Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.
The respondents' Vakil reports that he has no instructions in this second appeal. We have heard all that Mr. Seetharama Eao has had to say on behalf of the appellant. It is found as a fact that the 1st plaintiff has failed to establish that he was the hereditary pujari of this temple and sntitled to such office. Now the learned Vakil for the appellant has invited us to grant an injunction against the defendants on the ground that the 1st plaintiff being found to be in possession of the office, such possession may be protected by an injunction issued against persons who have no right to interfere with the enjoyment of the office. For this purpose he has referred to some cases relating to immoveable property. No doubt in certain eases, where the right of title to immoveable property was claimed and what was proved was mere possession of property but it was also found that the defendant was merely a trespasser, it was held that in the absence of any other proof possession may be regarded as sufficient proof of title, at any rate, against the defendant who was a trespasser and showed no title in himself. We must assume that, in all such cases, though a relief had not been claimed by the plaintiff originally, in the alternative, on the footing of mere possession alone the Court granted such relief being satisfied that, if it had been pleaded and prayed for in the alternative, the defendant would have had no defence to the action or that having had a defence he failed to make it out. The same cannot possibly be said of an office. In this caie if the 1st plaintiff had claimed on the footing of mere possession of the office, it might have been open to the defendants to show by evidence that such possession as he claimed could not nossibly be regarded as possession of the office and many new things might have been open to the defendants to allege and prove if they had an opportunity of alleging or proving in respect of any such case.
In these circumstances, it would be unjust and inequitable to grant any relief to the 1st plaintiff on that footing. There is no other ground. The second appeal must, therefore, be dismissed.
I agree. I will only add that I now see from the record that what the Subordinate Judge finds was the 1st plaintiff's irregular performance of the duties of pujari appears to have extended only for a period of three years, as his father died in 1917 and the plaint waa filed in 1920.