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Hari Prasad Singh Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectService;Constitution
CourtKolkata High Court
Decided On
Case NumberMatter No. 260 of 1969
Judge
Reported inAIR1972Cal27
ActsCentral Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955 - Rule 3; ;Central Civil Services (Conduct) (Amendment) Rules, 1964 - Rule 25; ;Constitution of India - Article 311; ;Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 - Rule 15(5)
AppellantHari Prasad Singh
RespondentCommissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal and ors.
DispositionApplication dismissed
Cases ReferredTesteels Ltd v. N. M. Desai
Excerpt:
- ordersabyasachi mukharji, j.1. this is an application by an erstwhile income-tax officer under article 226 of the constitution challenging the order of suspension dated 2nd september 1965, the memorandum dated 9th september 1965 containing the charge-sheet against the said officer, the orders dated 30th april, 1966, 18th july, 1966, 3rd october, 1966, the enquiry report dated 29th march 1967, the show cause notice dated 29th april 1968 and the order of removal on the said officer dated 10th february 1969. the petitioner was appointed to officiate as an income-tax officer, class ii grade iii of the income-tax department, calcutta, with effect from 22nd november 1954. thereafter from 1956 to 1959 the petitioner served in various capacities in the districts of bengal as income-tax officer as.....
Judgment:
ORDER

Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.

1. This is an application by an erstwhile Income-tax Officer under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of suspension dated 2nd September 1965, the memorandum dated 9th September 1965 containing the charge-sheet against the said officer, the orders dated 30th April, 1966, 18th July, 1966, 3rd October, 1966, the enquiry report dated 29th March 1967, the show cause notice dated 29th April 1968 and the order of removal on the said officer dated 10th February 1969. The petitioner was appointed to officiate as an Income-tax Officer, Class II Grade III of the Income-tax Department, Calcutta, with effect from 22nd November 1954. Thereafter from 1956 to 1959 the petitioner served in various capacities in the districts of Bengal as Income-tax Officer as well as in Calcutta. In July 1959 the petitioner was made quasi-permanent and with effect from 8th April 1960 the petitioner was confirmed as the Income-tax Officer. On the 17th August 1960 the petitioner was posted as the Income-tax Officer 'E' Ward, Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta. The petitioner also served the Special Survey Circle in various capacities as also in other districts of the Income-tax Department in Calcutta. In October 1963 the petitioner was transferred to hold the charge of D and E Wards of District III-A, Calcutta. It will be relevant at this stage to state that with effect from 30th November 1964 the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955 were repealed by the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964- The significance of this date would be evident later on. On the 2nd September 1965 the order of respondent No. 1 was passed under Rule 12 (1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1957 placing the petitioner under suspension. This is one of the orders which is under challenge in this application. On the 9th September 1965 the petitioner was charge-sheeted for violation of Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955. It would be relevant at this stage to refer to the said charge-sheet. There were two charges against the petitioner. It was stated firstly, that the petitioner while functioning as Income-tax Officer in the Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta during the period from 9-8-58 to 10-5-61 contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1955, inasmuch as,

(a) the petitioner made assessments in several cases in a dishonest and mala fide manner causing wrongful loss of revenue to the Government;

(b) the petitioner displayed gross negligence and/or inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties; and

(c) the petitioner tampered with the official records.

