The plaintiff who is the appellant in this second appeal instituted the suit for the purpose of recovering an annuity of 3 mums of rice on the ground that he is the assignee of such right from, one Puthu Bhatta in whose favour such a right was created in Ex. I in this case. The clause in Ex. I relating to it is in these terms: 'The three manigas of belatage rice which are being given annually to Kudapore Puth Bhatta shall be paid by the three sharers at the rate of one maniga of deletage rice each on the responsibility of the share of each in Muli No. 71 of Kundapore Kasba.' In the Court of the District Munsif a decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff but this was reversed by the learned Subordinate Judge, in the lower Appellate Court on the simple ground in his view that the grant was a personal grant and not in the nature of remuneration attached to an office and as such inalienable under Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. Exhibit 1 does not refer to any office and does not impose the performance of any service whatsoever and there seems to be no reason at all for the supposition made by the learned Subordinate Judge that there was such a thing as office and that this was remuneration attached to such office. If the grant, however, had been for the purpose of performance of personal service in future no doubt such a question might have arisen but clearly the grant which is in writing is not in those terms. It is a grant simplifier. The learned Subordinate Jude speaks of some motive of the defendants in making the grant. That is not to be found even in the grant itself and we fail to see what the motive has really to do with the grant or the terms of it. The delivery of this rice is constituted by the document a charge on the property. It is really in the nature of a grant of annuity. We must, therefore, differ from the conclusion arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below and hold that the grant in this case is not an inalienable one as was found by him and there is also no question of any personal services. Therefore, the only ground on which the lower Appellate Court disposed of the case fails. It is pointed out by the learned Vakil for the respondents that other questions have been raised by the defendants which have not been considered or decided by the lower Appellate Court. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the lower Appellate Court and remand the case for disposal on the other questions arising in the case. Costs of this second appeal will abide and follow the result.