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Madhav Janaradan Vs. Shrinivas Narayan Naik and anr. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectLimitation
CourtKarnataka High Court
Decided On
Case NumberSecond Appeal (B) No. 282 of 1956
Judge
ActsLimitation Act, 1908 - Sections 19; Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 - Sections 52
AppellantMadhav Janaradan
RespondentShrinivas Narayan Naik and anr.
Appellant AdvocateK. Srinivasa Rao, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateH. Bhaskar Rao and ;M.R. Kamath, Advs.
Excerpt:
- constitution of india -- article 226; [a.s. bopanna, j] jurisdiction under held, high court will have jurisdiction regarding the statutory contracts and not a non statutory contracts. proper remedy is to work out through the competent civil court. .....so signed. the question is whether 'the period prescribed' as mentioned in section 19 includes the period extended by virtue of s. 52 of the bombay agricultural debtors relief act, 1947. on principle, i find no difficulty in holding that the period prescribed, as mentioned in section 19, must include the extended period. i pointed out to the learned advocate for the appellant that the logical consequence of his contention, if it is accepted, would be that if a part payment is made within the period of limitation and as a result thereof the said period is extended, then any acknowledgment made thereafter within that extended period would not be a good acknowledgment. the learned advocate frankly conceded before us that he was unable to maintain this position, i, therefore, hold that there.....
Judgment:

S.R. Das Gupta, C.J.

(1) The only point raised in this appeal is the point of limitation. It arises in this way :

(2) The respondent filed a suit to enforce a simple mortgage debt dated 9.7.1932. the period for redemption fixed in the mortgage was four years. This suit was filed on 2.6.1952, i.e. after the period of limitation. But the limitation is sought to be saved by an acknowledgment made by the 1st defendant on 26.9.50. The plaintiff, before filing this suit, had started proceedings under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act on 31.7.1947. That proceeding was dismissed on 12.6.1950 on the ground that the petitioner was not a debtor.

Section 52 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 provides that in computing the period of limitation for the institution of any suit or proceeding in respect of any debt due from any person who is held not to be a debtor by the Court or the Court in appeal, the period during which the proceedings in respect of such debt were prosecuted before the Court or the Court in appeal shall be excluded. This case is therefore governed by section 52 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947 and in computing the period of limitation for this suit the period taken in prosecuting proceeding before the debt Court will have to be excluded. This acknowledgment dated 26.5.1950 was made within that extended period.

(3) The only contention urged before us by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant is that the acknowledgment made within this extended period cannot be a valid acknowledgment. I do not see any reason why it should not be so. Section 19 of the Limitation Act says that, where before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. The question is whether 'the period prescribed' as mentioned in section 19 includes the period extended by virtue of S. 52 of the Bombay Agricultural Debtors Relief Act, 1947. On principle, I find no difficulty in holding that the period prescribed, as mentioned in section 19, must include the extended period.

I pointed out to the learned Advocate for the appellant that the logical consequence of his contention, if it is accepted, would be that if a part payment is made within the period of limitation and as a result thereof the said period is extended, then any acknowledgment made thereafter within that extended period would not be a good acknowledgment. The learned Advocate frankly conceded before us that he was unable to maintain this position, I, therefore, hold that there is no force in the contention which was urged before us by the learned Advocate for the appellant.

(4) In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The matter will go back to the lower appellate Court for the purpose of making a final order in this case.

Hombe Gowda, J.

(5) I agree.

(6) Appeal dismissed.


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