1. In this case, the plaintiff's predecessor-in-title granted a lease of a village to a Chetty, and he also granted a lease of some village to the defendants. Then, the lessee of the entire village instituted a suit to establish his right in preference to the defendants. The suit was compromised, and the compromise decree provided, among other things, that both the leases were valid and that the defendants should pay the rent due under their lease to the Chetty during the continuance of the Chetty's lease. Thereafter, it appears there was a dispute as to the possession of the village between the Chetty and the plaintiff and proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were instituted. The result of the proceedings was that the plaintiff was found to be in actual possession of the village and an order was passed to that effect. The Chetty, it appears, did not take any steps to establish his right by getting rid of the effect of that order under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. The plaintiff now sues the defendants for rent.
2. He obtained a decree from the Subordinate Judge. In revision, Mr. Justice Phillips reversed that judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, holding that, under the compromise decree, the plaintiff was not entitled to any rent. He, however, overlooked the effect of the proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. That question is dealt with by the Subordinate Judge in his judgment. If the proceedings related to the land now in possession of the defendants, then, under Article 47 of the Limitation Act, the Chetty would have to institute a civil action within three years of the date of the order in order to establish his right to the property and, failing that, the person who was placed in possession of the land, would acquire a right to the property under Section 28 of the Limitation Act. The Chetty, however, was not made a party to the suit. As it is contended by the learned Pleader who appeared in support of the judgment of Mr. Justice Phillips that the proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, did not relate to the land in dispute, and that there is every possibility that his client might be exposed to further litigation if the Chetty is inclined to sue him for rent, we think that Palaniappa Chetty should have been made a party to the suit so that the question might be finally decided and set at rest in the presence of all the parties concerned. We reverse both the judgments and direct the suit to be re-tried by making Palaniappa Chetty a defendant in the suit. The costs of all proceedings up to date will abide and follow the result.