1. This is an application to revise the order of the District Munsif's Court of Ellore holding that the suit for partition instituted by the plaintiff in that Court was within the jurisdiction of his Court. The question raised for decision before him was whether a plaintiff, claiming partition but alleging that he is in possession jointly with the defendant of the properties belonging to both in common, is entitled to value the relief claimed by him for purposes of jurisdiction according to his own discretion, or whether the rules contained in Section 7, Clause 5 of the Court Fees Act, apply to such a suit. The Munsif held that the plaintiff was entitled to put his own value on the relief claimed by him. This petition asks us to set aside that order. A preliminary objection is raised by the respondent that we should not intefere as the order in question is an interlocutory one. It is not contended that we have no jurisdiction to set aside an interlocutory order, and the decisions of this Court have fully established that we have power to do so. In a case of this sort, where the question relates to the proper tribunal that has jurisdiction in the cause, we are not willing to refuse to consider it on the merits. Proceeding to deal with the merits, we must start with the proposition laid down by a Full Bench of this Court that, so far as valuation for Court-fees is concerned, Section 7, Clause 4(b), applies to a suit for partition where the plaintiff alleges that he is in possession along with those against whom he claims partition. Rungiah Chetty v. Subramania Chetty 21 M.L.J. 21 : (1910) 1 M.W.N. 755 : 9 M.L.T. 8 Ind. Cas. 512. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act makes the valuation for purposes of jurisdiction the same as for the computation of Court-fees except in certain specific cases. The present case is admittedly not within the exception. Prima facie, therefore, the plaintiff in a suit for partition would be entitled to value his relief for purposes of jurisdiction. But it is contended that Section 14 of the Madras Civil Courts Act III of 1873 lays down that for purposes of jurisdiction, the rules laid down in Section 7, Clause 5 of the Court Fees Act, must be applied in all cases where the subject-matter of a suit is land, and that where partition of land is sought, the subject-matter is land. But Sections 3 and 6 of the Suits Valuation Act show that Section 14 of Act III of 1873 is really not applicable where recovery of possession of land is not sought, for Section 6 enacts that, on the framing of rules by the Local Government under Section 3 for the computation of the value for jurisdiction purposes in suits for recovery of possession of land, Section 14 of Act III of 1873 shall stand repealed. It is unlikely that such a provision would be made if Section 14 of Act III of 1873 were regarded as applicable to any suits for land other than for recovery of possession. Section 9 of Suits Valuation Act also goes to strengthen this conclusion. The inference, therefore, is that Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act applies to suits for partition which are not also suits for possession.
2. In Chakrapani Asari v. Narasinga Rau 19 M.K 56 and Chinnasami Pillai v. Raruppa Udayan 21 M.P 234 Section 14 of Act III of 1873 and Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act were regarded as applicable to a suit connected with land according as it was one for possession or not. In Velu Goundan v. Kumaravelu Goundan 20 M.P 289 it was decided that Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act was applicable to a suit for partition. The cases Ramakristnamma v. Bhagamma 13 M.P 56 and Ramu Iyer v. Sankara Aiyar 31 M.L 89 : 17 M.L.J. 573 : 3 M.L.T. 73 have no bearing on the present case, as the suits there were for registration of documents. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act was, therefore, inapplicable. In Ramakristnamma v. Bhagamma 13 M.L 56 reference was no doubt, made to Section 14 of Act III of 1873 as laying down the rule for determining the value for jurisdiction but that was before the Suits Valuation Act was enacted. We must hold that the Munsif was right in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to value the relief for purposes of jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether the plaintiff's valuation is final and not liable to any control by the Court, because that question was not the subject of the Munsif's order. We dismiss the petition with costs.