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Dr. Madan Mohan Rao Vs. the State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by the Secretary to the Government, Education Department and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectService
CourtChennai High Court
Decided On
Reported in(1983)2MLJ491
AppellantDr. Madan Mohan Rao
RespondentThe State of Tamil Nadu, Represented by the Secretary to the Government, Education Department and an
Cases ReferredTara Chand v. Delhi Municipality
Excerpt:
- s. padmanabhan, j.1. this writ appeal has been filed by dr. madan mohan rao against the judgment of v. ramaswami, j. dismissing w.p. no. 2613 of 1977. the appellant was, the principal of sir theagaraya college, madras. on 26th may, 1975 as many as twelve charges were framed against him and he was called upon to submit his explanation thereto. the appellant filed, his explanation on 1st july, 1975. subsequently, there were certain proceedings between the appellant and the respondent no. 2 with which we are not very much concerned in this writ appeal. on 1st may, 1976, the appellant was served with notice of the enquiry to be held on 3rd may, 1976. since the appellant was absent the enquiry was adjourned to 7th may, 1976. even then the appellant was absent. thereafter on 7th may, 1976, the.....
Judgment:

S. Padmanabhan, J.

1. This writ appeal has been filed by Dr. Madan Mohan Rao against the judgment of V. Ramaswami, J. dismissing W.P. No. 2613 of 1977. The appellant was, the Principal of Sir Theagaraya College, Madras. On 26th May, 1975 as many as twelve charges were framed against him and he was called upon to submit his explanation thereto. The appellant filed, his explanation on 1st July, 1975. Subsequently, there were certain proceedings between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 with which we are not very much concerned in this writ appeal. On 1st May, 1976, the appellant was served with notice of the enquiry to be held on 3rd May, 1976. Since the appellant was absent the enquiry was adjourned to 7th May, 1976. Even then the appellant was absent. Thereafter on 7th May, 1976, the College Committee found that the charges against the appellant were proved, and dismissed the appellant from service. Against the dismissal order the appellant preferred an appeal to the Government on 17th May, 1976. On 23rd July, 1977, the Government by its order impugned in the writ petition dismissed the appeal. The appellant then preferred W.P. No. 2513 of 1977, before this Court and V. Ramaswami, J., dismissed the writ petition by his order, dated 24th August, 1978. The learned Judge held that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Government was not maintainable as by the time the appellant preferred the appeal, the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 (referred to as the Act) had not been constituted. The appeal preferred by the appellant before the Government was therefore an ineffective appeal. The law applicable to the case was that of master and servant and not the provisions of the Act.

2. Mr. Chidambaram, the learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following contentions: (1) The learned Judge committed an error in holding that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Government was not maintainable as the appellate authority under the Act had not been constituted. According to the learned Counsel, the Government promulgated the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Ordinance, 1975, which came into force on 21st November, 1975. That was followed by the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Ordinance, 1976. Section 1(4) of the 1976 Ordinance stated that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st November, 1975. The 1976 Ordinance repealed the 1975 Ordinance. Finally, the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 was passed. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that Section 19 of the Ordinance was the same as Section 19 of the Act. As regards Section 20 of the Act it included only an additional explanation to the effect that the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of commencement of the Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date. Section 20 of the Act conferred a power on a teacher or other person employed in a private college who had been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment was otherwise terminated, to prefer an appeal to such authority or officer as may be prescribed. The right of appeal is a vested right. No doubt, the appellate authority was constituted only on 25th June, 1976. However, the fact the appellate authority was constituted only subsequently cannot take away the right of appeal granted to a teacher of a private college whose services were terminated to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority. In this case, the appellant had preferred the appeal on 17th May, 1976 to the Government which itself was notified to be the appellate authority under the Act. The Government did not choose to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellant on 17th May, 1976 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under the Act. Consequently, when the Government was notified to be the appellate authority under the Act on 25th June, 1976, the appeal was pending with the Government. Therefore, the learned single Judge was not justified in holding that the appeal itself was not competent and to dismiss the writ petition on that ground.

3. The question for consideration is whether the contentions of Mr. Chidambaram can be sustained. The 1975 Ordinance came into force on 21st November, 1975. Section 1(4) of the Act states: 'Save as otherwise provided in Section 55, the provisions of this Act shall he deemed to have come into force on the 21st day of November, 1975.' It therefore follows that the provisions of the Act, except Section 55, which deals with persons other than teachers employed in private colleges have been given retrospective effect and must be deemed to have come into force on 21st November, 1975. In view of Section 1(4) of the Act, Section 20 of the Act must be deemed to have come into force on 21st November, 1975. Section 20 of the Act states:

Any teacher or other person employed in any private college--

(a) who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or

(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage. by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed: and different authorities or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private colleges.

