No. 896-C. Dated 6-5-66. Whereas I am satisfied with respect to the person known as BAG alias Sidhya Gopal Misra son of late Kumud Bandhu Misra of Seherapara (Suri), P. S. Suri, District Birbhum, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 (Act IV of 1950), I make this order directing that the said 'BAG' alias Sidhya Gopal Misra be detained.
Given under my hand and seal of office.
Sd/- M. Kar Gupta.
District Magistrate, Birbhum.
Seal of the District
Magistrate of Birbhum.
** ** **
The annexure to this order discloses 8 grounds between the period from January 21. 1961 and the date of detention. The grounds Ka to Ma mention incidents in the years 1961 and 1962 and the grounds Cha to Ja from September 1965. The grounds stated do not disclose any incident of the years1963 and 1964 and the learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Ajit Kumar Dutta has therefore argued that the grounds for the years 1961 and 1962 are too remote and as such should not be considered as sufficient grounds for detention. In support of his contention the learned advocate has referred to Rameshwar Shaw's case, reported in : 1964CriLJ257 In that case both when the order was passed and when it was served on Rameshwar he was held in jail in connection with the criminal case pending against him and it was not known how long he would remain in jail in that connection. The main question that was decided in Rameshwar's case. : 1964CriLJ257 was that where a person who was already in jail for an indefinite length of time in connection with the criminal case pending against him, it would not be possible for the authority to come to the conclusion that such a person's detention is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety etc. It was pointed out that the scheme of the section postulates that if the order of detention is not passed against a person he would be free and able to act in a prejudicial manner; but when the person against whom an order is passed is already in jail for an Indefinite length of time or for long time to come it could hardly besaid that such t person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety unless he is detained. That consideration will not apply to the present case. A similar question was considered in the case of Sahib Sing Dugal v. Union of India, reported in : 1966CriLJ305 . The petitioner in this reported case had been in jail for about three months before the detention order was made that the criminal case could not succeed for want of sufficient evidence, it applied for discharge. Thereafter an order for detention was passed. The learned Judges held that detention order is generally passed in the light of the evidence about the past activities of the persons concerned. These past activities should however ordinarily be proximate in point of time to justify the detention order. The learned Judges held that in the present case the petitioner had been in jail for only three months before the order of detention was passed against him. It could not therefore be said that the conduct of the petitioner before this period of three months was not proximate enough to justify an order of detention based on that conduct. It is true that in the present case, the earlier grounds relate to years 1961-62, but there is a continuity and a certain family likeness demonstrating a tendency to behave in a particular manner, which is calculated to affect the maintenance of the public order of the locality In the case reported in : AIR1964Cal231 , Suberuddin Sk. v. State of West Bengal it has been held that the detaining authority may reasonably have waited and watched the activities for the entire period before the order of detention was passed and no inference of mala fide can be drawn from that. In the present case there is a continuity of acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and as such the remoteness of some of the activities is no ground to invalidate an order of detention.
