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R. Srinivasa Iyengar Vs. S.K.M.R.M. Ramaswami Chettiar by Agent Somasundaram Chettiar - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported inAIR1916Mad120(2); 29Ind.Cas.846
AppellantR. Srinivasa Iyengar
RespondentS.K.M.R.M. Ramaswami Chettiar by Agent Somasundaram Chettiar
Excerpt:
letters patent act, section 15 - high courts act (24 and 25 vic., c. 104), section 13--high court exercing jurisdiction under section 25 of provincial small cause courts act (ix of 1887)--'appellate jurisdiction'--judgment--appeal against such, order, if maintainable--discretionary power given to subordinate courts--appellate court, power of, to interfere. - .....v. moidin kutti (1899) i.l.r. 22 mad. 68 (f.b.) to hold that in disposing of an application to exercise the high court's revisional jurisdiction over a court subordinate to it a single judge acts in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the court within the meaning of section 18 of the high courts act, and consequently that, if his order of disposal amounts to a judgment, an appeal lies from it under clause 15 of the letters patent. 2. we also think that we are bound by the decision of the full bench in tuljaram row v. alagappa chettiar (1912) i.l.r. 35 mad. i (f.b.), to hold that such order is a judgment even when the judge merely declines to interfere in revision, and that it is immaterial whether before such refusal the records were called for or notice issued to the other.....
Judgment:

Seshagiri Ayyar, J.

1. We are bound by the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of five Judges in Chappan v. Moidin Kutti (1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 68 (F.B.) to hold that in disposing of an application to exercise the High Court's revisional jurisdiction over a Court subordinate to it a single Judge acts in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court within the meaning of Section 18 of the High Courts Act, and consequently that, if his order of disposal amounts to a judgment, an appeal lies from it under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

2. We also think that we are bound by the decision of the Full Bench in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar (1912) I.L.R. 35 Mad. I (F.B.), to hold that such order is a judgment even when the Judge merely declines to interfere in revision, and that it is immaterial whether before such refusal the records were called for or notice issued to the other side. The decisions in Venkatarama Ayyar v. Madalai Ammal (1900) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 169 and Puthukudi Abdu v. Puvakka Kunhikutti (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 340 must therefore in our opinion be treated as overruled.

3. At the same time we think it right to say that in matters of discretion such as this, the Court will not ordinarily interfere on appeal though it has jurisdiction to do so. This is the practice of the Court of Appeal in England, (see Annual Practice, 1915, page 1911, citing Goldinq v. Wharton Salt Works Company (1876) 1 Q.B.D., 374, and other cases) and should, we think, be followed here.


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