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Chaitram Rambilas Vs. Bridhichand Kesrichand - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectArbitration
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1915)ILR42Cal1140
AppellantChaitram Rambilas
RespondentBridhichand Kesrichand
Excerpt:
arbitration - bengal chamber of commerce, arbitration by--arbitration act (ix of 1899) section 14--arbitration clause in a contract--reference to an association--rules of an association for the conduct of arbitration proceedings referred to it, whether imported into the contract and binding on the parties thereto. - .....the arbitration according to the rules of the tribunal of arbitration established by the bengal chamber of commerce and not according to the law under the indian arbitration act. the petitioners' contention is that the arbitration clause in the contract is merely an agreement to abide by the decision of the chamber without accepting to be governed by the wide powers of that body as expressed in their rules.' it is apparent therefore from this that it was admitted that the misconduct depended upon the alleged non-applicability of the rules governing an arbitration by the bengal chamber of commerce. i cannot attribute any other meaning to the words of the judgment which j have just quoted.3. the first question, therefore, which we have to consider is whether these rules were imported.....
Judgment:

Jenkins, C.J.

1. This is an appeal From an order of Mr. Justice Imam made apparently under Section 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act. There was an arbitration followed by an award. But it is alleged that there was misconduct on the part, of the arbitrators; and it is on the ground of this misconduct that the application was made to the Court and succeeded before the learned Judge. The misconduct, suggested was the failure to hear evidence. Whether there was that failure or not is a matter in dispute.

2. But the way in which the case was presented to the Learned Judge and in which he understood it appears from this passage in the judgment; 'The petitioners' complaint is that the arbitrators refused to allow them to adduce evidence to establish their contentions and proceeded with the arbitration according to the Rules of the Tribunal of Arbitration established by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and not according to the law under the Indian Arbitration Act. The petitioners' contention is that the arbitration clause in the contract is merely an agreement to abide by the decision of the Chamber without accepting to be governed by the wide powers of that body as expressed in their rules.' It is apparent therefore from this that it was admitted that the misconduct depended upon the alleged non-applicability of the rules governing an arbitration by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. I cannot attribute any other meaning to the words of the judgment which J have just quoted.

3. The first question, therefore, which we have to consider is whether these rules were imported into the contract. Even without the assistance of any authority it appears to me that these rules were imported into the contract and that without such importation the contract would be insensible so far as it related to arbitration. For, it would involve the ridiculous position that every member of the Chamber of Commerce would have to sit on the arbitration. So that on the contract itself I should have Celt no doubt. But apart from that there is a very careful judgment of Mr. Justice Harington in Ganges Manufacturing Co., Ld., v. Indra Chand, delivered as far back as the 5th June 1906, where the contract was in the same terms as that, with which we are now Concerned.

4. The learned Judge came to the conclusion which I have indicated as a correct view of the contract. That, decision was certainly binding on the learned Judge and, according to my opinion, should have been followed by him. It may not be binding on us in the strict sense. But I think it is entitled to every respect and it agrees with the view I entertain on the subject.

5. Therefore it appears to me that on the basis on which this case was argued and conducted before Mr. Justice Imam there was no misconduct, because the rules of the Chamber of Commerce were applicable.

6. It appears to us unnecessary to consider other matters. But I cannot refrain from pointing to the fact that the application, verified and supported in the way it is, forms a most unsatisfactory basis on which to claim relief under Section 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It is so unsatisfactory that I do not think that there should be a remand. In my opinion the appeal should be allowed and the application dismissed. The respondent should pay the costs of the hearing before Mr. Justice Imam and before this Court.

Woodroffe, J.

7. I agree that the appeal should be allowed. The fact that the Chamber of Commerce has framed rules for its arbitration is, I should have thought, well known to every trader in Calcutta, particularly to those accepting contracts, stipulating for arbitration by the Chamber of Commerce. However this-may be, I entirely agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Harington in the case referred to by the Chief Justice that if a party to a contract has agreed to submit to an arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce he must be held to be bound by the rules of that Chamber.

Mookerjee J.

8. I agree with the Chief Justice.


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