K. Veeraswami, J.
1. Defendants 1 and 2 are the petitioners, who seek to revise the order of the District Munsif of Coimbatore re-opening certain concluded proceedings, in order to give advantage to the respondent of the provisions of Madras Act XIII of 1960. The respondent instituted a suit for ejectment of the petitioners on the ground that they had violated a condition of the lease not to build on the land. The petitioners applied under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants' Protection Act, as extended to Coimbatore District. This application was contested but it was eventually allowed, the trial Court determining the value of the land at Rs. 7,312-50. That Court passed a preliminary decree in the suit, giving time to the petitioners to deposit the amount and directing the respondent on such deposit to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioners in respect of the land. There was an appeal by the respondent. The result of it was the Subordinate Judge considered that the value of the land should be fixed at Rs. 8,775 and that since the petitioners had a right claimed under Section 9, the suit should be remitted to the trial Court for making a proper order. The Subordinate Judge's view was that the preliminary decree ought to have been passed in the application under Section 9 and not in the suit itself. There was a further appeal by the respondent, which was dismissed by Anantanarayanan, J. (as he then was). This judgment is Naraindas v. Venkata-swami Naidu : (1960)2MLJ328 , and was dated 3rd May, 1960. A Letters Patent Appeal against that judgment was, however, allowed, the learned Judges holding that the petitioners had no right to get a conveyance of the land under Section 9, in view of the breach they had committed of a condition of the lease. They also directed that the order of the Subordinate Judge remitting the suit should be set aside. I may mention that neither the appeal before the single Judge nor the Letters Patent Appeal raised any question as to the propriety of the quantum of valuation arrived at by the Subordinate Judge. The matter was taken up on further appeal by the petitioners to the Supreme Court, which allowed the same, set aside the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal and restored that of Anantanarayanan, J. Naraindas v. Venkataswami Naidu I.L.R. : (1963)1MLJ140 , is the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal and Venkataswami v. Parasram Naraindas : 1SCR110 , is that of the Supreme Court. Madras Act XIII of 1960 came into force on 27th July, 1960. This Act amended the principal Act in two respects, so far as the present petition is concerned; (i) discretion being left in the Court as to the extent to be conveyed under Section 9 and (ii) the mode of arriving at the value of the land. The trial Court, in the context of these facts and apparently moved by the respondent, re-opened the question of valuation and made an order to the effect that it would do so. This petition is to revise that order.
2. It is not disputed for the petitioners that the final order in the prolonged litigation is that which was made by the Supreme Court on 27th April, 1965. What is urged for them is that it is, however, not open to the trial Court to review, as it were, the remit order of the Subordinate Judge, which embodied a decision as to the value of the property, and proceed to value the land afresh, as if it was open to it to do so. On the other hand, the contention strongly pressed upon me is that the result of the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal was to set aside the remit order as well as that of Anantanarayanan, J., and that the Supreme Court's judgment was confined only to the right of the petitioners under Section 9, so that the order of the Subordinate Judge fixing the Value of the property was, as a result, set at large. On this process of reasoning, it is said that the reopening of the question of valuation by the trial Court is proper.
3. It seems to me that the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court which set aside the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal and restored that of Anantanarayanan, J., is to confirm the remit order of the Subordinate Judge, including the valuation of the property. The question as to valuation, as determined by the Subordinate Judge, was never in dispute at any further stage. The appeals arising from that order were confined only to the right of the petitioners under Section 9. The judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal took the particular form, because the question of valuation was necessarily dependent upon such a right. Once the Supreme Court upheld the right of the petitioners, it necessarily, though impliedly, operated to restore and confirm the order of the Subordinate Judge in its entirety. That being the case, I think it is not within the purview of the trial Court's jurisdiction, to go behind it and proceed to determine the value of the property afresh.
4. Mr. Venkatarama Ayyar for the respondent invited my attention to Narayan Chandra v. Dinatarini Debi : AIR1961Cal643 . In my opinion, it is of no assistance in deciding the present case. In that case the original decree fixed a time for payment. It was held that if the decree was altered or modified in appeal, time ran from the date of the final appellate decree or such other time that the final appellate decree might fix. It was further pointed out that where the original decree requiring the plaintiff to deposit a certain sum within a particular period was first reversed by the first appellate Court, though it was later affirmed by the same Court on remand, the time for deposit ran from the date of the appellate decree after remand and not from the date of the original decree. I respectfully agree with the principle of the decision, but I fail to see how that will apply to a determination of the rights in relation to the valuation made by the Subordinate Judge, which, in effect was confirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court. I am inclined to think that the proper approach is that laid down in Veerappa Chettiar v. Sivagami Achi : AIR1942Mad291 . In that case Venkataramana Rao and Horwill, JJ., held that where a decree was made by the appellate Court, confirming the decree of the trial Court, and at the appellate stage a statute affecting the rights of the parties came into force, but the appellate decree took no notice of it, it would not be open to the trial Court, to re-open the matter in order to give effect to the statute. The learned Judges observed:.the party runs the risk of losing the benefit under the Act if he does not urge before the appellate Court the plea which the new enactment gives him or if he has already obtained a decree in the first Court, he fails to bring it to its notice.
This is precisely the position in this case. The petition is allowed. No costs.