As a result of the enquiry by the enquiring officer the petitioner was exonerated of all the charges under several heads mentioned above by the enquiring officer. The disciplinary authority however disagreed with the findings of the enquiring officer in so far as Sub-clause (b) of charge 1 referred to hereinabove, that is to say, that the petitioner displayed gross negligence and/or inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties. The disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the said charge had been established. The second charge against the petitioner was that while functioning as Income-tax Officer in Special Survey Circle IV, Calcutta during the period 9th August 1958 to 10th May 1961 he failed to comply with the instructions issued by the Commissioner of Income-tax regarding procedure to be followed in making the assessments and thereby contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955. The enquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner in respect of this charge. The disciplinary authority has also agreed with the said finding of the enquiry officer. On the 17th September 1965 the petitioner asked for inspection of certain documents. Thereafter on the 21st of September, 1965 the petitioner was asked to contact the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Head Quarters for inspection of documents. On the 20th November1965 Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal.) Rules 1965 were promulgated by the President and the said Rules came into force on the 1st December, 1965. By the 1965 Rules the 1957 Rules were repealed. It would be necessary later on to refer to the terms in which the said Rules have been repealed in order to appreciate one of the contentions raised in this application. Between 6th December, 1965 and 14th April 1966 the petitioner asked for inspection of certain documents. The said prayers of the petitioner are contained in two letters dated 6th December 1965 which is Annexure F to the present petition and the letter dated 14th April, 1966 which is also Annexure F to the said petition. On the 30th April 1966, the respondent No. 1, the Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal I, refused to give the petitioner inspection of certain documents specified in the letters mentioned before on the ground that either these were not relevant or these were not available at that moment with the department. The said order of respondent No. 1 is contained in Annexure G to the present petition. On the 18th July 1966 one Mr. G. B. Seth, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Range TV, Calcutta was appointed to present the case before the enquiry officer against the petitioner. On the 18th July 1966 the respondent No. 1 appointed respondent No. 3 under Rule 14 (2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1965 as the enquiring authority. Thereafter on the 30th September 1966 the petitioner requested the respondent No. 1 to permit him to engage a lawyer for representing the petitioner's case and the said prayer was refused. It would be relevant again to refer later on to the terms in which the said prayer has been refused to appreciate certain contentions raised in this application. On the 26th October, 1966 the first hearing took place before the enquiry officer and on the 7th February 1967 the second hearing took place. On the 29th April 1968 the petitioner received from respondent No. 1 a copy of the enquiry report submitted by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 1. In the said report respondent No. 3 found the petitioner innocent of all the charges, as mentioned hereinbefore. In the said notice, however, it was stated by respondent No. 1 that he agreed with the findings of respondent No, 3 in so far as it related to charges 1 (a) and 1 (c) and charge No. 2. The respondent No. 1, however, intimated to the petitioner he had provisionally come to the conclusion that No. 1 (b) had been proved differing from the finding made by the respondent No. 3. The petitioner was given an opportunity of making representation. The petitioner showed cause on the 28th September, 1968. There was a further representation by the petitioner on the 4th January 1969. On the 10th February 1969 the respondent No. 1 passed the order removing the petitioner from service. Thereafter this application was moved under Article 226 of the Constitution and a rule nisi was obtained.

2. Counsel for the petitioner raised several contentions in this case. The first contention that requires consideration is that the charges are vague, specially the charge in respect of which the petitioner has been found guilty. As mentioned hereinbefore the said charge was that the petitioner had contravened Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955 inasmuch as he had displayed gross negligence and inefficiency in the discharge of his official duties. It was contended that no particulars had been given of what was his duty and what acts he committed which might be termed as negligent. It was also urged that it had not been clearly stated what was the standard of efficiency and duty. I am unable to accept this contention. The said charge-sheet was sent along with the statement of allegations. The statement of allegations have detailed instances of several assessments and the circumstances under which the said assessments had been made. From the, facts enumerated in the said statement of allegations which gave particulars of the dates of assessments, the file numbers, the names of the assessees and the circumstances as appearing from the documents. The said facts were the basis upon which the charge of negligence was based. The question whether the charges were vague or not, cannot be judged in isolation. It was urged that there was no standard of duty or efficiency. I am of opinion that such standard of duty or efficiency must be judged from a common-sense point of view prevalent in a particular office or a particular department. Counsel for the petitioner referred me to several decisions. He first drew my attention to the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of R. Ananthanarayanan v. General Manager, Southern Rly., AIR 1956 Mad 220. There it was observed by the learned Judge that charges must be clear and specific. In so far as that proposition is concerned no exception can be taken to that proposition. In the aforesaid decision the Madras High Court was concerned with the charge made in the context of Rule 3 of Railway Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules 1954. The said Rule was differently worded from the present Rule with which I am concerned in this application. Furthermore, in so far as the Madras High Court expressed the view that the said Rule 3 was indefinite even when read in the context of expression 'national security', the same view has not been approved by the Supreme Court in the case of P. Ballakotiah v. Union of India, : [1958]1SCR1052 . Counsel for the petitioner then referred me to the decision of Sinha J. (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Amulya Ratan v. Deputy Chief Mechanical Engineer. Eastern Rly., : (1962)IILLJ537Cal . There Sinha J, expressed the opinion that the charges must be specific and must give all particulars. That is a proposition which is well-settled and I respectfully agree with the said observation. But whether charges are specific and give all particulars must be judged in the context of a particular charge and particular set of facts. Reliance was then placed on the decision in the case of Surath Chandra Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, : (1971)ILLJ293SC . There the Supreme Court observed that if a person was not told clearly and definitely what the allegations were on which the charges preferred against him were founded, he could not possibly by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that might be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him. The Supreme Court observed that the whole object of furnishing the statement of allegations was to give all the necessary particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. There, it is to be noted, that the statement of allegations was never sent to the delinquent in, that case. In the instant case, as mentioned herein-before the charges were supported by a statement of allegations where detailed facts have been stated. Therefore, in my opinion, the aforesaid decision cannot help the petitioner. Having considered the propositions of law mentioned herein-before and having considered the charges in this case, as well the fact that in the instant case the charges were supported by statement of allegations wherein detailed facts of several assessments had been given, I am of opinion that the charges in respect of which the petitioner had been found guilty cannot be termed as vague or indefinite.

