1. This is an appeal by the defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 from a decision of the learned Additional District Judge of the 24. Pergannahs, dated the 15th March 1913, affirming a decision of the Munsif at Diamond Harbour. The only question raised in this appeal is the question of limitation and that is whether Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to this case or whether the ordinary rate of twelve years applies. The father of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was the landlord of the plaintiffs and the pro forma defendants. He obtained in the first instance, in the year 1899, an ex parte decree for rent. That was set aside and the case was tried on the merits and a new decree was passed. In execution of that decree the . property was put up to sale and purchased ' by the landlord and possession was delivered in the year 1904. Then the landlord settled some of the lands with the present tenants, the defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5. The plaintiffs brought their suit for possession of a 13-anna share of the property, alleging that the dispossession took place in 1909. The only question that has been argued in this appeal is whether the special rule of limitation applies to a case of this nature or whether, as some of the cases say, the dispossession, in order that the special rule of limitation comprised in Article 3 of Schedule III may apply, must be by the landlord as such. The decisions are not all one way. There are conflicting decisions on this point. The latest decision is one of my own which is in favour of the appellants and, in the view that the matter is one on which different Courts have come to different conclusions, I think my own decision in which Mr. Justice Teunon concurred is, with all due respect, as much likely to be right as the others. The words 'as such' do not appear in the Article and it is admitted that the special rule of limitation, which was passed apparently for the reason that disputes between landlord and tenant as to ouster should be settled and determined within the shorter period fixed by the legislature rather than the longer period of twelve years, is considerably cut into by the addition of words in the Article such as the words 'when the landlord dispossesses as such.' There are no such words in the Article and I do not see why the Article should be limited or the generality of the language used therein cut down because it may be a hard case on the tenant. These holdings are of small value as a rule and it is essential that disputes of this nature should be decided within the shorter period mentioned in the Article. I see no reason to dissent from the judgment that I delivered in Fani Bhusan Sarkar v. Pulin Chandra Mandal 5 Ind. Cas. 838. That being so, I do not agree in the view of the learned Additional District Judge. The learned Mansif came to this finding. That assuming that the special rule of limitation contained in Article 3 of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act applied, he was of opinion that the evidence did not show that the dispossession took place in 1312 as alleged by the defendants and, therefore, the plaintiffs' Suit, in any event, was brought within time. The learned Additional District Judge made no finding in this respect. The case must, therefore, go back to the lower Appellate Court for the purpose of making a finding as to whether the suit was brought within time, having regard to the fact that, in our opinion, the special rule of limitation does apply, and then to pass a decree according to law. Costs will abide the result.
2. I agree.