Holmwood and Chapman, JJ.
1. In this second appeal two questions have been raised, first that the receipt (Ex. A) not being registered could not be admitted in evidence, being a document which purported to affect the terms of the mortgage; and, secondly, assuming that it could be looked at, the release really means that there is a release of four years for which payment has been made and not a waiver in future.
2. As regards the first point, we think the matter is concluded by the decision of the Fall Bench in Jiwan All Beg v. Basa Mal (886) I. L. R. 9 All., 108, which has now been, enacted into law by Clause (n) of Section 17 of the Registration Act. We therefore think that registration was not necessary and that the receipt operates as a full acquittance for the money already paid.
3. As regards the question of waiver, the words contained in the document are a clear waiver. They say 'be it known that I release you from the liability to pay compound interest as written in the said mortgage bond;' and we can find nothing in the law or in any authority which would require such waiver to be registered; although under the terms of Section 92 of the Evidence Act it undoubtedly must be in writing In the present case this question is rather an academical one, as the difference in the decree would be a matter of about 8 annas. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to disturb in any way the decree of the lower Appellate Court, and the appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.