3. The next contention that was urged was that Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1955 was vague and as such ultra vires. It was secondly contended that the said rule contained an expression of pious wish and could not be the subject-matter of any charge.

4. Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1956 states as follows:--

'Rule 3. General-- Every government servant shall at all times maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty.'

Rules of conduct may and do vary from time to time. They, however, at a particular point of time reflect the enlightened conscience of a society. Simply because, however, such rules are variable from age to age it cannot be said that at a particular point of time they become either non-existent or vague. They must at all times be judged from a robust commonsense point of view on a reasonable standard. In this connection it may be appropriate to refer to the observations of Banerjee, J, in the case of Sripati Ranjan Biswas v. Collector of Customs, : (1966)ILLJ111Cal . Considering the same identical Rule, that is to say. Rule 3 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules B.N. Banerjee, J, observed:

'Integrity is uprightness, honesty or purity. Devotion to duty is faithful service. Modern approaches to life have changed many ideals, which used to be held sacred. Such approaches have also worked a change in our sense of the sublime. But even then the idea of right and wrong has not been forgotten and the difference between honesty and dishonesty, fidelity and faithlessness wholly lost. It is sometimes argued with sophistry that it is difficult to prescribe the outside limits of integrity in a complex system of modern administration, in which considerations of expediency occasionally outweigh other considerations. Considerations of expediency may be irresistible at times but their evils are merely to be put up with and not to be extolled or prescribed as standards of life and work. If a public officer is required to maintain integrity and to be devoted to duty, he is merely asked to keep within the bounds of that administrative decency, which goes by the name of civilized administration. In my opinion, no vagueness or indefinite-ness attaches to the language used in Rule 3 above quoted. A public Officer is not at liberty to amass fortune by taking illegal gratifications, even though willingly given. In the view taken by me, Rule 3 does not offend against Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.'

I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. Counsel for the petitioner in this connection also referred me to the decision in the case of AIR 1956 Mad 220 for the argument that the Rule was vague. It must, however, be remembered that in so far as the Madras High Court expressed the opinion of indefiniteness about the Rule 3 of the Railway Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1954, the same has been disapproved by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to hereinbefore. In view of-what has been said hereinbefore and the rule read in the manner I have indicated above it appears to me that the said rule does not contain a mere pious hope but a clear mandate for the rule of conduct, and as such is not void on the ground of vagueness.

5. Counsel for the petitioner next contended that the Conduct Rules of 1955 were repealed by Conduct Rules of 1964 and, as such, the same became inoperative. Rules of 1964 came into effect on the 30th November as mentioned hereinbefore. It was, therefore, urged that the petitioner could not be proceeded for breach of 1955 Conduct Rules in the manner as had been done. To consider this argument it would be relevant to refer to Rule 25 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The said Rule 25 provides as follows:

'25. Repeal and Saving-- Any Rules corresponding to these rules in force immediately before the commencement of these rules and applicable to the Government servants to whom these rules apply are hereby repealed: Provided that any order made or action taken under the rules so repealed shall be deemed to have been made or taken under the corresponding provisions of these rules.'

