U.S. Supreme Court Railroad Company v. Fuller, 84 U.S. 17 Wall. 560 560 (1873)
Railroad Company v. Fuller
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 560
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IOWA
A state legislature passed in 1862 an act "in relation to the duties of railroad companies," enacting:
1st. That each railroad company should annually, in a month named by the act, fix its rates for the transportation of passengers and of freights of different kinds;
2d. That it should, on the first day of the next month, cause a printed copy of such rates to be put up at all its stations and depots, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year;
3d. That a failure to fulfill these requirements, or the charging of a higher rate than was posted, should subject the offending company to the payment of certain penalties prescribed.
Congress, afterwards (in 1866), by an act whose title was "An act to facilitate commercial, postal, and military communication between the several states," and which recited that "the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress, in express terms, the power to regulate commerce among the several states," and goes on " Therefore, be it enacted," &c.;, enacted
"That every railroad company in the united states, whose road is operated by steam . . . be, and hereby is authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, ferries, all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freights, and other property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor. "
And enacted further, "That Congress may at any time, alter, amend, or repeal this act." Held, in the case of a railroad running through several states, including that where the state enactment above mentioned had been made, that the state enactment was but a police law, and therefore constitutional.
A statute of Iowa "in relation to the duties of railroad companies," passed in 1862, [ Footnote 1 ] thus enacts:
"In the month of September annually, each railroad company shall fix its rates of fare for passengers, and freights for transportation of timber, wood, and coal, per ton, cord, or thousand feet, per mile, also, its fare and freight per mile, for transporting merchandise and articles of the first, second, third, and fourth grades of freight."
"And on the 1st day of October following, shall put up at
all the stations and depots on its road, a printed copy of such fare and freight, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year."
"For willfully neglecting so to do, or for receiving higher rates of fares or freight than those posted, the company shall forfeit not less than $100 nor more than $200 to any person injured thereby and suing therefor."
On the 15th of June, 1866, [ Footnote 2 ] Congress passed an act thus:
" An Act to facilitate Commercial, Postal, and Military "
" Communication among the several states "
"Whereas, the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress, in express terms, the power to regulate commerce among the several states, to establish post-roads and to raise and support armies, therefore: "
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted that every railroad company in the United States whose road is operated by steam, its successors and assigns, be and is hereby authorized to carry upon and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries, all passengers, troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their way from any state to another state, and to receive compensation therefor, . . . provided &c.;"
"SECTION 2. Be it further enacted that Congress may at any time, alter, amend, or repeal this act."
These two enactments, of the state and of the United States, being on the statute books, the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Company, a corporation chartered by Illinois and having its principal place of business at Chicago in that state and working a continuous line of railway from the said Chicago through Illinois, Iowa, and other states (by the legislatures of which, of course, the different parts of its road were authorized), having posted their rates of freight and put up a schedule of them in their office, in the station, was transporting, in pursuance of the request of one Fuller, certain goods of his from the said Chicago in Illinois to a place called Marshalltown, in Iowa. Having charged and received from Fuller, as he alleged, a higher
rate of freight than that posted, Fuller sued them in one of the district courts of Iowa to recover the penalty which the Iowa enactment purported to give in such a case. The company set up, among other defenses, that the said enactment was in violation of that clause of the Constitution [ Footnote 3 ] which ordains that:
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states."
The court in which the suit was brought and the supreme court of the state on appeal from it held that the enactment of Iowa was but a "police regulation," and accordingly that it was valid. Judgment going accordingly the case was now brought here.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case lies within a narrow compass, and presents but a single question for our consideration. That question is not difficult of solution. The second section, chapter 169, of the laws of the ninth General Assembly of Iowa is as follows:
"In the month of September annually, each railroad company shall fix its rates of fare for passengers and freight, for transportation of timber, wood, and coal per ton, cord, or thousand feet, per mile; also, its fare and freight per mile for transporting merchandise and articles of the first, second, third, and fourth grades of freight; and on the first day of October following shall put up at all stations and depots on its road a printed copy of such fare and freight, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year. For willfully neglecting so to do or for receiving higher rates of fare or freight than those posted, the company shall forfeit not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars to any person injured thereby and suing therefor."
The plaintiff in error was sued in the proper district court of the state for violations of these provisions. Among other defenses interposed, the company plead that the statute was in conflict with the commercial clause of the Constitution
of the United States. Fuller demurred to the plea. The court sustained the demurrer and the company excepted. The case was afterwards submitted to a jury. The company prayed the court to instruct them that the act was invalid by reason of the conflict before mentioned. The court refused, and the company again excepted. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The company removed the case to the supreme court of the state, and there insisted upon these exceptions as errors. That court affirmed the judgment of the district court, and the company thereupon prosecuted this writ of error. Was there error in this ruling?
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The statute complained of provides:
That each railroad company shall, in the month of September, annually, fix its rates for the transportation of passengers and of freights of different kinds;
That it shall cause a printed copy of such rates to be put up at all its stations and depots, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year;
That a failure to fulfill these requirements or the charging of a higher rate than is posted shall subject the offending company to the payment of the penalty prescribed.