Explanation.-In this section, the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of commencement of this Act-in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date.

Excepting for the explanation that is found in the Act, Section 20 of the Act is identical to Section 20 of the 1975 and 1976 Ordinances. It is in view of the fact that the 1975 Ordinance was in force from 21st November, 1975 and that the Act repealed the 1976 Ordinance which in turn had repealed the 1975 Ordinance that the provisions of the Act exempting as provided in Section 55, have been given retrospective effect. Consequently, the right of appeal conferred on a teacher who has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose services were otherwise terminated for the first time under the 1975 Ordinance which commenced on 21st November, 1975 continued without interruption by virtue of Section 20 of the Act. If that be the position, than the remedy of any teacher who had been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose services were otherwise terminated was to prefer an appeal to the appellate authority under the Act. The fact that an appellate authority had not been constituted would not take away the right of the aggrieved teacher to prefer an appeal against an order passed adversely to his interest. If on the date he was dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or his services were otherwise terminated, no appellate authority had been constituted, it could at the most be said that there was no forum before which he could have preferred the appeal. However, that would not take away his vested right of appeal that had been conferred on him under the statute. As and when the appellate authority was constituted it would be open to him to prefer an appeal. In our opinion, it may not be correct to say that after 21st November, 1975, when the 1975 Ordinance came into force or the date from which the Act has been given retrospective operation and 26th June, 1976, the date of the constitution of the appellate authority, the law governing the teachers of private colleges was the law of master and servant. We are fortified in this conclusion of ours by Section 49 of the Act, which is to the following effect: 'No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be decided or dealt with by any authority or officer empowered under this Act.' Section 49, therefore clearly barred any civil Court from deciding or dealing with any question which is required to be decided or dealt with the propriety or legality or the correctness of an order or dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination otherwise of the services of a teacher or a private college which power has been concerned on an appellate authority to be notified under the Act. This would mean that after 21st November, 1975 no teacher of a private college who has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose services had been otherwise, terminated could have filed a suit in a civil Court questioning his dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of service. It is in view of this we find Sections 21, 22 and 24 in the Act. Section 21 provides for a second appeal being preferred to the Education Tribunal by an aggrieved party against an order made by the appellate authority in an appeal filed under Section 20 of the Act. Section 22 provides for appeal in certain post disciplinary cases. Under Section 22, if any teacher or other person employed in a private college has been dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or his appointment had been otherwise terminated and if he has filed any appeal before the commencement of the Act or if an appeal preferred by him or educational agency is pending, such appeal shall stand transferred to the appellate authority prescribed under Section 20(a) or Section 20(b) as the case may be. Section 22(2) further provides that if an appeal has been disposed of before the date of commencement of the Act, the order made in such appeal should be deemed to be an order made under the Act and should have effect accordingly. In other words, the effect of Section 22(2) is that if an appeal had been disposed of even prior to the commencement of the Act, the aggrieved party will have a right of second appeal as provided under the Act. Section 24 confers an overriding effect on Chapter IV of the Act which deals with the terms and conditions of service of teachers and other persons employed in private colleges, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or award, agreement or contract of service, whether such award, agreement or contract of service, was made before or after the date of commencement of the act or judgment, decree or order of Court, Tribunal or other authority. It is therefore clear from Sections 20 and 21, that proceedings commenced even before the commencement of the Act are recognised and a right of appeal and second appeal is conferred on the teacher or the aggrieved party. We therefore held that as on 21st November, 1975 on which date Ordinance XVII of 1975 came into force and from which date the Act was given retrospective effect, the law of master and servant ceased to apply to private colleges and the teachers employed therein, but that the educational agency and the teachers and other persons employed in the private colleges are governed by the provisions of the Act. That being the position the aggrieved teacher has got a vested: right of appeal before the appellate authority to be notified under the Act in terms Of Section 20 of the Act. The fact that the appellate authority was constituted only on 25th June, 1976 would not deprive a teacher who has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose services had been otherwise terminated of his right to prefer an appeal to the appropriate authority. If a teacher had been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank subsequent to 21st November, 1975, and no appellate authority had been constituted as provided for under Section 20, his right of appeal would not be taken away, but, remain suspended till such time as an appellate authority is constituted. After the appellate authority is notified, the aggrieved teacher will have a right of preferring an appeal to that authority within a reasonable time from, the date of notification constituting the appellate authority.

