1. We are of opinion that the decision of the lower Court dismissing the plaintiffs' suit as barred by limitation under Article 14, Schedule II of the Limitation Act is erroneous. It is true that the plaintiffs in the plaint prayed for the reversal of the orders passed under the Land Registration Act VII of 1876, but that prayer may be treated as mere surplusage. The Civil Court has no power to set aside an order passed under the Land Registration Act. The second Clause (a), Section 89, of the Land Registration Act provides that nothing contained in that Act shall be deemed to 'preclude any person from bringing a regular suit for possession of, or for a declaration of right to, any immoveable property to which he may deem himself entitled,' and that is the clause under which the plaintiffs in this case are entitled to maintain this suit for declaration of their right to the property in dispute, and if they can successfully establish that right in a Civil Court, then under the decree of the Civil Court they would be entitled to have their names registered. On the production of that decree and on a proper application being made by the plaintiffs, the revenue officers will rectify their register in accordance with the declaration made by the Civil Court. Therefore it is quite clear that Article 14 has no application, because it is not a suit to set aside any act or order of an officer of Government in his official capacity. It is simply a suit for declaration of the plaintiffs' title, in respect of the property in dispute. Whether the six years' limitation, or the twelve years' limitation applies, we need not discuss, because in either case the claim is within time. All that we decide in this appeal is simply this; that the plaintiffs' claim on the face of the plaint is not barred under the provisions of Article 14 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act.
2. We set aside the judgment of the lower Court and remand this case to that Court for trial on the merits. Costs, as usual, will abide the results.