It would be apparent from the terms of the repeal that only rules applicable to the government servants after coming into operation of 1964 rules have been repealed. Rules of 1964 cannot be operative in respect of government servants for their past conduct. The significant words are 'to whom these apply'. Rule is operative in future. It is prospective. It does not deal with the past conduct of the government servants. Therefore, strictly it does not apply to the government servants in respect of conduct prior to 1964. Therefore, from that point of view, in this case as the allegations of the charges related to period prior to the coming into operation of the 1964 rules, the said rules of 1964 would not apply and the petitioner would be governed by the 1955 rules. The second aspect of the matter is that if any action is taken under the repealed rules that action shall be deemed to have been taken under the corresponding provisions of the new rules. Under the new rules there is a corresponding provision. Rule 3 Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together provide the same thing in substance as Rule 3 of 1955 Conduct Rules. Rule 3 of 1964 Rules is in the following terms:

'3. General-- (1) Every Government servant shall at all times-

(i) maintain absolute integrity;

(ii) maintain devotion to duty; and

(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.

(2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority;

(ii) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior and shall, where he is acting under such direction, obtain the direction in writing, wherever practicable, and where it is not practicable to obtain the direction in writing, he shall obtain written confirmation of the direction as soon thereafter as possible.'

I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention on behalf of the petitioner.

6. The main contention that requires consideration in this case is whether reasonable opportunity had been given to the petitioner to defend himself at the enquiry. Counsel for the petitioner urged several points in support of his argument that no reasonable opportunity had been given. He first urged that in denying inspection, particularly inspection of the documents as mentioned hereinbefore, there had been denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. As I have mentioned before by a letter dated the 6th of December, 1965 the petitioner had asked for inspection of certain documents. These were additional documents, namely, additional to the documents which had been relied on by the prosecution to prove the alleged guilt of the petitioner. The said documents, that is to say, the documents which the prosecution wanted to rely have been given inspection. By another letter dated 14th April, 1966, the petitioner again asked for several other documents. By the letter dated 30th April 1966, inspection of certain documents was allowed by the Commissioner but certain documents were refused inspection on the ground that some of these were not available at that moment and some of these were irrelevant. Looking at the list of the documents, it appears to me that the claim made by the petitioner in respect of some of these was exaggerated. Even, however, there were certain documents which prima facie appear to me to be relevant. The petitioner has alleged in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the petition that the petitioner had not been given inspection of all the relevant and necessary documents. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents it has been stated that all relevant and necessary documents had been given inspection and some of the documents which were not allowed inspection were irrelevant. In this state of affairs counsel for the department produced before me the records of tile enquiry. It appears from the said records produced that on the 26th October, 1966, the petitioner made another application for inspection including some of the documents which he had claimed previously. On the 26th October. 1966, in the order sheet there was an endorsement by the enquiry officer that documents Nos. 1 to 6 were admitted to be relevant by the officer and should be given inspection and so far as other documents were concerned, certain other directions were given. Thereafter it is recorded in the order sheet that on the 13th December, 1966, the petitioner had completed inspection of the documents and had said that he did not wish to examine any witness. In this connection it would be also relevant to refer to the enquiry report which appears at page 105 of the present petition. Inparagraph 5 the enquiring officer hasstated that on the 26th October, 1966,that is to say, when he made the application, the petitioner was heard inperson in presence of the presentingofficer regarding the relevancy of thedocuments and the petitioner had statedthat he wanted only 453 files to prove from them that the orders made by the other officers in the same district weresimilar to those made by the petitionerwhich formed the subject matter of theenquiry. It was suggested to the petitioner that he could inspect certainsample files and then he was asked togive a list of such files to the presenting officer for making arrangement forinspection. On the 13th December, 1966,in the enquiry report it has been statedby the presenting officer that ShriSingh had completed the inspection of thedocuments. Therefore, it appears to methat reading the enquiry report in thecontext of the entries in the ordersheet the petitioner had inspection ofall the relevant documents -- documentswhich he considered relevant for inspection and which he insisted for production at the time of the enquiry.There was some argument by counsel forthe petitioner that these documentswere not the original documents mentioned in the letters previously referredto hereinbefore. However, I am notable to appreciate this contention. Thelist of the documents had been mentioned and reading the letter of the26th October in conjunction with theentries in the order sheet and in conjunction with the remarks of the enquiry officer in the enquiry report itis clear to me that all relevant documents had been given for inspection tothe petitioner. I must further observethat the petitioner had not stated in thispetition the fact that the petitioner had Imade further prayers for inspection during the enquiry and that he wasallowed inspection of certain documents.Such conduct on the part of the petitioner does not disclose a free and frankapproach to the Court.