4. We shall in the above context refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in N. 1. Insurance Co. v. Shanti Misra : [1976]2SCR266 . The decision may not apply on all fours to the facts of the case. But we are of the view that the principles laid down in that case will be attracted to the facts of this case as well. The question that arose for decision by the Supreme Court was whether an application for compensation filed under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, arising out of an accident which occurred more than 60 days before the Constitution of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 110-A would be entertained by the Tribunal or the remedy of the aggrieved person was to institute a civil suit. After Section 110-A was amended providing for the constitution of a Claims Tribunal there was delay in the actual constitution of the Tribunal. In cases where accidents had occurred prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, resort to the Tribunal could not be made. Many of the High Courts took the view that in such a situation the only remedy for the injured person was to file an application before the Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred. In this context, the Supreme Court observed:

If the accident had occurred within 60 days prior to the commencement of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in Sub-section (3) was not an impediment. An application to the Tribunal could be said to be the only remedy. If such an application, due to one reason or the other, could not be made within 60 days then the Tribunal had the power to condone the delay under the proviso. But if the accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the Tribunal then the bar of limitation provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A on its face was attracted. This difficulty of limitation led most of the High Courts to fall back upon the proviso and say that such a case will be a fit one where the Tribunal would be able to condone the delay under the proviso to Sub-section (3), and led others to say that the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain such an application and the remedy of going to the civil Court in such a situation was not barred under Section 110 of the Act. While taking the latter view the High Court failed to notice that primarily the law engrafted in Sections 110-A and 110-F was a law relating to the change of forums...

Apropos the bar of limitation provided in Section 110-A (3), one can say, on the basis of the authorities aforesaid, that strictly speaking, the bar does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the Claims Tribunal. But since in such a case there is a change of forum, unlike the fact of the said cases, the reasonable view to take would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the Tribunal, which ordinarily and generally, would be the time of limitation mentioned in Sub-section (3). If the application could not be made within that time from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal, in a given case, the further time taken in the making of the application may be held to be the reasonable time on the facts of that case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in Sub-section (3) from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section. In any view, of the matter, in our opinion, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted as soon as the Claims Tribunal is constituted and the filing of the application before the Tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant. On the facts of this case, we hold that the remedy available to the respondents was to go before the Claims Tribunal and since the law was not very clear on the point, the time of about four months taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution can be held to be either a reasonable time or the delay of less than 2 months could well be condoned under the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A.

5. It should not be forgotten that so far as Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned, there was; only a change of forum with regard to the filing of application for compensation. Prior to the amendment of Section 110-A, the injured person had the right to file a suit for compensation, whereas after the amendment he had to file an application for compensation before the Tribunal. In the case of a teacher employed in a Private College, it is not a case of a mere change of forum with regard to the enforcement of a remedy already available. Under the master and servant jurisprudence, the only remedy of a dismissed teacher would be to get compensation for wrongful dismissal or removal. On the other hand, the Act gave the right to have the dismissal declared invalid if the facts and circumstances of the case so warranted. Therefore, the Act created a change in substantive law. Consequently, the principles laid down in the above-said Supreme Court case is all the more attracted to the facts of the present case.

6. The case in Hindu Girls High School v. Education Tribunal : (1980)1MLJ315 , arose under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act. The services of a teacher were terminated by the Educational agency on 31st May, 1971. The aggrieved teacher preferred an appeal to the Inspector of Girls' High School, Madurai. The appellate authority allowed the appeal on 17th November, 1974, and directed reinstatement. Thereupon, the Educational agency filed a second appeal which was presented to the Chief Educational Officer instead of the Director of School Education. The Chief Educational Officer returned the appeal to the Educational agency for being presented to the proper authority, namely, the Director of School Education. The Educational agency presented the appeal to the Director of School Education on 28th December, 1974. In the meanwhile on 1st December, 1974, the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, XXIX of 1974, came into force with effect from 1st December, 1974. That created for the first time the Education Tribunal to hear second appeals against the orders passed by the appellate authority. Though the Act came into force on 1st December, 1974, the Tribunal was constituted on 21st May, 1975, by G.O. Ms. No. 813, Education, dated1 21st May, 1975. However, since on 28th December, 1974, the Educational Tribunal had not been constituted, the Educational agency preferred an appeal to the Government. After the constitution of the Tribunal the Educational agency filed an application before the Educational Tribunal stating that it had filed an appeal before, the Director of School Education on 28th December, 1974, and the appeal should be transferred to the file of the Tribunal. A copy of the appeal petition preferred before the Director of School Education was also filed before the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal dismissed the application for transfer against which the Educational agency filed a writ petition before this Court. It was observed by one of us thus:

