1. This appeal is preferred against a summary order of the District Judge passed under Section 6 of Regulation VIII of 1819, directing the zemindar to accept the security tendered, and to give effect to the transfer without delay.
2. A preliminary objection has been raised that no appeal lies to this Court from such an order; and we are of opinion that the objection must prevail. The pleader for the appellant has been unable to show us any law which authorizes an appeal from an order under Section 6. His argument is that an appeal lies, because the Judge has used the word 'decreed,' and has drawn up an order in the form of a decree directing that an injunction should issue. We think that the fact of the Judge having dealt with the application in this manner does not entitle the appellant to come up here in appeal when the law does not provide for an appeal from an order passed under Section 6 of Regulation VIII of 1819.
3. It is then urged by the appellant's pleader that if we are against him on this point, we should still, under the circumstances of this case, exercise the extraordinary powers vested in this Court by Section 15 of the Charter Act.
4. Speaking for myself I must say that it is not in my opinion open to parties, when they find that they have adopted a wrong course and filed an appeal when no appeal is allowed by law, to turn round and say that the Court is bound to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. Upon this application, as to whether there may be grounds for interference under Section 15 or not, I pronounce no opinion. All that I say is that I decline to treat this petition of appeal as an application to us to exercise our extraordinary powers under Section 15.