1. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the daughters of one Kochu. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 are 1st defendant's children, 5th plaintiff and 3rd defendant are the children of the 2nd defendant. In March 1876, Kochu's husband gave a permanent lease of the properties in dispute to his wife. Kochu, in her turn, executed a deed of gift in respect of the major portion of these properties in favour of her two daughters, the 1st and 2nd defendants. In 1910, the 2nd defendant sold some of the properties which fell to her share to the 4th defendant. The present suit is for. a declaration that the alienation is not binding on the plaintiffs.
2. We think the Subordinate Judge is right, but not for the reasons given by him. The argument of the learned Vakil for the appellants is that the gift to Kochu by her husband is as puthrabakasam property and that the 2nd defendant has no right to alienate it. Reliance was placed on Kunhacha Umma v. Kutti Mammi Hajee 16 M.p 201 : 2 M.L.J. 226 and on the recent Full Bench decision in Machikandi Parkum Maramittath Tharuvil Mootha Chettiam Veettil Chakkara Kannan v. Varayalankandi Kunhi Pokker 30 Ind. Cas. 543 : 25 M.L.J. 637. It is conceded that when Exhibit I was executed, the defendants Non. 1 and 2 were in existence, yet the gift is not made by the father to his wife and children although the words used are makkalapaanpya. There-are no words conveying the estate to the children. In Exhibit II, Kochu deals with the properties as her self-acquisition. It is clear to our mind that the donor, under these circumstances, intended to give an absolute, estate to his wife. In Narasamma Hegadthi v. Billa Kesu Pujari 31 Ind. Cas. 543 : 25 M.L.J. 637, a similar gift was construed as conferring an absolute right on the donee. The words (santhanaparampariah) in the document in that case were appropriate, as the donee was a male, and his heirs, in the absence of a testamentary disposition, would not be his children. In the present case, the donee being a female, makkalin is the proper word to denote the course of devolution. We see no reason to extend the principle of the Full Bench decision to this case.
3. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.