On the date on which he filed the appeal before the Director of School Education, the Education Tribunal had not come into existence and therefore he could not have filed an appeal before the Tribunal as required by Section 24 of the Act. Naturally, therefore, the petitioner did what was: possible, namely, to file an appeal before the then second appellate authority namely the Director of School Education. The petitioner is not expected in law to do the impossible. The Education Tribunal: was established on 21st May, 1975. All appeals pending before the other appellate authorities should get automatically transferred to the Tribunal. No doubt the State gave the date 1st December, 1974, as the date of the coming into force of the Act. But that does not mean that the other appeals which had; been filed before the Director, School Education at a time when the Tribunal had not been established do not get transferred to the Education Tribunal, even assuming that Section 25 of the Act does not literally apply. The Tribunal should have exercised its; discretion and ought to have withdrawn the appeal from the file of the Director of Education in keeping with the spirit of Section 25 of the Act... By the time, the Tribunal itself was constituted the right of the petitioner had become barred by limitation. Therefore, he could not have presented a fresh appeal to the Education Tribunal. In the circumstances, the petitioner could not be made to suffer for no fault of his. The delay in setting up an Education Tribunal as required under Section 24 of the Act, cannot defeat the right of the petitioner.

On behalf of the respondent 2, Educational agency, reliance was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in Thyagaraya Chetty Educational Institutions v. Dr. G. Modan Mohan Rao (1977) 90 L.W. 90. In that case, the parties were the same. The appellant Dr. Madan Mohan Rao was suspended by the resolution of the College Committee on 26th September, 1975. Thereupon, he filed a writ petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Educational agency and the State Government to implement the provisions of Section 19 of Ordinance XVII of 1975. Section 19 of the Act provided that no teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be dismissed, reproved or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Section 19(2) provided that where there is such a proposal, the competent authority, if it was satisfied that there were adequate and reasonaide grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment. Section 19(3) provided that 'no teacher or other person employed in any private college shall be placed under suspension, except when an inquiry into the gross-misconduct, within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under Sub-section (1) of Section 18, of such teacher or other person is contemplated, and that no such suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of two months from the date of suspension and if such inquiry is not completed within that period, such teacher or other person shall, without prejudice to the inquiry, be deemed to have been restored as teacher or other employee' The proviso conferred a power on the competent authority for reasons to be recorded in writing to extend the period of suspension beyond 2 months, for a further period not exceeding two months. A learned single Judge of this Court held that the order of suspension was subject to Section 19(3)(b) and its duration was curtailed by the rule of limitation prescribed therein and in that view allowed the petition. The Educational agency, namely the second respondent herein, preferred a writ appeal. It was contended before this Court on behalf of the Educational agency that the provisions of Section 19(3)(b) were not applicable as the provisions were intended to apply only to enquiries that commenced after the Act came into force and as such the period of suspension was not limited to two months. The learned Judges held that it was clear from the provisions of Section 19(3)(a) and (b) that the restriction to the period of suspension to two months was confined only to enquiries that had commenced after the Act came into force, and that Section 19(3)(a) and (b) were not applicable to the facts of that case. We are not satisfied that this decision in any way precludes Mr. Chidambaram from contending that the appellant's appeal filed before the Government was maintainable. We shall only extract the following passage from the judgment of the Bench:

A reading of Sections 20, 21 and 22 lends considerable support to this view. The Explanation to Section 20 is very important and it runs as follows:In this section, the expression 'order' includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date.

An order made on the date of the commencement of this Act can only relate to an enquiry which was pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. This is made clear by the last part of the Explanation, which says 'in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date'. It is clear therefore that the order contemplated in the Explanation is an order passed on or after the date of the commencement of the Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date. Against such an order, an appeal is available to such authority or officer as may be prescribed. For the purpose of an appeal, the validity of an order passed on or after the date of the commencement of the Act in any proceeding which was pending on the date when the Act came into force is recognised and the appeal is provided to the authority constituted under the Act. So also a second appeal is provided for under Section 21. Section 22 makes the position clear. It provides; that if before the date of the commencement of the Act, any teacher or other person employed in any private college has been dismissed, or removed, or reduced in rank, and any appeal preferred before that date in pending, such appeal shall stand transferred to the appellate authority prescribed under Section 20 and to the Tribunal as the case may be. It is also provided that any order made in an appeal before the date of the commencement of the Act is deemed to be an order made under this Act and shall have effect accordingly. It is therefore clear on a reading of Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 that not only proceedings that were commenced before the Act came into force are not repealed, but they are also recognised and dovetailed into the provisions of the Act enabling the aggrieved teacher to appeal. The order passed before the Act came into force is appealable under Section 22 and a second appeal is provided under Section 21.

