Francis W. Maclean, C.J.
1. The Court below was right in holding that the Secretary of State for India in Council was a necessary party to the suit. It is a suit to set aside a sale effected under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act (B.C.I. of 1895). under Section 8 of that Act, the Secretary of State for India in Council shall be deemed to be the decree holder, and in all cases therein mentioned, the person named in the certificate as debtor shall be deemed to be the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor brings this suit to set aside the. sale effected under that statute. It is the, long established practice of this Court in suits of this class to make the decree higher, who is deeply interested in the matter, a party to the suit. In the present case, as has been pointed out, the Secretary of State for India in Council must be regarded as the decree-holder, and I, therefore, think that he is a necessary party to the suit. In the case of Bal Mokoond Lall v. Jirjudhun Roy (1882) I.L.R. 9 Calc. 271 and that of Balkishen Das v. Simpson (1898) I.L.R. 25 Calc. 833 : L.R. 25 I.A. 151, the sales were sales under the Revenue Sale law (Act XI of 1859), and there is no such provision in that Act, as there is in the Public Demands Recovery Act, viz., that the Secretary of State for India in Council is to be deemed the decree holder.
2. This is the only ground of appeal: it falls, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
3. I concur.