7. The next contention of counsel for the petitioner on the ground ofreasonable opportunity was about thefact that the prayer for being represented by a lawyer had been refused unreasonably. Under Rule 15 (5) ofthe Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957,there was a discretion with the disciplinary authority to permit the petitioner to be represented by a lawyer incertain contingency. That discretionmust always be carefully exercised. Inthis case firstly a contention was raisedthat that discretion had not been exercised at all inasmuch as in refusing the prayer by the letter dated the 3rd of October, 1966, the respondent No. 1 had completely misdirected himself. But reading the letter dated 3rd October 1966. I am unable to accept that contention. My attention was drawn to a decision by Anil Kumar Sen, J. in the case of Harbilas Biswas v. Union of India, Civil Rule No. 1988 (W) of 1966 judgment delivered on 26-3-1970 (Cal). There the enquiry was held against a delinquent officer more or less under similar circumstances and the delinquent in that case had been refused the assistance of a lawyer. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that there was no denial of reasonable opportunity in the facts and circumstances of that case. Whether by refusal of the assistance of a lawyer there is any denial of reasonable opportunity is essentially a question of fact. It must, however, be emphasized that the rule enjoins for the officer to exercise a discretion and before exercising the discretion the officers must consider the complexity of the case and the nature of the case. I must observe that practically in all the departmental enquiry cases that have come up before me I have hardly come across any instance where representation by a lawyer has been permitted. It is sometimes urged that the rule had been made nugatory by the manner in which the discretion was being exercised in refusing the assistance by a lawyer to the delinquents in the departmental enquiries. Such impression should not be created and must be attempted to be avoided. In this case, however, the enquiry was in respect of certain assessments. It was in respect certain assessment in the Income-tax Department and the most relevant fact was the general method of doing assessment in the department, there was hardly any scope of oral testimony. Taking these factors into consideration and taking into consideration the fact that as a result of the enquiry proceedings, the delinquent was found not guilty, I am unable to accept the contention that the petitioner, was, in this case denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself by refusal of the assistance by a lawyer. It has to be remembered that in his representation to the respondent No. 1, the delinquent had not chosen to ask for a personal hearing or to be represented by a lawyer. It also appears from the records that the delinquent himself was a qualified person. He has a degree of the Bachelor of Law and also a degree of Master of Arts, University of Calcutta. Reference may be made to the first annexure of the affidavit in reply from which the aforesaid qualifications of the delinquent would appear. Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the observations of the Special Bench in the case of Nripendra Nath Bagchi v. Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, : (1961)IILLJ312Cal (SB). The facts of that case were entirely different and, therefore, it is not necessary for me to consider the said aforesaid decision in detail. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there has been no denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner by not affording to him the assistance of a lawyer in the enquiry proceedings.

8. The next contention about the denial of reasonable opportunity was the non-compliance with the provisions of the Office Manual. It was urged that the said Office Manual if not mandatory was directory and there should have been substantial compliance with the said procedure for holding departmental enquiry laid down in the Office Manual. My attention was drawn to Ch. X (c) to Paras 41, 42 & 43.The only point that was urged in respect of breach of the Office Manual was that the charges should have been related to the offences of recent origin. It was urged that events which had taken place more than three years prior to the framing of the charges should not have been the basis for the framing of the charges. Looking at the nature of the charges it appears to me that the rule enjoined in substance that stale matters should not be revived. In this case after the assessments had been made, in order to find out whether these had been improperly made it was necessary to find that out by proper investigation before framing the charges. Taking that factor into consideration I am of the opinion that there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of the procedure for departmental enquiry as laid down in Chapter X (c) of the Office Manual.

