Skip to content


Sabitri Sundari Peshakar Vs. Jalekha Bai W/O Chandu Mea and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtKolkata
Decided On
Reported inAIR1947Cal244
AppellantSabitri Sundari Peshakar
RespondentJalekha Bai W/O Chandu Mea and ors.
Excerpt:
- .....on llth of magh 1350 b.s. required the defendant to quit by 30th of magh '30 shey magh tarihcr sange sange'. this phrase was interpreted by the learned munsif as meaning that the defendant was reonired to vacate the basha on 30th magh 1350. holding that she was entitled to remain up to the end of that date the learned munsif held that the order was an invalid order and therefore the defendant could not be ejected. the learned subordinate judge construed the bengali phrase differently and in the body of his judgment he saysplaintiff 2 said in his deposition that the notice required the defendant to quit the entire basha on 30th magh but in considering the validity of the notice we have to interpret it by itself. the words '30 shey tariker sange sange' interpreted literally mean that.....
Judgment:

Ellis, J.

1. This appeal arises out of the judgment and decree of Moulvi A. Majid, Munsif, Second Court, Feni, dated 7-4-1945 which was modified by Mr. M. Ahmed, Additional Subordinate Judge of Noakhali on 21-11-1945 in respect of a suit instituted by the plaintiffs for ejectment of a chandina tenant. Before the learned Munsif the plaintiffs were successful in part and the suit was decreed on contest; the plaintiffs were to recover a sum of Rs. 256-8-0 on account of rent for 3 years from Falgoon 1347 to Magh 1350 B.S. but the plaintiffs' prayer for the ejectment of the defendant was disallowed. The plaintiffs then carried the matter on appeal and were successful before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who modified the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif and directed that the defendant be ejected from the basha in question. The defendant has now moved this Court on second appeal.

2. The main point on which the parties joined issue in the Courts below concerned the validity of the notice served on the defendant to quit the premises. The learned Munsif held that the notice was not a valid notice. The lease was a lease from month to month and was terminable by 15 days expiring with the month of the tenancy. The notice which was served on llth of Magh 1350 B.S. required the defendant to quit by 30th of Magh '30 shey Magh tarihcr sange sange'. This phrase was interpreted by the learned Munsif as meaning that the defendant was reonired to vacate the basha on 30th Magh 1350. Holding that she was entitled to remain up to the end of that date the learned Munsif held that the order was an invalid order and therefore the defendant could not be ejected. The learned Subordinate Judge construed the Bengali phrase differently and in the body of his judgment he says

Plaintiff 2 said in his deposition that the notice required the defendant to quit the entire basha on 30th Magh but in considering the validity of the notice we have to interpret it by itself. The words '30 shey tariker sange sange' interpreted literally mean that the tenant is called upon to vacate the basha as 30th day of Magh comes to an end i.e., the tenant is to vacate the basha as the day comes to an end.

Mr. Azizul Islam who appeared for the appellant made a gallant attempt to interpret the words 'sange sange' as meaning with the dawning of 30th day of Magh, an interpretation with which I do not agree. It seems to me that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was quite right when he said that the tenant was called upon to vacate as the day came to an end. As the day expired, so the tenancy expired and in this view of the matter the notice was perfectly valid.

3. Mr. Azizul Islam then produced an amendment of the Bengal House Rent Control Order which was published in an Extraordinary Gazette on 20-5-1946 and claimed that the case was one which fell within the supplementary provisions of Clause 10-AA. That paragraph reads:

No suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in possession of a house for eviction of such tenant therefrom in which non-compliance with the provisions of this Order as to the payment or deposit of rent due by such tenant in respect of such house to the full extent allowable by this Order within the time specified in that behalf in this Order has been taken as a ground for such eviction shall be entertained by any Court.

Now it is clear to my mind that this clause cannot have any application at all to the present case. The present case is not a suit or proceeding by a landlord for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of his non-compliance with the provisions of the Order with regard to the payment or deposit of rent. Therefore this part of the paragraph cannot possibly apply. The paragraph then goes on to say

or where any such suit or proceeding by a landlord is pending in any Court on 20-5-1946, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of the house in respect of which such suit or proceeding is pending shall be made by such Court on such ground unless the landlord has been permitted by the Controller by an order in writing under sub-para. (2) to institute such suit....

Clearly again, the case does not fall within this second part of para. 10-AA for it is not any such suit the word 'such' being referable to Clause 1 of para. 10-AA. It is clear then to my thinking that the appellant cannot claim any benefit from Clause 10-AA in this second appeal. It is quite possible that he may have a remedy by way of an application to the trial Court or in execution proceedings but I do not think he has any remedy on the basis of this paragraph in this second appeal. It is accordingly ordered that this appeal be dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge be affirmed.


Save Judgments// Add Notes // Store Search Result sets // Organizer Client Files //