W. Comer Petheram, C.J. and Hill, J.
1. We are of opinion that this application was not barred by Section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act read with Article 179 of the second schedule, but that the operation of the Act was in this case arrested by Section 7.
2. Article 179 provides several points of time from which the period of three years shall begin to run, and for the purposes of the Limitation Act we think that the period which begins from each point is a separate period, and that if the person entitled to execution is under a disability at the time when any one of such periods commences, the operation of the Act is suspended during the continuance of the disability by the operation of Section 7.
3. The case of Mon Mohun Buksee v. Gunga Soondery Dabee I.L.R. 9 Cal. 181 supports this view, and with the decision of that case we agree.
4. We desire, however, not to be understood as expressing the opinion that the limitation of 12 years from the date of the decree provided by section '230 of the Civil Procedure Code can be extended by any disability of the person entitled to execution which arises subsequently to the date of the decree.