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Authinarayana Iyer and ors. Vs. Krishnaswamy Iyer - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1924Mad854; 82Ind.Cas.481
AppellantAuthinarayana Iyer and ors.
RespondentKrishnaswamy Iyer
Cases ReferredKavoonoor Velayuda Reddi v. Reddiyvari Narasimha
Excerpt:
limitation act (ix of 1908), schedule i, article 182 - unpaid purchase-money, suit for--date of payment postponed limitation, operation of. - securitisation & reconstruction of financial assets & enforcement of security interest act, 2002 [c.a. no. 54/2002]section 17; power of tribunal to impose condition relating to deposit for grant of stay of auction held, there is no specific provision made under section 17 of securitisation act or under any other provisions of the said act empowering the tribunal to pass any interim order. but under sub-section (12) of section 19 of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act, 1993, the tribunal has been empowered to pass various interim orders. if sub-section (7) of section 17 of securitisation act is read along with..........for exhibit a and the plaintiff, way not entitled to claim a statutory charge for the unpaid purchase-money. from a perusal of exhibits a and b it is clear that the vendor did not accept exhibit b as consideration for the sale. according to exhibits a and b the arrangement was that the vendee should execute a bond for the unpaid purchase-money, undertaking to pay the amount on the happening of a certain event, namely, the attaining of majority of dharmaraja iyer. it cannot be said that the vendor accepted the bond as consideration for the price of the property sold. the vendee undertook to pay the price of the land sold to him on the happening of a certain event. i find against the appellant so far as this contention is concerned.2. the next contention is that the suit is barred by.....
Judgment:

Devadoss, J.

1. The first question argued in this second appeal, was that Exhibit B was the consideration for Exhibit A and the plaintiff, way not entitled to claim a statutory charge for the unpaid purchase-money. From a perusal of Exhibits A and B it is clear that the vendor did not accept Exhibit B as consideration for the sale. According to Exhibits A and B the arrangement was that the vendee should execute a bond for the unpaid purchase-money, Undertaking to pay the amount on the happening of a certain event, namely, the attaining of majority of Dharmaraja Iyer. It cannot be said that the vendor accepted the bond as consideration for the price of the property sold. The vendee undertook to pay the price of the land sold to him on the happening of a certain event. I find against the appellant so far as this contention is concerned.

2. The next contention is that the suit is barred by limitation as more than 12 years have elapsed from the date of the sale. The plaintiff's case is that he had a statutory charge and by Exhibit B the date of payment was fixed as 17th July 1905 and that he therefore, has 12 years from that date. The plaint was filed no doubt within 12 years from that date. But the real question is whether in the case of statutory charge for unpaid purchase-money, the vendor can claim the purchase-money more than 12 years after the date of the sale. It is settled law that in the case of a Claim for unpaid purchase-money, Article 132 of the Limitation Act applies, vide Ramakrishna Ayyar v. Subramania Ayyer, 29 M,K 305. The further question is when does the money become payable? The third column of the First Schedule against Article 132 contains the words 'when the money sued for becomes due'. The price of the land sold is payable on the date of the sale. So the money becomes payable to the vendor on the date of the sale. The suit, therefore, has to be brought within 12 years from the date of the sale.

3. On behalf of the plaintiff it is urged that Exhibits A and B should be considered as parts of one transaction and by Exhibit B time for payment was postponed and that, therefore, the plaintiff's suit is within the period of limitation. No doubt in the case of contract between two persons it is, open to the obligor to extend the period of limitation by a subsequent document. But in this case the charge was not created by the act of the parties. The charge Was a statutory charge and unless the parties clearly expressed their intention to extend the period of limitation by a proper, instrument, a document like Exhibit B cannot extend the period of limitation given by law. The respondent relies upon a judgment of this Court in Kavoonoor Velayuda Reddi v. Reddiyvari Narasimha, Reddi 38 Ind. Cas. 240 : 21 M.L.T. 105 : 5 L.W. 111 : 32 M.L.J. 263. I do not see how that case can help the plaintiff. There the charge or mortgage was created by the act of the parties; it was open to the parties to vary the terms of a prior document, by a proper subsequent instrument, Here as I have said the charge is given by law and the parties can not extend the time given by law for the enforcement of such a charge by simply putting off the date of payment. As I said it was open to them to create a charge by a proper document and fix a period for the payment of the amount due. Exhibit B is not such a document and, therefore, the contention of the appellant ought to prevail.

4. In the result I allow the appeal and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.

5. The memorandum of objections is dismissed but without costs.


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