C.J.R. Paul, J.
1. This revision petition under Section 25 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 is filed by one Ambiga Ammal who is the trustee of Sri Pandurangaswami Bhajanai Koil and who filed an application before the learned Rent Controller under Sections 10 (2) (i), 10 (2) (ii), (b), 10 (2) (iii) and 10 (2) (v) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act for eviction of the respondent who is a tenant in respect of a shop adjacent to the Sri Pandurangaswami Bhajanai Koil, which premises belongs to the aforesaid Sri Pandurangaswami Bhajanai Koil. The revision petitioner sought the eviction of the tenant on the following grounds : (1) that the tenant committed wilful default in the payment of rent; (2) that the tenant committed acts of waste in the premises; (3) that he caused nuisance to the occupiers of the other premises; and (4) that the tenant had converted the non-residential portion into a residential one. The tenant refuted those assertions and contended that the eviction petition is not maintainable, since there was no valid notice terminating the tenancy. The learned Rent Controller found that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent and that the tenant did not commit any act of waste or cause any nuisance to the occupiers of the other premises. But, he found that the tenant was using the premises for a purpose other than the one for which it was leased out, inasmuch as the premises was let out for non-residential purposes, but the tenant was using it as a residential one. The learned Rent Controller, despite his finding that the tenant had used the premises for a purpose other than the one for which it was leased out, yet dismissed the petition on the ground that no valid notice terminating the, tenancy was given. On appeal by the revision petitioner, the Appellate Authority agreed with the findings of the learned Rent Controller. Hence this revision petition.
2. The only point that has been raised in this revision petition is that both the Courts below erred in holding that there was no valid notice terminating the tenancy. On behalf of the revision petitioner Mr. Venkatarama Iyer endeavoured to show that there was a valid notice terminating the tenancy inasmuch as the notice, the copy of which is Exhibit P-7, was sent under certificate of posting properly addressed to the tenant and a registered notice was also sent in addition to the sending of a copy of the notice under certificate of posting Mr. Arasappa on behalf of the respondent, after refuting the arguments addressed by Mr. Venkatarama Iyer, raised a new point. He has contended that in view of G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home, dated 12th August, 1974 passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, this revision petition is not maintainable at all, and this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any orders in regard to the premises in question in view of the aforesaid Government Order. Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act empowers the Government to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act by means of a notification and it is in pursuance of that power, that the notification dated 12th August, 1974 in G.O.Ms. No. 1998 has been issued, whereby the Government has exempted all the buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions from all the provisions of the Act. Admittedly, the premises in question belongs to a Hindu religious trust. Therefore after 12th August, 1974, the date on which this notification was issued, no provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would apply to buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions. Mr. Arasappa therefore contends that this Court cannot now pass any order with regard to this premises under any of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, in this revision proceedings which is under Section 25 of the Madras Act XX of 1960, since the building in question is now removed from the purview of all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act including Section 25. On behalf of Mr. Venkatarama Iyer, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner Mr. N. C. Rangaswamy, argued that on the date when this revision petition was filed, the revision petitioner had the right under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act to file a revision before this Court, and that right has not been taken away by the issuance of the notification referred to above, which notification is not to take effect retrospectively and that consequently this Court has jurisdiction to pass an order in this revision proceeding with regard to the premises in question despite the notification. In support for this contention, he has cited the decision of Balakrishna Aiyar, J., in Seshadri Aiyangar v. Narayana Nair : AIR1950Mad106 . That was a case where the tenant was unsuccessful before the Rent Controller and the Collector, who, under the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945, was the appellate authority, and the tenant presented a petition to the Government under the provisions of that Order to revise the order of the Collector. After the filing of that petition before the Government, the Madras House Rent Control Order of 1945 ceased to be in force, and Madras Act XV of 1946 had taken its place. It Was after the Madras House Rent Control Order, had ceased to be in force and Madras Act XV of 1946 had taken its place that the Government passed orders allowing the petition of the tenant. It was contended before Balakrishna Aiyar, J., that since the source from which the Government derived their power had dried up, their order revising the order of the Collector after Madras Act XV of 1946 had taken the place of the Madras House Rent Control Order was incompetent. Balakrishna Aiyar, J. repelled that contention. He has observed that,
When what is called a permanent Act, that is to say, an Act which is of indefinite duration is repealed, Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1891 (Madras) provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed or affect any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted or continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or regulation had not been passed. The provision of this section will not directly apply when a temporary Act expires by efflux of time. What is to happen to pending-proceedings in such a case must depend upon the intention of the Legislature, and where clear words are not used the intention must be inferred from the 1 relevant circumstances. Thus, where a temporary Act sets up a special Tribunal and as the result of the expiration of Act, the Special Tribunal < ceases to exist and no clear provision 1 is made for continuing pending proceedings it will be reasonable to infer that the intention of the Legislature is that such proceeding shall not be continued.
Balakrishna Aiyar, J., eventually held that,
Regard being had to the facts that the right which the tenant had was a vested right, that the authority before whom proceedings could be taken to enforce that right continued to exist and Section 18 of Madras Act XV of 1946 suggests that the intention of the Legislature was that all pending proceedings should as far as possible be saved, it must be found that the decision of the Court below was right.
3. But, those observations will not apply to the case now before me, because this is not a case where a temporary Act had ceased to exist and had been repealed by a permanent Act. This is a case where under the statute itself, power was given to the Government to exempt any premises from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act. In pursuance of that power, the Government had exempted all buildings belonging to the religious trusts and charitable institutions from all the provisions of the Act. No doubt, at the time when this revision petition was filed, the petitioner had the right to file a revision petition under Section 25 of the Act before this Court. But in view of the fact that the Government by its notification has removed all buildings belonging to religious trusts from the purview of the Act, in my view this Court's jurisdiction to pass any orders in regard to the premises in question in this case which by reason of the aforesaid notification has been exempt from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act including Section 25, has come to an end. Mr. Arasappa has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mulla v. Godhu : 2SCR129 . That was an appeal preferred by one set of pre-emptors against the order of the High Court allowing the rival preemptor's appeal by reducing the preemption money under the Punjab Preemption Act (X of 1960). It deprived them of their right of preemption with retrospective effect. That contention was upheld by the Supreme Court.
4. The effect of the notification passed by the Government of Tamil Nadu mentioned above is that in respect of the premises in question, the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act would no longer apply and no order can be passed in respect of such a building under any of the provisions of the Act including Section 25 which provides for a revision to this Court. Therefore, I find that this Court has no jurisdiction now to pass any orders with regard to the premises in question and consequently, this revision petition has to be dismissed and it is dismissed. No costs.