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Roy Vs. Thakur Ram Jiwan Singh - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectProperty
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1906)ILR33Cal363
AppellantRoy
RespondentThakur Ram Jiwan Singh
Cases ReferredGregson v. Udoy Aditya Deb
Excerpt:
khorposh grant - temporary disability of such grantee to contract, his estate being subject to the provisions of chutia nagpore encumbered estates act (vi of 1876)--ratification, effect of. - .....of chota nagpur, is whether the khorposh lease, which was granted by thakur chaitan singh to madhu sudan singh, tinder whom the plaintiff claims, was valid or not. at the time that grant was made, the estate in respect of a portion of which the grant was made was under the chutia nagpur encumbered estates act, and under section 3, sub-section (a) of that act, thakur chaitan singh was incompetent to make that khorposh grant. but in august 1897 that disability came to an end and, after it had come to an end, thakur chaitan singh received on two occasions, once in july 1898 and again in april 1899, the rent payable by the khorposhdar under the khorposh grant. no doubt the thakur was under a legal disability at the time he made the grant, but the contention of the plaintiff, who.....
Judgment:

Francis W. Maclean, K.C.I.E., C.J.

1. The only question argued upon this appeal, and which was the only question upon which the case was decided by the Judicial Commissioner of Chota Nagpur, is whether the khorposh lease, which was granted by Thakur Chaitan Singh to Madhu Sudan Singh, tinder whom the plaintiff claims, was valid or not. At the time that grant was made, the estate in respect of a portion of which the grant was made was under the Chutia Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, and under Section 3, Sub-section (a) of that Act, Thakur Chaitan Singh was incompetent to make that khorposh grant. But in August 1897 that disability came to an end and, after it had come to an end, Thakur Chaitan Singh received on two occasions, once in July 1898 and again in April 1899, the rent payable by the khorposhdar under the khorposh grant. No doubt the Thakur was under a legal disability at the time he made the grant, but the contention of the plaintiff, who claims, as I have said, under Madhu Sudan Singh, who was the grantee under that grant, is, that this grant was subsequently ratified by the Thakur after his estate had been released in August 1897, and, having been so ratified, it is a perfectly good grant so far as he is concerned. There was another incident in connection with this ratification. It appears from the road-cess return filed by the Thakur in 1898 that he admitted that Madhu Sudan Singh was Ms Morposhdar and that he had given him a khorposh grant.

2. The contention on behalf of the respondents, put briefly, is that, inasmuch as the Thakur was incompetent, at the time he made this grant, to make it, the whole contract was void, and there could be no ratification of a veid contract. It seems to us that the question has been practically decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Gregson v. Udoy Aditya Deb (1889) I.L.R. 37 Calc. 223 : L.R. 16 I.A. 221. That was a case under the same Act, and there the same argument was submitted to the Judicial Committee, but was not accepted, and there the Judicial Committee held that it was quite competent for a person emerging from a state of disability, as is the case here, to take up and carry on the transactions commenced while he was under disability in such a way as to bind himself as to the whole The circumstances of that case were stronger in favour of the present appellant than those of the present. The case hero is a simpler one because the granting of the lease and its subsequent ratification or adoption have been established.

3. There is another element in this case, and that is that there was a litigation between Madhu Sudan Singh and the defendant No. 1 in relation to certain other properties, which were covered by the same grant, and in that litigation it was held that the grant was perfectly good and that Madhu Sudan Singh was entitled to succeed. If that was so, it is difficult to see why his lessee, the present plaintiff, should not succeed. But we prefer to base our decision upon the fact that, in our opinion, this case is not distinguishable in principle from that before the Judicial Committee, to which I have referred and which is an authority binding upon us. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the case must go back, because there are various other questions in the case, which have not been decided by the Judicial Commissioner. The case will be remanded accordingly for trial on the merits and the costs will abide the ultimate result.

Mitra J.

4. I am of the same opinion.


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