1. This was a suit for rent. The only question is, whether the claim was comprised in the deed of compromise, which was executed previously with reference to a former suit between the parties. The language of this deed is, in several places, somewhat general, and extends to claims of every description. In construing it, the view taken by the original Court is, that it deals with a particular claim, namely, the subject of the former suit, which was a certain account to be rendered as an agent, and certain sums of money to be recovered, for which the defendants, in the former suit, were responsible. I think the general expressions used in the deed of compromise must, according to the well-known rule of interpretation, be confined to matters of the same nature, and forming part of the transaction which the parties had in view. I, therefore, agree with the view taken with regard to the compromise by the original Court, and think that the appeal, so far as regards this part of the case, must be allowed.
2. The result is, that the decision of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside, and the case remanded for trial of the other points raised in the petition of appeal to this Court.
3. In this case the plaintiff sued two persons--namely, Bhoobun Chunder Roy and the heirs of Kamiruddin Mahomed, for rent of an ijara for 1283 to 1285. It appears that Kamiruddin Mahomed was in the employment of the plaintiff as gomashta; and, after his death, the plaintiff had brought a previous suit against the heirs of Kamiruddin in order to have an account of the moneys received and disbursed by Kamiruddin Mahomed during the period of his agency. That suit was terminated by a compromise dated the 16th of May 1879, and the question which we have to decide in this case is, whether that compromise was intended to embrace, not only the subjects which were then in dispute between the parties, but also the claim for rent which forms the subject of the present suit.
4. I concur with my learned colleague in thinking, that the proper construction to be put upon that compromise is, that it was not intended to embrace the claim which forms the subject of the present suit. It is a general rule of construction that general words in a release are to be limited to that thing or those things which was or were in the contemplation of the parties; see the judgment of Lord Westbury in the case of the Directors of the London and South-Western Railway Company v. Blackmore L.R. 4 H.L. 610. In that case the words of the release were quite as general as the words which are to be found in the solehnama in the present case. It was a release of 'all claims and demands therein mentioned and for or on any other account or claim whatsoever.'
5. I, therefore, concur in reversing the decision of the District Judge, and I also agree that the case must be remanded to him for a decision of the other questions raised in the petition of appeal to this Court.
6. The costs of this Court will abide the result.