Pratt and Bodilly, JJ.
1. This is a suit by the plaintiffs against their tenants for recovery of possession of certain Jands, which it is alleged, had been encroached upon in excess of the actual land appertaining to their holding.
2. The first Court decreed the plaintiff's suit. The learned District Judge has reversed that decision in a very complete judgment, from which it appears that he carefully went into the evidence on both sides, and in addition, with a view to a better, understanding of that evidence and to clear up some doubtful points, he visited the spot and observed the local character of the building to which a portion of the case related, and the banks of the adjacent lake, and other matters, to which he refers in his judgment.
3. The only points which have been urged before us in appeal are contained in the first two grounds of the memorandum of appeal, namely, that the learned Judge erred in holding a local inspection in the absence of the plaintiffs or their agents and without giving notice to the parties, and in not preparing a report embodying the results of his local inspection.
4. There can be no question that in this country at all events a Judge is at liberty to himself inspect the property in dispute and inform himself by the observation of his senses of matters which may help him in understanding the evidence and in deciding the case, and especially such matters as do not require scientific knowledge. This was laid down in the cases of Joy Coomar v. Bundhoo Lal (1882) I.L.R. 9 Calc. 363 and Dwarkanath Sardar v. Prosunno Kumar Hajra (1897) 1 C.W.N. 682 There is no law which requires the Judge to give notice to the parties, or to give them an opportunity of being heard either during or after (he inspection. In this instance the Judge's observation was confined to certain simple and plain matters regarding which he did not require any arguments to be addressed to him. No doubt it is generally desirable that the Judge should place upon record the result of his investigation. He did so on this occasion in his judgment, but not otherwise; and in the particular circumstances and with reference to the special matters which he observed, and the absence of any necessity for hearing the parties upon these matters, we do not think that there has been any miscarriage of justice. Indeed, it is not stated any where in the grounds of appeal that there was any matter which came under the Judge's observation and which has been referred to in his judgment, which the parties could have presented in a different aspect if they had been permitted to address the Judge.
5. In this view we think that the grounds of appeal are untenable and we accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.