5. Mr. Dutta has next urged that the object of the order of detention is maintenance of public order but so far as ground No. 1 is concerned, that question would not arise. This relates to petitioner's activities in so far as he insulted the girls and women in public places and of using violent and abusive language and actually assaulting out Ashutosh Majumdar who protested against such conduct. Apparently such conduct is likely to result in breach of public peace and order and this argument therefore cannot be accepted. Mr. Dutta has also urged that some of the grounds at least are too vague to enable the detenu to make an effective representation to the Advisory Board and in support he has referred to the ground No. Kha. This ground No. Kha not only gives the date and the hour of the incident but the District Magistrate's affidavit discloses that the petitioner did not make any representation for further or better particulars nor did he raise any objection in his representation to the Advisory Board on theground of vagueness The Preventive Detention Act provides that the detenu shall be furnished as soon as may be, with the grounds on which the order is made and has to be afforded the earliest possible opportunity of making representation against the order. If the grounds are not sufficient to enable the person detained to make a representation he can rely on his second right and if he likes, he may ask for particulars which would enable him to make the representation. On an infringement of these two rights the detained person has a right to approach the Court and complain that there has been an infringement of his fundamental right. This view has been taken in the case reported in : 1951CriLJ373 State of Bombay v. Atmaram S. Baidya. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in : AIR1963Cal589 . Priyatosh Majumdar v. State of West Bengal where it has been held that though the High Court has no power to examine the truth or falsity of the grounds, it has the power to see whether the detenu has been enabled to exercise his constitutional right of making an effective representation against the order he complains of. This really resolves itself to the question of vagueness or imprecision of the grounds. Whether the grounds are sufficient in the opinion of the detaining authority for the purpose of inducing its subjective satisfaction in making the order of detention is a matter which is entirely outside the purview of the Court's consideration. The same view is reiterated in another decision reported in : AIR1964Cal231 . It was held that the High Court did not possess the power of investigating the truth or falsity of the particulars upon which an order of detention is based. It can only confine its consideration to the question whether the detenu has been enabled to exercise his constitutional right of making an effective representation against the order made. It was pointed out that whatever be the rival versions, the High Court is only concerned to see whether any material exists which would warrant the plea that the order was vitiated by bad faith. We have already found that the grounds given are not vague and in any case, the detenu made representation and did not ask for further or necessary particulars on the grounds If the detenu feels embarrassed by reason of want of necessary details, he has the right to ask for further necessary particulars and that right follows from his other right to make an effective representation before the authority is concerned This objection therefore cannot hold good.
6. Mr. Dutta next argued that some of the grounds were too trifling or too remote and if any of them goes out the order of detention could not be supported, as the decision of the detaining authority might be otherwise in the absence of this ground. The same point arose in the case earlier referredto in : AIR1963Cal589 earlier referred to a Division Bench of this Court held that while the Court should not uphold an order of detention in spite of invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds it is its duty to be satisfied as to whether the allegedly vague irrelevant ground is such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. If some ground or reason appears to the Court to be of comparatively unessential nature, the order of detention cannot be held bad, merely because there are one or two such particulars amongst a number of others upon which an order of detention has been made. An order of detention is made on the totality of the facts contained in the particulars attached to the ground and it would not be right to take a particular ground and study it in isolation from the rest. It is necessary to take the particulars together and in order to see whether they could have reasonably produced the personal satisfaction of the authority making the order and whether all of them were such as to have enabled the detenu to make an effective representation against the order. The satisfaction is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and it is well settled that the Court cannot substitute its own satisfaction in that place. The Supreme Court has held in Baidya's case, : 1951CriLJ373 earlier referred to that there is nothing in Article 22(5) to warrant the view that the ground on which the order of detention has been made must be such that, when communicated to the person detained, they are found by a Court of law to be sufficient to enable him to what the Court considers to be an adequate representation.
7. It is then urged that the incidents in any case were petty incidents and the alleged satisfaction of the detaining authority is not bona fide. We have already held that it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that matters and that the High Court has no power to examine the truth or falsity of the grounds. Sufficiency of the grounds for the purpose of inducing satisfaction of the authority concerned is entirely different and what this Court is concerned with is its sufficiency in relation to detenu's right to make an effective representation.
8. In the result, we find that the requirements of law for furnishing the detenu with grounds on which the order has been made, have been complied with and that the grounds are not also vague or too remote. Indeed the detenu made a representation and did not complain about vagueness of the grounds nor did he apply for further or better particulars to enable him to make a representation which was considered by the Advisory Board. The affidavit-in-opposition aworn by the District Magistrate clearly stated that he had taken all the materials into consideration before passing the orderof detention and that he was satisfied that his detention was necessary for maintenance of public order. What matters is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and it cannot be said that the order was passed mala fide and this Court will not therefore interfere with the order of detention.
9. The application is therefore rejected.
R.N. Dutt, J.
10. I agree.