1. This petition arises out of an application to set aside a sale in execution of a decree obtained against a Hindu widow representing the estate of the last male owner. In execution of the decree three items of property were sold and purchased for Rs. 210, Rs. 450 and Rs. 650 respectively. The District Judge has committed a slip in stating the figures in respect of the 2nd and 3rd items as Rs 250, Rs. 650 instead of Rs. 450 and Rs. 650. The petitioner before the District Munsif is a presumptive reversioner who will be entitled to the property after the death of the widow and the application was filed under Order XXI, Rule 90, on the ground of material irregularity in the conduct of the sale and the publishing of the proclamation causing substantial injury. The District Munsif holding that there was no irregularity and also that the properties were sold for the proper prices dismissed the petition.
2. On appeal, the District Judge held on the evidence that the properties were sold for grossly inadequate prices. The prices entered in the sale proclamation are Rs. 200, Rs. 110 and Rs. 200 for the three items respectively. The District Judge is, therefore, justified in stating that the value of the items given in the sale proclamation was ridiculously low. He then states:
There has been, therefore, material irregularity in the framing of the sale proclamation and considering the prices fetched at the sale and the prices the items are worth, there can be no doubt that there had been substantial injury by reason of the irregularity.
3. No doubt in the case of items Nos. 2 and 3, on account of a mistake in stating the figures, the actual injury is less substantial than what he supposes, assuming it not to be a slip. The auction-purchaser files this revision petition.
4. The first point argued before me by the learned Vakil for the petitioner is that the respondent has not got such an interest as will enable him to maintain a petition under Order XXI, Rule 90. He argues that the case of Brij Kishore La1 v. Pratap Natrain 51 Ind. Cas. 359 relied on by the District Judge is not correctly decided. That case itself follows a case in Pankhabati v. Nonihal Singh 21 Ind. Cas. 207 where it was held that a reversioner was entitled to file a petition under Order XXI, Rule 89. It is true that in Kathiresan Chettiar v Ramaswamy Chettiar 26 Ind. Cas. 93 : 27 M.L.J. 302 : (1911) M.W.N. 871, Jogendra Nath Chatterjee v. Manmatha Nath Ghose 15 Ind Cas. 668 and Pragji Kala v. Assa Jalal 35 Ind. Cas. 530 it was held that a creditor, a mere decree-holder or even an attaching decree-holder (the decree being one other than the one in execution) cannot be said to be sufficiently interested in the property for the purpose of maintaining a petition under Order XXI, Rule 90. But I do not think that the last three cases can help the petitioner. They were cases in which all the interest of the petitioner was in the general solvency of the judgment-debtor and not in any particular item of property, whereas in the case of a reversioner entitled to property after the death of a Hindu female his interest is in the estate and though it might be said to be contingent and not vested, still it is interest enough for the purpose of enabling him to file a suit for a declaration under the Specific Relief Act, to file a petition under Order XXI, Rule 89, and to restrain waste and I cannot see why the interest is not interest enough for the purpose of Order XXI, Rule 90. If any distinction is to be made between Rule 89 and Rule 90, I should think that the phrase used in Rule 90, namely 'whose interests are affected by the sale' is of a wider scope than the description in Rule 89, 'holding an interest therein by virtue of a title acquired before such sale.' As pointed out in Brij Kishore Lal v. Pratap Narain 51 Ind. Cas. 359 it is difficult to describe the scope of the word 'interest'. I am content to follow that decision. There is no doubt that such interests as the reversioner has are affected by the sale. I think, therefore, the first point fails.
5. The second point argued before me is that some positive connection must be shown between irregularity and injury and that the inadequacy of the prices must be shown to have resulted from the injury and a number of cases have been cited in support of the proposition. This is true. Where the injury is not the obvious result of the irregularity, actual evidence must be adduced to connect the one with the other and the burden of adducing such evidence is upon the person seeking to set aside the sale. But in a case like this, where the irregularity is an understatement of the probable price of the property, the connection is so near that it is difficult to adduce evidence showing that the injury had resulted from the irregularity. In Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar 2 C.W.N. 550 their Lordships of the Privy Council say:
It is a misstatement of the value of the property which is so glaring in amount that it can hardly have been made in good faith, and which, however, it came to be made, was calculated to mislead possible bidders, and to prevent them from offering adequate prices, or from bidding at all. So long as that consideration applies, I think it is open to the District Judge to infer without any other evidence that injury has resulted from the irregularity. In this case he has done so. I do not think I am justified in interfering with his finding oh the ground that there must be some more materials, under Section 115, C.P.C.
6. The petition is dismissed with costs.