Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. The plaintiff claiming to be the reversionary heir to the estate of one Subbabattudu, has instituted this suit for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that a sale-deed executed by P. Subbamma alias Chittamma and her husband, the 2nd defendant, is not binding upon him and the 8th defendant who is his brother. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that it was barred under Article 125 of the Limitation Act. I agree with his conclusion, though not with the reasoning by which the judgment is supported. Subbamma alias Chittamma acquired title to the property by the sale-de;ed of 1893 marked Ex. I. It purports to be a sale of two-thirds share in the property, the 7th defendant one of her sisters being treated as an owner of a third share, the plaintiff and the 8th defendant, the sons of the 6th defendant, another sister of hers being, assumed to be owners of the other share.
2. The assumption, of course, is entirely wrong, because at the time the plaintiff and the 8th defendant had no more than a mere possibility, a hope of succeeding as reversionary heirs. The alienation of the one-third share by Manikam the 6th defendant, if it is regarded as an alienation on behalf of her minor children would, therefore, be void: see Ananda Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick 74 Ind. Cas. 499 : 50 I.A. 239 : 21 A.L.J. 718 : 4 P.L.T. 609 : A.I.R. (1923) (P.C.) 189 : (1923) M.W.N. 803 : 45 M.L.J. 617 : 25 Bom. L.R. 1269 : 33 M.L.T. 365 : 50 C.P 929 : 28 C.W.N. 713 : 40 C.L.J. 10 and Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh 44 Ind. Cas. 408 : 45 I.A. 35 : 23 M.L.T. 142 : 22 C.W.N. 409 : 27 C.L.J. 296 : 34 M.L.J. 298 : 4 P.L.W. 221 : 16 A.L.J. 265 : (1918) M.W.N. 306 : 7 L.W. 581 : 20 Bom. L.R. 546 : 45 C.P 590. This is what their Lordships of the Judicial Committee say in the second of the above mentioned cases: 'A Hindu reversioner has no right or interest in praesenti in the property which the female owner holds for her life. Until it vests in him on her death should he survive her, he has nothing to assign or to relinquish, or even to transmit to his heirs. His right becomes concrete only on her demise; until then it is mere spes successionis. His guardian, if he happens to be a minor, cannot bargain with it on his behalf or bind him by any contractual engagement in respect thereto.' But the transaction, in substance, is not a sale by the 7th defendant and the sons of the 6th defendant in favour of Subbamma alias Chittamma. It is really a sale by all the three sisters in favour of one of them, namely, Subbamma alias Chittamma. A reference to Ex. II will show what the nature of the transaction is. Although the consideration in the sale-deed is mentioned as Rs. 380, in truth it was Rs. 570. The vendee paid off the amount due to a mortgagee, namely, Rs. 450 and there was a balance of Rs. 120. This sum of Rs. 120 belonged to the three daughters in three equal shares. The vendee paid Rs. 80 to the 6th and 7th defendants. The parties carried out their intention in a very clumsy manner and, unless both Exs. I and II are looked at, it will be extremely difficult to understand what the real transaction was. In my opinion, the effect of Exs. I and II is, as I have said, that the property was sold by the three sisters to one of them, namely, Subbamma alias Chittamma. The sisters did not purport to convey only their limited interest in the property. The sale was made upon the footing that what was conveyed to the vendee was the absolute right of the vendors. In this view the suit is clearly barred by limitation.
3. The plaintiff was 36 years old, at the time of the institution of the suit, and, in my opinion, the present suit is merely speculative instituted after the members of his family parted with their interest in the property to strangers. This is an attempt to wrest the property from their hands.
4. Mr. Somasundaram, the learned Vakil for the appellant has argued that the existence of justifiable necessity, for the alienation of 1893 has not been shown. The question does not arise because the suit is dismissed in limine on the ground that it is barred by limitation. He also says that he will be able to prove that Exs. I and II do not represent a genuine transaction at all. These are questions which may be decided in a suit properly framed when a cause of action accrues to him. For the present I am not concerned with these questions. The second appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.