the decree obtained against the first defendant.

2. Two questions are raised in this second appeal on behalf of the appellants. The first is that the lower Appellate Court is wrong in saying that Item No. 17 was not included in the first claim petition Ex. VI. The second argument is that assuming that it was not included nevertheless it is not liable in law to be attached. As I am clear that the appellants must succeed on the second point I need only say as regards the first that it appears to me doubtful that Item No. 17 is not included in Ex. VI. Though the boundaries are different there appears to be only one house on the estate and Ex. VI does include a house. If I did not hold that the appellants must succeed on the second point of law, I should have been obliged to refer this question back for further finding as to whether certain boundaries given in Ex. VI include Item No. 17 or not. However, as I fell no doubt that the appellant must succeed on the second point I need not discuss this matter further. The learned District Judge in para. 17 seems not to have recognised the distinction between the liability of property in the hands of sons after partition to be seized in satisfaction of their father's debts with the mode in which the said seizure can be effected. The decision in Devaguptapu Kameswaramma v. Vadaddi Venkatasubba Rao : AIR1914Mad328 makes it clear that where there has been a partition subsequent to a decree obtained against the father only, the property which has fallen to the sons in the partition cannot be attached in execution of thac decree. In the earlier case Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Aiyar 22 M. 519 : 9 MLJ 127 it had been held that where the partition was prior to the decree the property in the hands of the sons could not be attached in satisfaction of the decree obtained against the father alone. The Full Bench decision in Subramania Ayyar v Sabapathi Ayyar : AIR1928Mad657 and Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar 112 Ind. Cas. 541 : 51 M 417 : (1928) MWN 294 : AIR 1923 Mad. 735 : 28 LW 109 : 55 MLJ 175 the former of which was quoted by the learned District Judge, approves the decision in Devaguptapu Kameswaramma v. Vadaddi Venkatasubba Rao : AIR1914Mad328 . It is quite one thing to say that in a suit in which the sons have been impleaded the poperty which has fallen to them in partition may be attached for a pre-partition debt of the father which is binding on them, and another thing to say that where they have not been so impleaded in the suit property which has fallen to them in partition can be proceeded against. The lower Appellate Court does not seem to have grasped this distinction. The learned Counsel for the respondent did not deny the legal position contended for by the learned Advocate for the appellants but suggested that the attachment in 1921 which was made before the partition remained in force. But the trial Court has stated that the execution filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 31 of 1917 in 1920 was subsequently not proceeded with and it was also dismissed. It is clear therefore that there was no subsisting attachment at the time of the partition which took place some time about 1921. Under these circumstances this second appeal must be allowed with costs and decree of the Court of the first instance restored with costs here and the Court below.


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