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Kally Prosonno Hazra Vs. Heera Lal Mundle - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1877)ILR2Cal468
AppellantKally Prosonno Hazra
RespondentHeera Lal Mundle
Excerpt:
limitation - act ix of 1871, sections 20, 21, schedule ii, articles 107, 169--execution proceedings. - .....this application by signing the petition, which was granted. the question we have to determine on special appeal is, whether a new period of limitation runs either from the date of this petition under the provisions of section 20 or from the date of the part-payment under the provisions of section 21, act ix of 1871. both these sections are applicable to 'debts and legacies' only, and i do not think that the sum due under a decree is a 'debt' within the meaning of these two sections. it seems to me that the proviso to section 21, which is general, would be unmeaning as applied to sums due under a decree; and the proviso to article 169, schedule ii would also have been wholly useless if part-payment of money due under a decree had been already provided for under section 21. both these.....
Judgment:

Markby, J.

1. In this case, whilst execution proceedings were going on, the judgment-debtor filed a petition in Court notifying payment of a part of the sum due under the decree, and asking for a stay of execution for four months. The judgment-creditor signified his assent to this application by signing the petition, which was granted. The question we have to determine on special appeal is, whether a new period of limitation runs either from the date of this petition under the provisions of Section 20 or from the date of the part-payment under the provisions of Section 21, Act IX of 1871. Both these sections are applicable to 'debts and legacies' only, and I do not think that the sum due under a decree is a 'debt' within the meaning of these two sections. It seems to me that the proviso to Section 21, which is general, would be unmeaning as applied to sums due under a decree; and the proviso to Article 169, Schedule II would also have been wholly useless if part-payment of money due under a decree had been already provided for under Section 21. Both these arguments, it is true, apply only to Section 21. But I cannot suppose that the word 'debt' is used in a different sense in two consecutive sections of the Act. I do not of course mean to say that the sum due under a decree may not sometimes be properly called a 'debt;' it is constantly spoken of as a judgment-debt; but taking the whole Act together, I think the 'debt' spoken of in Sections 20 and 21 is a liability to pay money for which a suit could be brought, and not for which judgment has been obtained. The Miscellaneous Special Appeal will he dismissed with costs.

Prinsep, J.

2. I am of the same opinion. I would only add that the fact that it has been thought necessary to make a special proviso in Article 169 Schedule ii of the Limitation Act, seems to show that the ordinary law was not sufficient in this respect as regards decrees or orders of a High Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction. There is no such special provision for other decrees or orders. We cannot apply Section 20 or 21.


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