The above observation, in our opinion, far from supporting the respondent-Educational agency, supports the appellant. The Bench has confined its decision only to Section 19, which, according to the Bench, is not applicable to enquiries that had commenced before the Act came into force. This decision therefore does act help the Educational agency in the present case.

7. We are therefore of the view that the parties in this case were not governed by the master and servant jurisprudence but by the provisions of the Act and that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the Government was maintainable. No doubt, the appellant preferred the appeal before the Government on 17th May, 1976. On that date, the appellate authority had not been constituted. However, the Government did not reject the appeal immediately on the ground that it was; not competent authority for entertaining appeals under Section 20 of the Act. On 25th June, 1976, the Government constituted the appellate authority by Rule 14 of the Rules promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act. On that date, the appeal preferred by the appellant was pending before the Government. The appeal must therefore, be deemed to have been an appeal presented before the competent authority under Section 20 of the Act. As a matter of fact, as rightly contended by Mr. Chidambaram, the impugned order does not state that the appeal was being rejected on the ground that the same was not maintainable before the Government.

8. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the merits. The impugned order merely states that there is no case to interfere in the matter.

9. Mr. Chidambaram cited the decision in Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh : [1971]1SCR201 , and Siemens Engineering and Maufacturing Co. v. Union of India : AIR1976SC1785 , to the effect that where an authority makes an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, it must record its reasons in support of its order and that inasmuch as the Government has not given any reasons for rejecting the appeal the order is liable to be quashed. In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India : AIR1976SC1785 , Bhagwati, J., has observed as follows:

If Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and Tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and Tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of adulterant partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.

As against this, the learned Counsel for the Educational agency drew our attention to the following passage in the decision in Tara ('hand v. Delhi Municipality : [1976]105ITR642(SC) :

It cannot also, in our opinion, be laid down as a general rule that an order is a non-speaking order simply because it is brief and not elaborate. Every case, we think, has to be judged is the light of its own facts and circumstances;.

10. On the facts of this case, it has to be home in mind that the right of appeal conferred on a teacher or any other person who is dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated is a first appeal against such an order passed by the Educational agency. It is therefore necessary for the appellate authority who is exercising a quasi-judicial function, to consider the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence available for and against the teacher in an impartial manner and come to its own conclusion. Consequently, the order must give cogent and explicit reasons, so that the second appellate authority which is the Educational Tribunal can find out whether the order passed by the appellate authority can be sustained. The necessity to give reasons in support of the decision of the Government is all the more relevant in the present case because at the time the order was passed there was no occasion for the Educational agency to obtain the prior approval of the competent authority prescribed under Section 19 of the Act. Therefore, the decision of the Educational agency ought to have received better consideration at the hands of the appellate authority. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. V. Shanmugam that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Tara Chand v. Delhi Municipality : [1976]105ITR642(SC) , is applicable to the facts of this case. Even the very decision states that the matter has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a situation like the present, we are of the opinion that the appellate authority is bound to give cogent and explicit reasons in support of its order. The impugned order does not contain any reasons: whatever. We do not therefore consider that the impugned order is an order valid in the eye of law and passed in exercise of the powers conferred on the appellate authority under Section 20 of the Act. We therefore set aside the order impugned and remit the matter back to the Government for fresh consideration.

11. The writ appeal is allowed and the order of the single Judge of this Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Government for fresh consideration. It is admitted that the appellant is now employed in Libya. The Government will bear that fact also in mind while passing appropriate orders on his appeal.

12. There will be no order as to costs in the writ appeal.

13. It is now stated by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the College Committee: met on 27th January, 1983, and passed a resolution reinstating the appellant, Dr. Madan Mohan Rao, for the reasons stated in the resolution . As regards payment of compensation, the resolution says that it should be settled after negotiation between the appellant and the College Committee. We make it clear that the judgment delivered by us today will not stand as a bar to the resolution being given effect to. Mr. Shanmugam states that the resolution itself is the subject-matter of a civil suit. We, however, express no opinion on the validity or otherwise of the resolution.


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