G. Ramanujam, J.
1. The Life Insurance Corporation of. India is the petitioner herein. It acquired the assets of the South India Teachers' Union Protection Fund Limited, which included five buildings bearing Door Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 in S.I.T.U. Colony, Raja Annamalaipuram four of which are residential buildings. At the time of acquisition respondents 2 to 6 who were not the employees of the Corporation, were occupying separate portions of the said residential buildings. Since the Corporation felt considerable need for providing residential houses for the occupation of its staff, it has been pursuading respondents 2 to 6 to give vacant possession of the portions of the premises in their occupation. When it could not get possession of the portions from them, it applied to the first respondent to exempt the premises Nos. 3, 4, 6 and 7 under Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Act XVIII of 1960 from the provisions of Section 10(3) of the said Act.
2. The two grounds that were urged in support of the application for exemption are : (1) that it is not possible for the Corporation to file an application for eviction under Section 10(3) before the Rent Controller on the ground that the premises are required for housing its staff and (2) that the staff of the Corporation who had to be provided with houses are pressing for providing residential accommodation. The said application for exemption filed before the first respondent seems to have been, sent to the Accommodation Controller for remarks. The Accommodation Controller had reported that the Corporation can file an application for eviction before the Rent Controller under Section 10(3) of the Act and that the hardship that will be caused to the tenants will outweigh the benefits which will accrue to the Corporation by exemption of the buildings. Taking note of this report from the Accommodation Controller, the Government passed an order in. G.O. Rt. No. 4319, Home, dated 13th October, 1972 rejecting the petitioner's application for exemption on the ground that the Corporation has got a remedy to evict the tenants under the Act and that therefore there is no justification for granting exemption under Section 29 of the Act. The said order of the Government, dated 13th October, 1972 has been challenged in this writ petition.
3. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the view taken by the Government that the Corporation has got a remedy of seeking eviction before the Rent Controller under Section 10(3) of the Act is erroneous and that in fact having regard to the purpose for which the building is required, the remedy by way of application for eviction before the Rent Controller is not available to the petitioner. Therefore we have to see whether the petitioner can approach the Rent Controller for eviction of the Respondents 2 to 6 under Section 10(3) of the Act.
Section 10(3)(b) is as follows:
Where the landlord of a building, whether, residential or non-residential, is a religious, charitable, educational, or other public institution, it may, if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply to the Controller, subject to the provisions of Clause (d) for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building.
In this case, the petitioner is seeking possession of the building on the ground that the building is required for the occupation of its employees and not for its own occupation. Therefore, the Corporation cannot be taken to require the premises for its purposes so as to enable it to invoke Section 10(3)(b) of the Act for getting possession of the building from the tenants. Therefore, the Life Insurance Corporation cannot be said to have remedy under Section 10(3)(b). Ananthanarayanan, C.J., has taken a similar view in Bhakthavatsalu Chetty v. Natesa Achari (1968) 81 L.W. 13. In that case, a building was owned by a charitable trust. That building was occupied by a tenant. The trust filed an eviction petition under Section 10(3)(b) on the ground that the building was required for letting it out as a Kalyana Mandapam with a view to get a higher income to the trust. The learned Chief Justice held that so long as the celebration of marriages in a mandapam is not one of the objects for which the trust was founded, that the object of establishing a Kalyana Mandapam cannot be said to be for the purpose of the trust and that therefore the trust cannot be taken to require the building for its own use. Veeraswamy, J. as he then was in Official Trustee, Madras v. Gopalji Chamshi and Co. (1967) 1 M.L.J. 45 : (1967) 80 L.W. 17, has held that the Official Trustee's application under Section 10(3)(b) for possession in the occupation of a tenant building on the ground that the trust requires the building for conversion as a Kalyana Mandapam does not fulfil the criteria of requirement for the purposes of the trust, as the trust does not require possession of the building for its own purposes, and therefore Section 10(3)(b) cannot be invoked.
4. In this case, as already stated, the Life Insurance Corporation is not requiring the building for its own use or for its own purposes, i.e., for carrying on the life insurance business. The building is required by the Corporation to provide housing accommodation for its own employees. Provision of housing accommodation for its employees has nothing to do with its business or the purposes for which the Corporation has been established. Though the Corporation may be morally obliged to provide its staff housing accommodation it cannot be taken to be the purpose of the Corporation. In these circumstances, therefore, the Corporation cannot file an application under Section 10(3) for eviction, of the tenants for the purpose of providing, house accommodation to its staff.
5. The only reason given in the impugned order of the Government is that the Corporation has got a remedy to evict the tenants under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. Now that it has been found that the provisions of the Rent Control Act, cannot be invoked by the Corporation and that the only reason given in the impugned order is quite unsustainable, the Government has to reconsider the petitioner's request for exemption afresh and dispose of the same in the light of this judgment. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner's application for exemption was filed as early as 15th June, 1971, nearly six years before, the Government will pass final order's at least, within two months from the date of receipt of this order. This writ petition is ordered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.