Rampini and Pratt, JJ.
1. This is an appeal against an order of the Officiating Additional Judge of Dacca, dated 4th July 1900, setting aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of that District, dismissing a suit as barred by limitation and remanding it to him for trial.
2. The facts are as follows: The respondent was a party to a partition before the Collector under the Estates Partition Act. He contended before the Collector that certain land, measured as part of taluk No. 2466, the estate under partition, was not part of that estate, but appertained to his howla, Muktaram Datta Das, subordinate to taluks Nos. 241, 242 and 243. The Revenue authorities enquired into his contention under Section 116 of the Act and decided it against him. The respondent then brought this suit to have it declared that the disputed land was part of his howla, Muktaram Datta Das, but he brought his suit after the lapse of one year, and so the Subordinate Judge held it to be barred and dismissed it.
3. The Additional Judge was of opinion the suit was not barred and remanded the case for trial.
4. The defendant appeals, and on his behalf it has been urged that the Additional Judge's order is wrong. We are of opinion that the appeal should be decreed.
5. The plea which the plaintiff raises in this suit is exactly the same as he raised before the Revenue authorities and which was decided against him.
6. The Revenue authorities had jurisdiction to enquire into Ms plea under Section 116 of the Act: hence the plaintiff was bound by that order. Section 149 provides that no order of a Revenue officer passed under Part VIII of the Act (which is the part in which Section 116 occurs) shall be set aside, except as provided in Section 150. Section 150 expressly provides that any person aggrieved by an order under Section 116 may bring a suit to modify it or set it aside, and Article 14 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of one year for the bringing of such a suit. Now, the present suit was brought after the lapse of one year from the date of the order. It is, accordingly, in our opinion, barred. The learned pleader for the respondent urges that the respondent brings the suit in a different capacity from that in which he raised his plea under Section 116 before the Revenue authorities. This is not so. He did not really raise this plea under Section 116 before the Revenue authorities as the proprietor of taluk 2466. As such, it was his interest that as much land as possible should be measured as part of taluk No. 2466. He was only interested in having the disputed land excluded from measurement in his capacity as holder of the howla Muktaram Datta Das. Whatever he may now say, he raised his plea before the Revenue authorities and he has brought this suit in the same capacity and as the same individual. Hence the ruling in the case of Laloo Singh v. Puma Chancier Banerjee (1896) I. L. R. 24 Calc. 149., on which the Additional Judge relies is not in point. It is further clearly distinguishable from, the present case, for the plaintiff in Laloo Singh v. Purna Chander Banerjee (1896) I. L. R. 24 Calc. 149. appears to have been no party to the proceedings before the Revenue authorities and to have been in no way bound by the orders passed by them.
7. We accordingly decree the appeal with costs.