W. Comer Petheram, C.J.
1. This is a rule which has been obtained for the purpose of revising a conviction of three men for an offence Under Sections 503 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, that is to say, for the offence of having threatened the complainant within the meaning of those sections. The charge is a charge of having threatened him on the 28th Aughran 1294 and in support of that charge two witnesses are called who speak to what took place on that occasion.
2. The facts of the case up to that point are these: that the complainant had purchased a ryoti tenure within the limits of the accused's zemindari, and the accused disliked his being there, and apparently, from what the witnesses say, they intimated their dislike of that to them. Two witnesses say that on that day they were at the house of the accused, when a peada of theirs came and told them that the complainant, notwithstanding what they had done, was still in the place and was still taking away the paddy on the land, upon which the accused said that they would beat him and set fire to his house. Assuming that to be true, the question is, whether that is a threat within the meaning of the section.
3. The section which defines the offence is Section 503, and it is in there words: 'Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.'
4. It is clear that the gist of the offence, as defined in that section, is the effect which the threat is intended to have upon the mind of the person threatened, and it is equally clear that before it can have any effect upon his mind it must be either made to him by the person threatening or communicated to him in some way. In this particular case there is no suggestion that the threat was made to the person threatened. All that happened was, that in the presence of some persons the accused used the words I have quoted in their house. In one sense those words amount to a very bad threat, but there is no evidence on the face of them, and there is no other evidence, that they intended that the words should be communicated to the complainant for the purpose of influencing his mind. It seems to us that the evidence in the case falls far short of establishing the offence defined by this section, which is, in our opinion, a threat communicated or uttered with the intention of its being communicated to the person threatened for the purpose of influencing that man's mind. In this case there is nothing whatever to show that it was the intention of the accused that the threat should be communicated to the complainant. The complainant himself was called, and he does not say that he ever heard this particular threat. Though he speaks of a threat uttered on some other occasion, he does not say that the threat which is the subject of this charge was ever communicated to him or that he ever heard it. Under these circumstances we think that there is no evidence of an offence having been committed under this section and that this rule must be made absolute.