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Srirama Raghvachariar Vs. Narasama Naidu and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in113Ind.Cas.92
AppellantSrirama Raghvachariar
RespondentNarasama Naidu and ors.
Cases ReferredPalancheri Govinda Menon v. Pookote Kunti Krishna Munnadiar
Excerpt:
res judicata - execution 'proceedings--application for execution--failure to object on ground of limitation--order for sale,--subsequent application--res judicata. - .....the parties compromised, embodying the terms in a decree dated the 3rd march, 1911. after this, a final decree was passed on 25th september, 1914, and there were three successive execution petitions, in 16, 17 and 20 respectively. the fourth execution petition, that with which we are concerned, was filed on 21st june, 1923, asking for the sale of the hypothecated property. an order for sale was accordingly passed by the district munsif on 15th december, 1928, fixing the sale on 5th february, 1924. shortly before that day arrived, the appellant (1st defendant) filed a petition under section 47, civil procedure code asking the court to re-consider its order for sale. this petition was dismissed by the district munsif and an appeal to the subordinate judge was equally unsuccessful. against.....
Judgment:

1. The circumstances in which this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises are briefly as follows: The respondent sued the appellant upon a simple mortgage and the parties compromised, embodying the terms in a decree dated the 3rd March, 1911. After this, a final decree was passed on 25th September, 1914, and there were three successive execution petitions, in 16, 17 and 20 respectively. The fourth execution petition, that with which we are concerned, was filed on 21st June, 1923, asking for the sale of the hypothecated property. An order for sale was accordingly passed by the District Munsif on 15th December, 1928, fixing the sale on 5th February, 1924. Shortly before that day arrived, the appellant (1st defendant) filed a petition under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code asking the Court to re-consider its order for sale. This petition was dismissed by the District Munsif and an appeal to the Subordinate Judge was equally unsuccessful. Against the latter order this appeal has been filed.

2. The substantial question which the appellant now raises is one of limitation being shortly that the compromise decree was in effect a combined preliminary and final decree and was executable, so that time should run from that decree and not from the so-called final decree; and if that be so, this execution petition is beyond the 12 years. We have heard much argument upon this point, but we think that the appeal may be disposed of upon the short ground that the petition to which it relates did not lie because it was barred by res judicata. We have said that there was an order for sale on the 15th December, 1923, and it was an order after notice and was appealable. It was open on that occasion to the present appellant to have raised his plea of limitation and he omitted to do so. It is impossible to assent to the argument that that was not an occasion where such a plea could have been raised and it appears to us that the matter is concluded on the authority of the Privy Council judgment in Mungul Pershad Dechit v. Grija Kant Lahiri 8 C. 51 : 8 I.A. 123 : 11 C.L.R. 113 : 4 Sar.P.C. 249 which has been followed already by this Court in similar circumstances in Palancheri Govinda Menon v. Pookote Kunti Krishna Munnadiar : AIR1923Mad649 . In the latter case it was held that an order directing the sale of some of the mortgaged items in execution of a decree for redemption involved a decision in favour of the executability of the decree as it stood, and that the mortgagee who was served with notice of the mortgagors application for sale of those items and who omitted to raise the objection that it was not executable because there was no final decree in the case, was barred by res judicata from raising it subsequently. We are in agreement with this decision, based as it is upon the Privy Council ruling, and must accordingly hold that the petition in second appeal was barred by res judicata.

3. Another aspect of the matter is that the application was in the nature of a petition to review the order of sale and that a refusal to grant the review would not be appealable. In these circumstances there is no need to proceed with the other question;--as to the nature of the compromise decree--we dismiss the appeal with costs.


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