1. The petitioner in this matter is a commission agent who bought certain goods on behalf of the defendant. His case is that the defendant refused to reimburse him for the expenses he had incurred and that events occurred which justified him in reselling the goods on behalf of the defendant at a less price than he had paid for them. Before the re-sale the defendant paid him Rs. 600 as a deposit in respect of the expenses he had incurred on behalf of the defendant. He now sues the defendant for the loss incurred on the re-sale of the goods allowing for the Rs. 600 he has received. The defendant brought a suit at Ludhiana for a return of Rs. 600 before the institution of the present suit. The plaintiff has obtained a rule on the defendant calling on him to show cause why he should not be restrained from proceeding with his suit in Ludhiana, and the two suits are so far concerned with the same subject matter, that were the Ludhiana suit brought in a Court subordinate to this Court, it would certainly be stayed. The defendant, however, shows cause by contending that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction on him, as he is not resident in Bengal. To this the plaintiff replies that the defendant has property within the jurisdiction, namely, the Rs. 600 deposit and that this gives this Court jurisdiction over him. I cannot, however, consider that this argument is well founded in point of law. In Vulcan Iron Works v. Bishumbhur Prasad (1908) I.L.R. 36 Cale. 233, Fletcher J. after referring to The Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1855) 5 H.L.C. 416, comes to the conclusion that a Court of Equity can only restrain a person from proceeding with a suit in a Foreign Court, if he is within the jurisdiction of the Court. It has been sought to show that this conclusion was not properly deduced from the authority referred to on the ground that that case was decided on the merits of the case, and that if the Court that is asked to issue an injunction can make any order that would affect the person whom it is sought to enjoin, if, as is said, the Court can reach him by attaching or sequestering his property, it has jurisdiction to issue an injunction. I do not consider that this is so. The Court in the Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren (1885) 5 H.L.C. 416, proceeded not on the particular merits of the case but on the general rule that a person living entirely under a foreign jurisdiction must be left to obtain such relief as his own Courts may afford, and that being so, the case is an authority for the proposition put forward by Fletcher J. Lord Brougham's judgment seems to me quite inconsistent with any other view. I agree with Fletcher J. in the view he takes of the decision of this Court in Mungle Chand v. Gopal Ram (1906) I.L.R. 34 Cale. 101.
2. The petition therefore fails on a point of law and I need not determine the question whether the defendant has any property within the jurisdiction, as the question does not arise. But I may say that the term property would have to be extended to very wide limits to embrace the Rs. 600 that the plaintiff has received and has applied to his own purposes. The rule is therefore discharged with costs.