Skip to content


Pichammal Vs. A. Ponnambala Bhatter and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in15Ind.Cas.326
AppellantPichammal
RespondentA. Ponnambala Bhatter and ors.
Cases Referred and Jagadbandhu Saha v. Radha Krishna Pal
Excerpt:
evidence act (i of 1872), sections 92, 115 - oral evidence varying terms of document--estoppel. - securitisation & reconstruction of financial assets & enforcement of security interest act, 2002 [c.a. no. 54/2002]section 17; power of tribunal to impose condition relating to deposit for grant of stay of auction held, there is no specific provision made under section 17 of securitisation act or under any other provisions of the said act empowering the tribunal to pass any interim order. but under sub-section (12) of section 19 of the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions act, 1993, the tribunal has been empowered to pass various interim orders. if sub-section (7) of section 17 of securitisation act is read along with sub-section (12) of section 19 of recovery of debts..........that the defendants were precluded, by section 92 of the indian evidence act, from proving the oral agreement set up by the 1st defendant, whereby the plaintiff is said to have agreed in substance to return the sale-deed, exhibit a, and to relinquish his rights thereunder. the learned vakil for the appellant argues that, in spite of this provision of law, the plaintiff is estopped, under section 115 of the indian evidence act, from [prosecuting the present suit. but, in order to set up any plea of estoppel, the party raising it must first prove the declaration, act or omission on which it is based, and, in the present case, section 92 stands in his way. we cannot accede to the suggestion that section 92 must be read subject to section 115.2. we may also observe that, to allow.....
Judgment:

1. In our opinion, the Subordinate Judge has rightly held that the defendants were precluded, by Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, from proving the oral agreement set up by the 1st defendant, whereby the plaintiff is said to have agreed in substance to return the sale-deed, Exhibit A, and to relinquish his rights thereunder. The learned Vakil for the appellant argues that, in spite of this provision of law, the plaintiff is estopped, under Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, from [prosecuting the present suit. But, in order to set up any plea of estoppel, the party raising it must first prove the declaration, act or omission on which it is based, and, in the present case, Section 92 stands in his way. We cannot accede to the suggestion that Section 92 must be read subject to Section 115.

2. We may also observe that, to allow appellant's contention would be to run counter to the spirit of the rulings in Kurri Veerareddi v. Kurri Bapireddi 29 M.P 336 : 1 M.L.T. 153 : 16 M.L.J. 395 and Jagadbandhu Saha v. Radha Krishna Pal 36 C.P 920 : 4 Ind. Cas. 414. It is true that, at the time of the alleged oral agreement, the plaintiff's document had not been registered, but it had been executed, and plaintiff had thereby acquired a right to get it registered; whenever he chose. We do not think the cases quoted can be sufficiently distinguished on this ground The second appeal is dismissed with costs.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //