Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. I regret to have to reverse the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and dismiss the suit of this unfortunate plaintiff, but I am afraid on the materials no other course is possible. Venkatesam was the foster son of Venkatamma and they settled by Ex. C on Mangamma the plaintiff, the house in question. This was oh the 12th of July 1890. The deed was executed just on the eve of the marriage of Venkatesam with the plaintiff and there is no dispute that the plaintiff practically never resided with her husband in the plaint house. It is clear beyond any possibility of doubt that at any rate since 1890 the plaintiff has not been living in this house. The present suit was instituted in 1920. It is necessary to set forth in some detail the history of the relations between Venkatamma and Venkatesam on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other. Owing to misunderstandings, the plaintiff did not go to live with her husband and on the 24th of July 1901 the mother and the son executed what is described as a cancellation deed revoking the settlement in the plaintiff's favour. This was followed a few months later by what is termed a relinquishment deed by which Venkatesam gave up his rights in the (sic) to Venkatamma. The next step was (sic) Venkatamma filed Suit No. 522 of 1901 (sic) declaration that the plaintiff had (sic) her rights to the suit property. At (sic) Venkatamma was in possession (sic) only relief she sought to obtain was (sic) as to her rights to the property. (sic) suit was for some reason dismissed in (sic) Venkatamma in 1905 executed Ex. (sic) of sale in favour of Tiruvenkatacharlu and the latter sold the property; to the defendant by Ex. 1 on the 13th April 1909. Venkatamma died in 1910.
2. The Subordinate Judge makes two mistakes of law. He says that Venkatamma's possession was originally permissive. I shall assume that this is a correct statement of fact. Then he says that possession originally permissive could never become adverse. In this, of course, he is entirely wrong. I shall take the following statement of the law from Rustomji's well-known Book on Limitation, page 610 (3rd Edition):
It is not indispensable that the entry should be adverse in its inception.
Unless adverse in its inception, possession will be presumed to continue as it began, yet this does not preclude the occupant from setting up an adverse claim at any time he chooses by any act which changes the character of his occupancy from amicable to adverse.
3. Again the learned Author says:
Where a party is in possession of lands in privity with the original owner, nothing short of an open and explicit disavowal and I disclaimer of a holding under that title and assertion of title in himself brought home to the owner, will satisfy the law.
4. These propositions are so well settled that I do not think I need trouble to refer to decided cases.
5. This being the law, let me now examine the facts. In 1901 Venkatamma and Venkatesam joined in revoking the settlement. This is an unequivocal denial of the plaintiff's right. The question then is: was this brought to the knowledge of the plaintiff? In the suit that followed the revocation, Venkatamma relied on her own title and repudiated the right of the plaintiff. Venkatamma and the plaintiff joined issue and went to trial. Venkatamma denied the plaintiffs title and openly asserted her own, and this was clearly brought to the plaintiff's knowledge. In 1903 the suit was dismissed and notwithstanding this, Venkatamma continued to be in undisturbed possession. Adverse possession on the part of Venkatamma clearly began in 1903 if hot at an earlier date. It is unnecessary to enquire whether the plaintiff became aware of the sale deeds of 1905 and 1909.
6. The second mistake of law which the Subordinate Judge makes is, that the, possession of the defendant cannot be added to the possession of Venkatamma. I shall once again quote from Rustomji, page 634, 3rd Edition:
It is now, it seems, well established that a succession of trespassers claiming through one another (e.g., as heir, legatee, assignee, or otherwise) can, though the possession of each of them has extended to less than 12 years, add and tack the periods of their possession so as to defeat the right of the owner. Thus if the original dispossessor dies after remaining in possession for six years, and his heir or legatee thereupon enters into and remains in possession for seven years, these two periods can be added to complete the 12 years, and the owner would be effectually barred.
7. This statement is borne out by a large body of authority, but I do not propose to refer to decided cases.
8. On behalf of the respondent it was finally urged that it has not been found that Tiruvenkatacharlu took possession. But what difference does it make? If Venkatamma was in possession till 1910 and subsequent to her death the defendant was in possession, the plaintiff's title would become barred.
9. The decree of the lower Appellate Court is reversed and the appeal is allowed. The suit is dismissed with costs throughout.