William Watkins Phillips, J.
1. This suit to recover a sum of money acknowledged to be due by the defendant to the plaintiff has been rejected on the ground that the Subordinate Judge of Palghat had no jurisdiction to try the same. This acknowledgment and promise to pay, Ex. A, was executed at Bombay where the defendant was temporarily a clerk in the Bombay Secretariat. The plaintiff resides at Palghat and alleges that as the defendant's permanent place of resilience was in Palghat, part of the cause of action arose there. Under Section 20, Ex pi. I, of the C.P.C: 'Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place and also a temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence'.
2. It is not disputed that the defendant's family house is at Palghat, and no enquiry has been held as to whether that is his permanent place of residence. If it is the permanent place of residence, this suit could be instituted at Palghat under Section 20 Expl. I. Apart from this the question as to whether a part of the cause of action has not arisen within the jurisdiction of the Palghat Subordinate Judge has not been considered. The ordinary principle of law is that the debtor shall find out his creditor and pay him. Ordinarily, therefore, the debtor has to pay the debt at the creditor's place of residence or place of business. This principle was held not to be applicable in Raman Chettiar v. Gopalachari 31 M. 223 : 4 M.L.T. 97 because in Section 17 Expl. III of the C.P.C. (1882) there was a special definition of the place where the cause of action arises, it was there held that this special definition overruled this provision of law and the principle of Section 49 of the Contract Act, That provision has been omitted in the present Code of 1908; not only that, but Section 17 Clause (a) of the old Code reads 'the cause of action arises' whereas in the present Code Section 20 Clause (c) we have 'the cause of action wholly or in part arises.' There has been considerable modification in the new Code and there is certainly no definition of the place where the cause of action may be said to arise. This being so, the principle on which Raman Chettiar v. Gopalachari 31 M. 223 : 4 M.L.T. 97 is decided does not seem to be applicable, and the ordinary principle that the debtor must seek out his creditor and pay him would appear to be applicable here. It is also possible from the terms of Ex. A to read into it an implied promise to pay to the creditor at his residence. The money was not apparently borrowed at |he time Ex. A was executed, for it refers to an anterior debt and is a promise to pay off that debt within a certain time. Owing to this reason, namely, that a part of the cause of action arises in Palghat, the Subordinate Judge's order rejecting the plaint is wrong.
3. The order is set aside and the Subordinate Judge is directed to receive the plaint and dispose of it according to law.
4. The respondent will pay the petitioner's costs.