9. It was next contended that there was a violation of the rights of the petitioner in not consulting the Union Public Service Commission in respect of this punishment. I am unable to agree. It was only when the President was the disciplinary authority, consultation with the Union Public Service Commission was required. In this connection no rule or provision of law bas been shown to me which enjoys consultation with the Union Public Service Commission.

10. Next contention of counsel for the petitioner was that the 2nd show cause notice mentioned hereinbefore indicated that the same was biased and prejudiced. No grounds in support of this contention was advanced. I am unable to accept this contention.

11. Next contention of counsel for the petitioner was that there should have been another show cause notice, because, counsel for the petitioner contended that it was the disciplinary authority who was disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer. Counsel further contended that the 2nd show cause notice was against the penalty proposed and, therefore, it did not offer any reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. I am, however, unable to accept this contention. Article 311 of the Constitution, Sub-clause (2) specifically provides for this kind of show cause notice. This is in compliance with Article 311(2). Reference may be made to the observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sreedhariah v. Dist. Supdt. of Police, : (1960)IILLJ156AP at para 18, and to the case of Ghanshyamdas Srivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh. : (1968)IILLJ264MP . The said show cause notice was also in compliance with Rule 15 (4) (i) (b) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention that there should have been another show cause notice in the facts and circumstances of this case. I am also unable to accept the contention that the show cause notice was bad because it was only against the penalty proposed. Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the case of State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, : (1963)ILLJ295SC . I am, however, of the opinion that the aforesaid decision does not support the said contention of counsel for the petitioner.

12. Next contention of counselfor the petitioner was that the orderof removal was not a speaking orderand, as such, was bad. He drew myattention to the decision of the SupremeCourt in the case of M/s. TravancoreRayons Ltd. v. Union of India. : 1978(2)ELT378(SC) , to the decision in the caseof Mahabir Prosad v. State of U. P., : [1971]1SCR201 , to the decision inthe case of Mohinder Singh Babbra v.State of Punjab, 1971 Lab IC 554 (Punj)and to the decision in the case of Testeels Ltd v. N. M. Desai, : AIR1970Guj1 (FB) and to the decision in the caseof : (1960)IILLJ156AP . It is truethat the quasi, judicial authorities shouldindicate in the orders the reasons formaking the orders. In this case, however, the final order of removal, that is,Annexure 'C' cannot and should not beconsidered in isolation. It is not necessary for me to refer to the aforesaiddecisions in detail because in so far as the aforesaid decisions, lay down the proposition that the quasi judicial authorities should indicate the reasons, I am in respectful agreement with the said proposition. But if the reasons can be found out either from the order itself or from other documents it would not be proper to strike down the order merely because the formal reasons had not been recorded in the order itself. In the instant case the order of removal cannot and should not be read in isolation. This has to be considered along with the letter dated 29th of April 1966 whereby the Commr. had given detailed reasons for disagreement with the enquiring officer. If annexure 'A' is read in conjunction with annexure 'L' then it would be apparent what are the reasons that impelled the Commissioner to pass the final order. Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of the order dated 10th of February, 1969, the Commissioner has stated that a representation had been made and he had considered the representation and that was the representation of the petitioner in which the petition had stated that the finding that the disagreement with the enquiring officer was merely based on suspension, surmise, conjecture and presumption. The Enquiring Officer has considered that contention and has not been able to accept the same. The disciplinary authority has referred to his reasons recorded in the Memorandum dated 29th of April 1968. Read in the aforesaid light, it cannot be said that the order for removal passed by the disciplinary authority did not state the reasons and it suffered from the infirmity that it was not a speaking order. I am, therefore, unable to accept this last contention of counsel for the petitioner.

13. This application is, therefore, dismissed.

14. Rule nisi is discharged.

15. Interim order, if any, is vacated.

16. There will be no order as tocosts.

17. I direct the Dept. to file a correct copy of the order sheets dated 26th of October, 1966 and 13th of Dec-ember, 1966. Let the correct copies of the order sheet along with the correct copy of the letter dated 26th of October, 1966 be kept as exhibits in this Court.

18. By consent of parties, there will, be a stay of operation of this order from date for six weeks.


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