In all other respects there is no interference. No other constraint is imposed. Except in these particulars, the company may exercise all its faculties as it shall deem proper. No discrimination is made between local and interstate freights and no attempt is made to control the rates that may be charged. It is only required that the rates shall be fixed, made public, and honestly adhered to. In this there is nothing unreasonable or onerous. The public welfare is promoted without wrong or injury to the company. The statute was doubtless deemed to be called for by the interests of the community to be affected by it, and it rests upon a solid foundation of reason and justice.
It is not, in the sense of the Constitution, in any wise a regulation of commerce. It is a police regulation, and as such forms
"a portion of the immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the Territory of a state not surrendered to the general government, all which can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. [ Footnote 4 ]"
This case presents a striking analogy to a prominent feature in the case of The Brig James Gray v. Ship John Fraser. [ Footnote 5 ] There, the city authorities of Charleston had passed an ordinance prescribing where a vessel should lie in the harbor, what light she should show at night, and making other similar regulations. It was objected that these requirements were regulations of commerce, and therefore void. This Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance.
In the complex system of polity which exists in this country, the powers of government may be divided into four classes:
Those which belong exclusively to the states.
Those which belong exclusively to the National Government.
Those which may be exercised concurrently and independently by both.
And those which may be exercised by the states but only until Congress shall see fit to act upon the subject.
The authority of the state then retires and lies in abeyance until the occasion for its exercise shall recur. [ Footnote 6 ]
Commerce is traffic, but it is much more. It embraces also transportation by land and water, and all the means and appliances necessarily employed in carrying it on. [ Footnote 7 ]
The authority to regulate commerce, lodged by the Constitution in Congress, is in part within the last division of the powers of government above mentioned. Some of the rules prescribed in the exercise of that power must from the nature of things be uniform throughout the country. To
that extent the authority itself must necessarily be exclusive, as much so as if it had been declared so to be by the Constitution in express terms.
Others may well vary with the varying circumstances of different localities. Where a stream navigable for the purposes of foreign or interstate commerce is obstructed by the authority of a state, such exercise of authority may be valid until Congress shall see fit to intervene. The authority of Congress in such cases is paramount and absolute, and it may compel the abatement of the obstruction whenever it shall deem it proper to do so. A few of the cases illustrating these views will be adverted to.
In Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, [ Footnote 8 ] under a law of the state of Delaware, a dam had been erected across the creek. This Court held that the dam was a lawful structure because not in conflict with any law of Congress.
In Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, [ Footnote 9 ] the State of Pennsylvania had authorized the erection of a bridge over the Schuylkill River in the City of Philadelphia. This Court refused to interpose, because there was no legislation by Congress affecting the river. The authority of Congress over the subject was affirmed in the strongest terms.
In The Wheeling Bridge Case, [ Footnote 10 ] the bridge was decreed to be a nuisance because Congress "had regulated the Ohio River, and had thereby secured to the public the free and unobstructed use of the same." Congress subsequently legalized the bridge, and this Court held the case to be thereby terminated.
In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, [ Footnote 11 ] the validity of a state law establishing certain pilotage regulations was drawn in question. It was admitted by this Court that the regulations were regulations of commerce, but it was held that they were valid and would continue to be so until superseded by the action of Congress.
In Ex Parte McNiel, [ Footnote 12 ] the same question arose, and the doctrine of the preceding case was reaffirmed.
In The James Gray v. John Fraser, [ Footnote 13 ] stress was laid upon the fact that there was no act of Congress in conflict with the city ordinance in question. See also in this connection Osborne v. City of Mobile. [ Footnote 14 ]
If the requirements of the statute here in question were, as contended by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, regulations of commerce, the question would arise whether, regarded in the light of the authorities referred to and of reason and principle, they are not regulations of such a character as to be valid until superseded by the paramount action of Congress. But as we are unanimously of the opinion that they are merely police regulations, it is unnecessary to pursue the subject.
[ Footnote 1 ]
Laws of the Ninth General Assembly of the State of Iowa, second section, chapter 169.
[ Footnote 2 ]
14 Stat. at Large 66.
[ Footnote 3 ]
Article I, Sec. 8.
[ Footnote 4 ]
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
[ Footnote 5 ]
62 U. S. 21 How. 184.
[ Footnote 6 ]
Ex Parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 240.
[ Footnote 7 ]
2 Story on the Constitution §§ 1061, 1062.
[ Footnote 8 ]
27 U. S. 2 Pet. 250.
[ Footnote 9 ]
70 U. S. 3 Wall. 728.
[ Footnote 10 ]
59 U. S. 18 How. 430.
[ Footnote 11 ]
53 U. S. 12 How. 319.
[ Footnote 12 ]
[ Footnote 13 ]
62 U. S. 21 How. 184.
[ Footnote 14 ]
83 U. S. 16