Pigot and Ghose, JJ.
1. The question referred to this Fall Beach arises under Section 2 of Bengal Act III of 1884, which is as follows:
On the commencement of this Act, the enactment specified the sixth schedule shall be repealed to the extent mentioned in the third column thereof.
' But this repeal shall not revive any office, authority or thing abolished by any such enactment, or affect the validity of anything done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability accrued before the commencement of this Act.
And all rules and bye-laws prescribed, assessments, valuations, measurements, divisions and appointments made, powers conferred, and notifications published under any such enactment, and all other rules (if any) now in force and relating to the matters hereinafter dealt with, shall (so far as they are consistent with this Act) be deemed to have been respectively prescribed, made, conferred, and published hereunder.
' And all references to any such enactment shall (so far as may be practicable) be deemed to be made to this Act.
' And all proceedings now pending, which may have been commenced under any such enactment, shall be deemed to be commenced under this Act.
' In respect of all the matters aforesaid, the Commissioners under this Act shall be substituted for the Commissioners elected or appointed under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1876.'
2. Act V of 1876 is one of the Acts mentioned in schedule VI of the Act.
3. The question is, whether an order made under Section 234 of that Act extending to the Municipality of Balasore the provisions of chapter VII of the Act is, under the provisions of Section 2 of the Act of 1884, 'to be deemed to have been made under the provisions of the Act of 1884. If so, the provisions of Sections 232 and 270, Sub-section (4) of the Act of 1884 are in force in Balasore, inasmuch as they are a re-enactment of the provisions of Sections 249-250 of Act V of 1876, which were part of chapter VII of that Act.
4. The decision of the question depends upon the effect to be given to the word notification 'in Section 2 of the Act of 1884, that is, whether 'orders' made under Section 234 of the old Act can be held to be included within the term 'notification' as used in that section.
5. Upon the whole, we are of opinion that the term notification 'as used in the section does include such an order, although, no doubt if the word be interpreted in its original and primary sense, it could not be held to do so. We think that, having regard to the reasons stated in the order of reference before us, the term' notification 'must be held to include an order notified,' notwithstanding the difficulties which arise from the manner in which the Act is framed, and which are pointed out in the judgment of this Court in the case of Horodeb Das Agurwalla v. Municipality of Kushtea, as well as in the order of reference in the present case.
6. The question referred to this Full Bench must therefore be answered as follows:
The first question in the negative.
The second question in the affirmative.
The third question in the affirmative.
The conviction had in the present case must therefore be affirmed.
7. After reading the order of reference in this case, and considering the line of argument therein adopted, I am not prepared to say that a 'notification' may not include 'an order notified,' and therefore, though with much hesitation, I concur in the judgment just delivered.