1. This is a suit upon a mortgage bond, and the only question raised in this appeal is whether or not the suit was instituted within twelve years from the date on which the money sued for became due.
2. The bond's fated the 8th Assar 1283 Fusli, corresponding with the 14th June 1876, and the suit was instituted on the 12th June 1894. The question turns upon the construction of the document as to what was the date upon which the money became payable. The stipulation in the bond was to repay the money 'in the month of Jeyth 1289 Fusli, being a period of six year.' The period of six years from the date of execution of the bond would carry us to the 14th June 1882, and the plaintiff contends that that should be regarded as the due date irrespective of all mention of the month of Jeyth 1289 Fusli. The defendant on the other hand pleads that the debtor bound himself to repay the money on or before the 29th Jeyth 1289 Fusli (there being only twenty-nine days in the month of Jeyth in that year) which corrospond(sic)ancy with 1st of June 1882, and that consequently this suit is barred.
3. The lower Court has held that the plaintiff's contention is correct an(sic) accordingly the defendant has appealed.
4. The deed having been (sic)convented on the 8th Assar 1283 were possibility of bable that it had been (sic) days previously, that purchasers being month of Jeyth 128(sic) drafted so(sic) my stipulation was inse(sic)mable probability or exe(sic)de effect that he 3, and that when the single in six years, it (sic)ght to which the to th(sic)d is may (sic)he money would be repayable 289. The (sic) that period would expire in the month of Jeyth (sic) is whether the parties intended that the money should in (sic) learned the execution of the bond, without reference (sic) whether it was intended that the money should be repa(sic) circumstance casually mentioned that that month was within the per(sic)nt the plaint the date of the execution of the deed. I am of opinion that t(sic)f the num more liberal and proper construction to place upon the deedifs had fa that the debtor was to have a period of full six years from the injunct execution of the deed within which to repay the money. Th(sic)J., was to taken by the Bombay High Court in a precisely similar case, (sic)m lling Runao Bujaji v. Babaji I.L.R. 6 Bom. 83. That a libeibit innexee should be given in cases of doubt such as the present was also (sic) embling of Almas Banee v. Mahomed Buja I.L.R. 6 Cal. 239 decided to in any in which it was held that in consequence of the mention of the 30 (sic) deed it was intended that the debtor should have full thirty days in (sic) case within which to repay the money, although as a matter of fact there entitle twenty-nine days in that particular month of Pous. That decision wa(sic)ances by the Madras High Court in the case of Gnanasammanda (sic)deceive Palaniyandi Pillai I.L.R. 17 Mad. 61. Upon these authorities (sic)itation upon the ground that in construing acts of limitation the Court is bo(sic) them a liberal interpretation, I am of opinion that the decision of Court is correct, and that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Ameer Ali, J.
5. I must say that the point is by no 1. into the (sic)in; mind Section 25 of the Limitation Act does not apply use would this, and I am not prepared to follow the ruling of the Bombay High Court. The question is one of intention. What was the intention of the parties with regard to the document which is before us? Whether the intention was to make the repayment in Jeyth 1289, or was it to be made within six years from the time of the execution of the document? There are indications in the document that Jeyth 1289 was to be taken as the time for the repayment of the loan, and the suits that were brought by the plaintiff also give grounds, as contended for by the defendant's pleader, for the view that the time for repayment, was fixed in Jeyth 1289. But although I have a doubt on the question before us, my doubt is not so strong as to justify my differing from the view taken by my learned colleague. I therefore concur in dismissing the appeal with costs.