1. The position of things is therefore as follows:
2. The plaintiff has, by purchase, become lessor, as to an eight-anna interest of a lease by which the lessees are entitled to grow indigo till October 1881, and the lessor is bound to assent to indigo being grown. As to a five-anna interest, the plaintiff has become lessor of a lease by which the lessee's right of growing indigo extends only to 1880.
3. It is admitted that indigo can be grown on land, which is the subject of co-ownership, only by the consent of all the co-owners.
4. It is urged in appeal that the plaintiff being bound as lessor of the eight-annas interest to assent to the cultivation of indigo and receiving consideration for that assent, cannot, in his capacity as lessor of the five-annas interest refuse his assent, and invoke the aid of the Court to have the cultivation stopped, and this assent given in respect of the eight-annas interest rendered unavailing.
5. The Advocate-General, in support of the plaintiff's claim to exercise in one capacity a right which he has surrendered in another, has put a hypothetical case. Suppose, he says, that A and B are joint owners, and X gets a lease from A of his interest for Rs. 10,000. X then tries to get a lease from B, but fails, as B demands Rs. 15,000. A acquires B's interest. Then if this vesting of the two interests in one person would disentitle A, as representing B's interest, to object to cultivation, the result, he says, would be to confer on X for nothing the boon he was unable to procure from B except at a price of Rs. 15,000.
6. But it is argued, and we think with justice, with reference to this illustration, that though X is thus accidentally benefited by the union of A and B's interest, it would be a still greater anomaly if A, having for consideration given his assent to X, could by purchasing B's interest render that assent unavailing.
7. The case of different and conflicting interest, the right to refuse and the obligation to assent being vested simultaneously in the same person, is not one which appears to have been dealt with in the recorded rulings of this Court, nor has any English authority, by the analogy of which our decision might proceed, been brought to our notice. We are obliged, therefore, to be guided by the general equities of the case; and it appears to us that the plaintiff, having by his own act become the owner of both leases, cannot equitably, under one of them, exercise a right which he is precluded from exercising under the other, and which would render the benefit conferred by the other unavailing.
8. We hold accordingly that the plaintiff cannot, as owner of the eight-annas interest, sue to stop the tenant's cultivation, because the lease has not expired, and that he cannot do so as owner of the five-annas, six gandas interest, because, though the lease has expired, and he would have, if this lease stood alone, a right to enforce its terms, it would be inequitable that he should in his capacity as owner of one interest in the estate do anything which would render his acts, as owner of another interest, abortive, and the advantages purchased by the tenant for valuable consideration practically valueless. We, therefore, allow the appeal, and dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.