Chakravartti, Ag. C.J.
1. These are six applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgement passed by this Court in its civil revisional jurisdiction in six cases. Those cases were heard together.
2. The judgment was delivered on 14-1-1952 in all the six cases in the form of separate sectionsof a single pronouncement and' the learned Judges signed the 'judgment at 'the end. The applicants for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court made their first application for a certified copy on 8-2-1952 and we are informed from the Bar that that application was for a copy of the judgment. The requisites were filed on the same day and the copy was ready on the 12th of February next. Delivery of the copy was also taken on the same day. As the application was for a copy of the judgment, what was supplied was only a copy of the judgment.
3. It appears that on 21-4-1952 the applicants for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court made a second application for copy and we arc informed that this time they wanted a copy of the decree. The requisites were filed on the same day and the copy was ready for delivery on the 25th of April next. Actually delivery was taken on the 28th of April. As this time the application was for a copy of what was called the decree the office supplied a certified copy not merely of the judgment covering all the six cases signed by the learned Judge, but also a copy of the cost-sheet signed by an Assistant Registrar of the Appellate Side on 8-2-1952. 'The applications for leave were filed on 2-5-1952 but the office, besides pointing out several other, defects of form also pointed out that the applications were barred by time, inasmuch as more than ninety day sand the time allowable for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment had elapsed from the date of the judgment, It was, however, added that if the date on which the cost-sheet was signed by the Assistant Registrar was taken as the starting point of limitation or if the period between the date of the judgment and the date on which the cost-sheet was signed was deducted, the applications would appear to be in time. As this was a matter which, in the opinion of the office, was a matter for decision by the Court, it was placed before us and we have heard the parties.
5. It will appear from the dates which I have already mentioned that if the date on which the judgment was pronounced be taken as the starting point of limitation, the period of limitation for applying for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had already expired before the second application for a certified copy was made on 21-4-1952. I do 'not know whether a discovery of that position was the cause for making the second application for a copy, not of the judgment but this time of the 'decree.' If, however, the applicants are entitled in law to have the period of limitation computed from the later date on which the cost-sheet was signed, they are entitled to the benefit of such computation and the motive from which they made a second application for a copy will be entirely immaterial.
6. I am, however, unable to hold that the date on which the Assistant Registrar signed the cost-sheet is in any way material. The proposed appeal is going to be an appeal from a final order passedby this Court in the exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction. The relevant article in the Constitution is Article 133 and it mentions only 'any judgment, decree or final, order in a civil proceeding ofa High Court' and stops there. What papers haveto be filed along with a petition for leave to appeal is indicated in Rule 8 of chap, VI of the Rulesof the Appellate Side of this Court which dealswith appeals to the Supreme Court. Mr. Mukherjee who appeared on behalf of the petitioners relied upon Clause (4) of it. 8 under which every petitionfor leave to appeal to the Supreme Court must beaccompanied by 'certified copies of the judgmentand decree complained of.' The contention ofMr. Mukherjee was that the cost-sheet signed bythe Assistant Registrar was a decree and sinceunder RULE 8 (4) he was bound to file a copy of thecost-sheet, limitation could not start to run against him before the date on which the cost-sheet was signed or, in any event, he was entitled to adeduction of the period between the date of thejudgment and the date of the signature of thecost-sheet.
7. This argument assumes that the cost-sheet signed on 8-2-1952 by the Assistant Registrar is a decree and that it is a decree complained of by the proposed appeal. In my opinion, it is neither.
8. The definition of 'decree' is well known and is to be found in Section 2(2), Civil P. C. To recall the familiar terms, a 'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. In the second place, under Order 20, Rule 7 of the Code the decree must bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced and must be, signed by the Judge who passed the decree. The proceedings to which the proposed appeals relate were proceedings for the standardisation of the rents of several premises and it is impossible to see how the rights of the parties with regard to any of the matters in ' controversy in those proceedings could be said to have been adjudicated on by the cost-sheet signed by the Assistant Registrar. Nor is it easy to see how the cost-sheet signed by an Assistant Registrar can be or can have the force or effect of a decree in view of the clear provisions of Order 20, Rule 7, Civil P. C. The fact that decrees drawn-up in suits or appeals contain a statement of the costs awarded, need not mislead anyone, because those decrees are statutorily required to contain and do in fact contain particulars of the claim and the Court's determination of the matter.
9. Mr. Mukherjee, however, contended that the cost-sheet should not be regarded separately and that the judgment pronounced by the learned Judges, together with the cost-sheet, should be taken as embodying the formal adjudication by the Court on the rights of the parties with regard 'to matters in controversy in the proceedings concerned. On the argument of Mr. Mukherjee we would havethe curious result that a part of a decree is signed by the Judges of the Court, whereas another part is signed by a ministerial officer. I also enquired of Mr. Mukherjee whether, if he could not furnish any reason from the relevant provisions of law or any authority from any decided cases, he could at least refer us to some precedent when a proposed application for leave to appeal to the: Supreme Court or to 'the Privy Council was thrown out on the ground that it was not accompanied by a copy of the cost-sheet or whether he could cite a case where the filing of the cost-sheet was insisted on. Mr. Mukherjee frankly conceded that he could not refer us to any such precedent or instance.
10. In my view, in computing the period of limitation for the purpose of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a judgment of this Court, passed in its revisional jurisdiction, it is not possible to take into account the date on which the Assistant Registrar may sign the cost-sheet.
11. In the second place, even if we were to hold that the terms of Rule 8 (4) of chap, VI of the Appellate Side Rules were sufficient to make it necessary that the cost-sheet in such a case must be-filed along with the application for leave to appeal, it is further necessary to see whether, on the facts of this case, the cost-sheet can be regard, ed as 'the decree complained of.' I have looked into the grounds in the petitions of appeal and I do not find that as regards the costs themselves any particular ground has been taken or that the cost-sheet as such is complained of at all. It is quite true that in order that the award of costs may be challenged, it is not necessary to take a specific ground, since should the applicants succeed in their appeals on the merits, a reversal of the order for costs would consequentially follow. But if the applicants would insist that the cost-sheet must be taken into account in computing the period of limitation, they must not only establish that the cost-sheet can be, treated as a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2), Civil P. C., but also that the cost-sheet is or embodies an order which is complained of. I have already made it clear that neither of these tests is satisfied in the present case.
12. IN my opinion, the doubt felt by the office that the date on which the Assistant Registrar signed the cost-sheet could not be taken into consideration was well founded and that the present applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court are barred by limitation.
13. Let these applications be returned to the office to be dealt with by them in accordance with oar decision given above.
G.N. Das J.
14. I agree.